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Abstract 
From April-July 1994, over 800,000 people were killed in a genocide in Rwanda. Since 
2004, over 450,000 people have been killed in a genocide in Darfur, Sudan. In both 
instances, physical and sexual dehumanization were used against the targeted groups. 
While dehumanization in genocide has been studied, most literature on dehumanization 
looks at it from a psychological viewpoint, and does not include the socio-economic 
factors that can lead to a population being dehumanized and targeted for genocide. In 
addition, research on the different types of dehumanization, especially sexual 
dehumanization, is needed in order to fully understand the role that dehumanization plays 
in encouraging and facilitating genocide. The purpose of this dissertation was to compare 
how dehumanization was/is used in the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Thus, in this 
study, I analyzed the literature on Rwanda and Darfur and explain how dehumanization 
was spread from the top down by both governments, the role structural violence played in 
the genocides, and the types of dehumanization, both physical and sexual, used in each 
genocide. This dissertation is a qualitative study that used case study methodology in 
order to review the existing literature on Rwanda and Darfur, as well as the literature on 
dehumanization. I argued that rape in Rwanda and Sudan was an act of genocide, done to 
inflict severe physical and mental harm upon the groups, as well as a measure intended to 
prevent births within the targeted group. I concluded with some policy recommendations, 
including mental health care for the survivors, steps to recognize and stop the spread of 
dehumanization of a targeted group, and the need to rehumanize not only the victims, but 
also the perpetrators, in order to build a lasting peace.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter Introduction 
During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
were murdered in 100 days. Those who took part in the killings included doctors, 
teachers, farmers, and members of the clergy. According to Gourevitch (1998), neighbors 
killed neighbors in their homes, doctors killed patients, and teachers killed students (p. 
115). The killings were highly organized: members of the Interahamwe prepared small 
groups in neighborhoods, as well as drawing up lists of Tutsis to be executed and 
organizing retreats where members practiced burning houses and hacking up dummies 
with machetes, while local leaders referred to Tutsis as devils, and ordered people to kill 
them (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 94-95). Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in their 
homes, as well as gathering places such as churches, schools, and hospitals.  
The genocide was the culmination of events that had taken place since 
independence. During the colonial era, the Belgians favored the Tutsi over the Hutu, even 
though the Tutsi make up a minority of the population. The Belgians denied education 
and job opportunities to the Hutu, and issued identity cards based on the father’s 
ethnicity. After independence, periodic massacres of Tutsis occurred until Juvenal 
Habyarimana came to power in the 1970s. Although the Tutsis were still denied political 
power, they were grateful that the killings had stopped, and did not protest their ill 
treatment. However, the uneasy peace that existed in Rwanda was shattered when the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of Tutsis who grew up in exile in Uganda, 
invaded Rwanda in 1990. The RPF demanded an open political system, and power 
sharing between Hutus and Tutsis. A peace agreement known as the Arusha Accords was 
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signed in 1993, but it was unpopular with the Hutu extremists in the government. Just as 
the Arusha Accords were about to be implemented, President Habyarimana was 
assassinated when his plane was shot down as he flew into Kigali on April 6, 1994. 
Although it is still not known who shot the plane down, the Hutu extremists immediately 
blamed the RPF, and the massacre of Tutsis began that very night. Around 800,000 
people were killed between April-July 1994, and the genocide only ended when the RPF 
overthrew the extremist government in Kigali.  
Since 2004, there has been a genocide in Darfur, the western region of Sudan. An 
estimated 450,000 people have been killed, with millions displaced within Sudan and in 
neighboring Chad. Those being targeted are the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, the three 
largest “African” ethnic groups in Darfur. The genocide is a result of a civil war started in 
2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) attacked the airport in Al-Fasher, the capital of Darfur. The 
rebels demanded equal access to resources, government spending on infrastructure, and 
equal treatment by the government. 
The government responded by arming “Arab” militias, known as the Janjaweed, 
to carry out the genocide. The Janjaweed attack villages, usually at dawn, killing the men 
and boys, raping girls and women, burning down the homes, destroying food sources, and 
stealing livestock (Flint & de Waal, 2005). Although the government of Sudan denies 
arming and supporting the Janjaweed, there is strong evidence to show that the 
government is not only arming and supplying the militias, it is also taking part in the 
killings (Steidle, 2007).  A peace agreement was signed in 2005, but it was broken almost 
immediately, and the civil war and genocide are still occurring.  
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In both Rwanda and Darfur, dehumanization played a large part in facilitating the 
genocides. In Rwanda, the media, including Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM), disseminated anti-Tutsi propaganda, such as calling Tutsis “cockroach” and 
reminding listeners not to take pity on women and children and to kill every Tutsi in 
Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).  The media also routinized the work, comparing it to 
everyday, ordinary tasks such as weeding (Gourevitch, 1998). In Darfur, the government 
sees the “Arab” groups as racially superior to the “African” groups, whom they call dogs, 
monkeys, and slaves. In both cases, physical and sexual dehumanization have occurred. 
Physical dehumanization is done via depicting the victims as animals or non-humans, 
while sexual dehumanization has manifested in the mass rape of women and girls.  
As mentioned above, mass rape has occurred in both genocides. Hundreds of 
thousands of women and girls were raped in Rwanda and Darfur, albeit for different 
reasons. In Rwanda, rape was an act of humiliation, of putting Tutsi women “in their 
place,” as it was rumored that Tutsi women saw themselves as superior to Hutu men. 
Thus, the primary goal of rape was to inflict physical and mental harm on members of the 
group. In Darfur, while rape did cause physical and mental harm, rape was a measure 
intended to prevent births within the group. In Rwanda, women were often gang raped or 
repeatedly raped, which caused significant, and sometimes permanent, damage to their 
reproductive organs. Pregnancy was not an intended consequence of the rapes, but rather 
a byproduct. In Darfur, pregnancy with a so-called “Arab” baby is what the Janjaweed 
wants to have happen.  
It is important to note that genocide does not occur in a vacuum; individuals do 
not decide to try to eliminate an entire group of people overnight. Dehumanizing a whole 
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group of people takes time and effort. In Rwanda, RTLM introduced dehumanizing 
language, such as calling Tutsis “cockroaches” slowly, so as not to shock or disgust their 
listeners. Jokes and comments were used to condition people to hearing derogatory terms 
and phrases. The use of the word “cockroach” to mean Tutsi seeped slowly into the 
public’s consciousness, and by the time the genocide started, a majority of the population 
no longer saw the Tutsis as human and were prepared to eliminate them, or at the very 
least, not protest against those who took part in the killings. 
In Darfur, dehumanization began after independence and was continued by 
successive governments. Racism against the black population of Sudan is systemic, and 
non-Arabs are treated with contempt. The government used the so-called “African” 
groups in Darfur as soldiers against the people in the south, as most Darfuris are Muslim, 
and they were persuaded to kill the non-believers, a.k.a. Christians and Animists, in the 
south. When the government no longer saw the African groups as useful, they openly 
supported the so-called “Arab” groups in the conflict over shrinking arable land and 
grazing sources. When armed groups attacked government planes at the airport in Al-
Fasher, Darfur’s capital, the government responded by arming Arab groups to remove the 
African groups from the land permanently. The contempt for the African groups was so 
intense that the government did not even consider listening to their complaints and 
negotiating with them, but instead, decided to get rid of them once and for all. Darfuris 
are often derided as “dogs”, “monkeys”, and “slaves.” This systemic racism and hatred 
made it easier for the Arab groups to agree to participate in the genocide. 
Along with dehumanization, structural violence was a key component of the 
genocides. In both cases, only a small part of the population was, and is, benefitting from 
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the resources of the country. In Rwanda, land and money were controlled by the Akazu, 
meaning “little house”, a group of Hutu extremists that supported the Habyarimana 
regime. Most of the population worked in agriculture, but overpopulation meant smaller 
plots of land for subsequent generations, and the fluctuating world markets for crops kept 
people in poverty. Most of the aid being sent to Rwanda only helped the small group of 
elites. In Sudan, the oil revenues are spent in Khartoum, which is the base of support for 
Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF). Very little of the money reached 
the south or Darfur. New hotels are being built in Khartoum, but Darfur lacks proper 
roads, schools, and hospitals.  
With very little of the money and resources trickling down to the populations of 
Rwanda and Darfur, frustration increased among the people, leading to anger about their 
situation. The respective governments knew that they would have to redirect that anger 
away from them, so they chose to scapegoat the Tutsis and the “African” groups. 
Although most of the Tutsis were just as poor as the Hutu, the government convinced the 
population that the Tutsi were to blame for their problems, that they were controlling 
resources and land that should go to the Hutu instead. Part of this belief was tied to the 
fact that the Belgians had promoted the Tutsi over the Hutu by putting them into power 
during colonialism, but by the time of the genocide, the Tutsi had lost almost all power 
and prestige. However, the successful invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) forced the government to negotiate a peace agreement whereby they would 
have shared power, something the Akazu violently opposed. Thus, by blaming the Tutsi 
for Rwanda’s problems, the government was able to convince the population that by 
killing the Tutsi, their problems would be solved.  
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In Darfur, the African groups own most of the land, as they are farmers, while the 
Arabs are mostly nomadic. There had been sharing of resources, as the farmers would 
allow the nomads to water and graze their animals on their land. However, when 
desertification increased, and the amount of arable land shrank, the farmers began 
blocking access to their land. Instead of trying to negotiate a settlement, the government 
publicly backed the Arab groups, and argued that the land should belong to them. 
Darfuris report being told by the Janjaweed that “…Sudan is for the Arabs. It is not for 
black dogs and slaves” (Bashir, 2008, p. 218). The government is providing money and 
arms for the Janjaweed, so they can drive the African population out of Darfur and take 
over the land. Although desertification is causing problems for both the farmers and the 
nomads, the nomads see the farmers as being selfish for cutting off access to the land, a 
belief encouraged by the government, who sees the Arabs as superior and thus the 
rightful owners of the land.  
Statement of the Problem 
While dehumanization in genocide has been studied, most literature on 
dehumanization looks at it from a psychological viewpoint, and does not include the 
socio-economic factors that can lead to a population being dehumanized and targeted for 
genocide. In addition, research on the different types of dehumanization, especially 
sexual dehumanization, is needed in order to fully understand the role that 
dehumanization plays in encouraging and facilitating genocide  
The purpose of this dissertation is to compare how dehumanization was/is used in 
the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Although dehumanization has been studied, how it 
is spread is still being discussed and debated, and very few studies discuss more than one 
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type of dehumanization found in genocide. Thus, in this study, I will analyze the 
literature on Rwanda and Darfur and explain how dehumanization was/is spread from the 
top down by both governments; the various types of dehumanization, including physical 
and sexual); and how both victims and perpetrators need to be re-humanized after the 
genocide in order to stop the cycle of violence.  The main goal of this study is to look at 
dehumanization in genocide in great detail, in order to understand how it is spread and 
what types of dehumanization are found during genocide. This dissertation is a 
qualitative study using case study methodology in order to review the existing literature 
on Rwanda and Darfur, as well as the literature on dehumanization. 
Research Questions 
The research questions are the following: how was/is dehumanization spread in 
these countries? What was/is the impact of physical and sexual dehumanization on each 
genocide? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-humanize both the victims 
and killers? Is it possible to facilitate reconciliation between the two groups in order to 
prevent a new or continuing cycle of violence? 
Research Method 
 The research method that will be used for this study is case study. For my 
dissertation, I used multiple case design. The reason for this is that I wanted to compare 
and contrast two cases of genocide where both physical and sexual dehumanization were 
present, to understand how dehumanization is used to facilitate genocide. I chose Rwanda 
and Darfur as my cases because while there are many similarities between the two 
genocides, the spread of dehumanization varied, and sexual dehumanization carried out 
via mass rape had a different intentionality in each case.  
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 I collected data on both genocides, including books, articles, and websites, to 
help explain the dehumanization process in both countries, as well as how physical and 
sexual dehumanization manifested in both conflicts. I spent a year gathering, analyzing, 
and interpreting my data. I tried to limit my data to reliable sources, such as respected 
NGOs, journals, and scholars. I collected data from a variety of areas, including: histories 
of each genocide; dehumanization in general; dehumanization in genocide; rape in 
general; rape as an act of genocide; and reconciliation and re-humanization efforts after 
genocide ends. 
Delimitations of Study 
 The biggest limitation of this study is that it relies on literature to provide the 
framework of analysis for the cases. While I tried to ensure that the sources I used come 
from respected sources, the problem remains that I could not independently verify the 
claims made in the sources. This would have required fieldwork, which was not possible. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the literature used clearly demonstrates how dehumanization, 
especially physical and sexual dehumanization, played a significant role in both Rwanda 
and Darfur.  
 Another limitation is my own bias. I have been studying genocide for 12 years 
now, and I had some ideas in mind for what the literature would tell me about 
dehumanization. However, as a researcher, I had to be careful not to let me pre-existing 
knowledge influence the direction this study took, or how I interpreted the literature. In 
order to do this, I read each source at least 2 times, to verify that my analysis of the 
source was correct. I also kept an open mind as I read, and did not automatically 
disqualify any literature from an author I disagreed with. For example, some scholars 
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argue that what is happening in Darfur is not genocide; while I firmly believe that it is 
genocide, I nonetheless included their research because it provided valuable insight into 
what has been happening in Darfur.  
Definitions of Terms 
 There are four terms used throughout this dissertation that are important to 
explain, and are defined below: 
Genocide. I used the formal, international definition decided upon in the United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), 
which is the following: “The attempt to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial, or religious group (Article II).  
Dehumanization. The Oxford Dictionary defines dehumanization as “The 
Process of depriving a person or group of positive human qualities” 
(oxforddictionaries.com).  
Physical Dehumanization. I define this as the practice of reducing human beings 
to non-human entities, such as animals or plants.  
Sexual Dehumanization. I define this as the reduction of a group of people, 
usually women, to an object for personal gratification or reproductive humiliation.  
Commonly Used Acronyms 
 There are many groups and organizations referenced in this dissertation, so a list 
of the commonly used acronyms is important.  
UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front 
RTLM: Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
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SLA: Sudanese Liberation Army 
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement 
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders 
NIF: National Islamic Front 
ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
AU: African Union 
IDP: Internally Displaced Person(s) 
 Outline of Dissertation 
 This dissertation is divided into six chapters plus appendices. The first chapter 
provided a brief background on Rwanda and Darfur and the circumstances that led to the 
genocides, the research methodology, the problem statement and the research questions. 
Chapter 2 discusses in detail the existing literature on the topic, as well as the gaps in the 
current research. It will also provide the theoretical framework for the dissertation by 
discussing theories that provide insight into how dehumanization occurs. Chapter 3 
explains the research method, including detailed information on how to conduct a case 
study, how the data will be collected and analyzed, and the ethical concerns arising from 
the study. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the first case study, the Rwandan genocide. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings from the second case study, the Darfur genocide. Chapter 
6 discusses the findings of the study, the limitations of the study, recommendations for 
future research, and policy implications.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
 Much has been written about the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. Books, articles, 
and dissertations explore various aspects of the genocides, including the history of 
Rwanda and Darfur, accounting for participation in genocide, the role dehumanization 
has played, and the search for justice in post-genocide Rwanda. In this chapter, I will 
explore the current works on these various topics, and underline the gaps in the literature. 
In addition, I will explain the theoretical lens through which dehumanization in Rwanda 
and Darfur is analyzed.  
History of the Rwandan Genocide 
One of the key books on the history of the genocide is by Philip Gourevitch 
(1998). Gourevitch was one of the first journalists to write about the genocide in Rwanda, 
and he conducted his research from 1995 to 1998. Gourevitch (1998) interviewed 
genocide survivors and perpetrators, government officials, and aid workers to explore the 
history of Rwanda and the causes of the genocide. Gourevitch (1998) was critical of the 
international response to the genocide, particularly the US response, and points out the 
absurdity of the international response after the genocide when he argues that the 
genocide had been tolerated by the international community, but dogs who ate corpses 
were shot by UN soldiers (pp. 148-149). Gourevitch’s (1998) book covers pre-genocide 
Rwandan history, the genocide, and post-genocide events, including the issues of 
refugees returning to Rwanda and the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
Gourevitch (1998) wrote a clear, concise book that is intended for a general 
audience and written in a way that makes the book easy to read. Gourevitch (1998) has 
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been criticized for certain aspects of the book, such as appearing to support the RPF and 
its government, but it should be kept in mind that he wrote the book right after the 
genocide, when the international community in general was uncritical and supportive of 
the new government. Overall, Gourevitch (1998) is a good introductory text for anyone 
unfamiliar with the genocide. 
Another useful source on Rwandan history is Linda Melvern’s (2004) book 
Conspiracy to Murder. In the book, Melvern (2004) traces the campaign to exterminate 
the Tutsi, and argues that plans began in 1990, right after the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda (p. 20).  Melvern (2004) describes the peace 
agreement brokered between the government and the RPF, and the UN intervention force 
that was sent to monitor the peace agreement. She asserts that the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a failure due to the limited mandate of 
monitoring a peace agreement, non-intervention rules, and lack of interest in expanding 
and changing the UN mission by the Security Council (Melvern, 2004, pp. 65-84).  
Melvern (2004) explains Rwandan history during the genocide in great detail, 
from the government officials who were in charge during the genocide to the failed UN 
mission to the use of the Interahamwe and other groups to carry out the genocide. 
Melvern is very critical of the international community for its failure to respond 
adequately to the genocide, especially the refusal of the U.S. to call what was happening 
genocide and for demanding the withdrawal of the UN troops (p. 234). Melvern provides 
figures for the genocide, including that 93.7% of those killed were killed because they 
were identified as Tutsi; 53.7% of the victims were between the ages of 0 and 24; and 
that while most victims were killed with machetes, other methods of killing included 
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using screwdrivers, clubs with nails and hammers, forcing victims to commit suicide, 
drowning victims in rivers or lakes, burning victims alive, and throwing babies and 
infants against walls (p. 253). Melvern’s (2004) meticulously researched and documented 
book provides a clear understanding of Rwanda right before and during the genocide, as 
well as how the genocide was carried out and the lack of international response to the 
genocide.  
History of Darfur  
Many books have been written about the Sudan, but only a few focus specifically 
on Darfur or have chapters on the current events in Darfur. One useful book that helps 
explain Darfur in the context of Sudanese history overall is Richard Cockett’s (2010) 
Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State. Cockett explored how Darfur was 
neglected even before Sudan became independent, and how the government in Khartoum 
chose to ignore the needs of Darfur because it was seen as a periphery area, and therefore 
unimportant to the successive governments. Cockett talked to government officials who 
downplayed the crisis, UN staff in Darfur, refugees, and former Janjaweed militias. One 
of the most interesting comments in the book is when Cockett (2010) recounts the UN 
Chief in Sudan being told by a government official that the government wanted “…a final 
solution in Darfur” (p. 170). Cockett also analyzed the international response to the crisis, 
and the events in Darfur up to 2010. 
Another good book that provides a historical context for the civil war and 
genocide in Darfur is Julie Flint and Alex de Waal’s (2005) Darfur: A Short History of a 
Long War. In this book, Flint and de Waal discuss the various parties in Darfur on a 
chapter by chapter basis. They start with the people of Darfur-the ethnic groups-then 
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move on to the government, the Janjaweed, and the rebel groups in Darfur, ending with a 
detailed account of the war in Darfur. Flint and de Waal’s book is an excellent guide for 
people just learning about the genocide in Darfur.  
Like Flint and de Waal (2005), Gérard Prunier’s (2008) Darfur: A 21st Century 
Genocide analyzes the history of Darfur to help explain why the war and genocide are 
occurring in Darfur. Prunier describes the differences between the so-called “Arab” and 
“African” groups in Darfur, and the systemic racism and discrimination against the 
“African” groups. Prunier examines the lack of democracy in Darfur, the government’s 
refusal to alleviate the famine of the 1980s, the use of Darfur as a back-door entry for 
Libya to invade Chad, and finally, the genocide in Darfur and the international response. 
Prunier’s book is meticulously detailed and lays out the problems of Darfur in a clear, 
concise way. 
A different perspective on the genocide is found in Brian Steidle’s (2007) 
autobiographical book The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide 
in Darfur. Steidle was a U.S. Marine Corps Captain who signed on to serve as part of the 
African Union Mission in Darfur. Steidle documented many atrocities in Darfur, which 
he describes in great and painful detail. After Steidle’s contract ended, he returned to the 
U.S. to educate politicians and the public about what he saw in Darfur. Steidle’s book 
will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.  
In addition to the aforementioned books, there are a number of articles written on 
identity in Sudan, although I will only mention two here. The first one is by Alex de 
Waal (2005), who describes the creation of the Darfur state, the major ethnic groups, and 
how identity has been constructed by the government within Darfur. de Waal (2005) 
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points out that identity has been simplified in Darfur by the government, in order to pit 
the Arabs against the “Africans” (p. 197).  
The other article that analyzes identity in Sudan is by Heather Sharkey (2008), 
who outlines the Arabization of Sudan in the post-colonial era, which led to 
discrimination and wars in the South as well as Darfur. Sharkey (2008) sees the 
institutionalized racism and discrimination as a top-down process, one that has ties to the 
historical slave trade in Sudan (p. 29). Sharkey does an excellent job of explaining the 
historical roots of discrimination that fostered the anger and resentment of the “African” 
groups in Darfur, which in turn led to the civil war and genocide. Sharkey’s (2008) article 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter five.  
Rape in Genocide 
It is important to discuss literature on the topic of rape in genocide generally, 
before outlining specific materials on rape in Rwanda and Darfur. An edited volume by 
Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (2012) analyzes rape in the Holocaust, Rwanda, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Guatemala, as well as rape in international law, rape 
as a weapon of war, and rape in film. A beneficial chapter in the book is by James Waller 
(2012), who looks at rape as a way of “othering” the targeted group during genocide. 
Waller points out that Tutsi women were dehumanized during the genocide; an example 
of this is a survivor recounting that Interahamwe members threw a bottle of milk at her 
and said Tutsis were like cats because they like milk (p. 83). Waller argues that putting 
the Tutsis into a separate, non-human category facilitated the mass rape of women, and 
uses the example of Interahamwe referring to rape as “…getting a taste of Tutsi women” 
(p. 91).  Waller’s chapter will be discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
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Unlike Waller, Sherrie Russell-Brown (2003) examines rape in genocide through 
a gender lens, as well as a legal one. Russell-Brown recounts specific examples of rape in 
Rwanda as acts of genocide, and asserts that the aim of genocidal rape in Rwanda was to 
kill Tutsi women via the transmission of AIDS, raping women with sharp objects, or 
raping women multiple times (p. 356). Russell-Brown points out that genocidal rape is 
not just about women’s identity, but also their identity in a particular group and how rape 
can impact this (p. 365). Russell-Brown concludes with a discussion of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) acknowledgment that rape is an act of genocide, 
and that Tutsi women were targeted on the basis of both their ethnicity and their gender. 
Similar to Russell-Brown (2003), Jennifer Green (2004) investigates genocidal 
rape, although she refers to it as collective rape. According to Green, collective rape is 
“…a pattern of sexual violence perpetrated on civilians by agents of a state, political 
group, and/or politicized ethnic group” (p. 101). Green looks at the acts of violence, the 
magnitude of the violence, the perpetrators, the victims, and the victims’ silence. Green 
sums up her article by stating that collective rape is usually an indiscriminate crime 
perpetrated on a distinct group, for a variety of reasons that include reducing women to 
their reproductive capabilities, thus making it okay to attack them (pp. 109-112).  
Finally, Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham (2008) studies genocidal rape through 
the lens of its impact on the targeted community. Reid-Cunningham asserts that rape 
carries a message to the men of the community that they cannot protect their women, 
which causes harm to the community (p. 282). Reid-Cunningham discusses the various 
consequences of rape, including bodily injuries, forced impregnation, psychological 
problems, PTSD, and the reactions of the community to rape. Reid-Cunningham provides 
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a comprehensive explanation of the way genocidal rape impacts not only the survivors, 
but also their communities, and how mass rape can destroy a community.  
Rape and Sexual Violence in Rwanda and Darfur 
In both Rwanda and Darfur, rape and sexual violence against women was/is 
rampant during the genocides. All the literature mentioned here will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapters four and five.  One of the best resources on sexual violence in 
Rwanda is a Human Rights Watch (1996) report done only two years after the genocide. 
Human Rights Watch meticulously documented, via interviews with survivors, the anti-
Tutsi women propaganda before the genocide, the acts of violence carried out against the 
women during the genocide, and the health problems the survivors face, both physically 
and mentally. The Human Rights Watch report is difficult to read, as it contains graphic 
descriptions of acts of sexual violence against Tutsi women, but it is critical reading for 
understanding this violence. 
Another good source on sexual violence in Rwanda is an article by Christopher 
Mullins (2009), who discusses genocidal rape in general and specifically within Rwanda. 
Mullins reviews the different types of genocidal rape, such as sexual enslavement, sexual 
mutilation, and mass rapes of women. Mullins rightly points out that genocidal rape is 
done to generate fear within the targeted population and humiliate both men and women 
within the targeted group (pp. 721-722). Mullins’s article provides a significant context 
for understanding the impact of rape during genocide. 
Like Human Rights Watch (1996), Nicole Fox (2011) interviewed survivors of 
the Rwandan genocide-both men and women-about their experiences with gender-based 
violence during the genocide. Fox describes the social status of women before the 
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genocide, how rape was used in Rwanda, and the problems survivors have with 
discussing their experiences of rape and sexual violence. Fox provides an important 
insight into the survivors’ ability to process what happened and their attempts to 
reconcile what happened to them with their inability to speak about it to their families 
and friends. 
Like Rwanda, rape and sexual violence have occurred frequently in Darfur. 
Several human rights organizations have written reports on the violence, one of the most 
important being the Médicins Sans Frontiéres (MSF; a.k.a Doctors Without Borders) 
(2005) report on rape in Darfur. MSF doctors and staff documented the treatment of rape 
victims, with over 500 survivors being treated between October 2004 and February 2005 
(p. 2). The MSF report outlines the brutal nature of the rapes and sexual violence carried 
out against women in Darfur, which led to the government of Sudan responding to the 
publication of the report by arresting the head of MSF Holland (Moszynski, 2005). The 
MSF report was one of the first to document the extensive use of rape and sexual 
violence in Darfur. 
Another helpful report on rape in Darfur was written by Amnesty International 
(2004). This report contains interviews with rape survivors in Chad and illustrates the 
brutal nature of the attacks, pregnancy that resulted from rape, the stigmatization of the 
survivors by their communities and families, and the health issues the survivors face. The 
Amnesty International report is well organized and detailed, and provides important 
information on the impact of rape on the survivors, their families, and the communities. 
Like MSF and Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (2005) interviewed 
survivors in Chad and Darfur on the mass rape and sexual violence occurring there. 
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Human Rights Watch describes the attacks on women, the verbal abuse during the rapes, 
and the social and psychological ramifications of being raped and impregnated. Human 
Rights Watch ends their report with recommendations for the international community, 
which include ensuring confidentiality for reporting rape, taking measures to prevent 
sexual violence, and protecting women and girls in the refugee camps. 
The last source that I will discuss in this section is an article by Justin Wagner 
(2005-2006) on rape as a tool of genocide and the legal procedures for prosecuting 
individuals for acts of rape. Wagner points out that the government, both on the local and 
national levels, has done little or nothing to investigate acts of sexual violence in Sudan. 
Wagner describes acts of sexual violence carried out against women, and argues that 
individuals who carried out or authorized acts of sexual violence should be prosecuted for 
genocide, as rape in Darfur is legally an act of genocide. Wagner’s article provides useful 
information on the legal ramifications for rape and sexual violence during genocide.  
Explanations for Participation in the Genocide 
Many books and articles have explored the question of why individuals 
participate in genocide. Ravi Bhavnani’s (2006) article examines the various explanations 
for why individuals participated in the Rwandan genocide. Bhavnani (2006) starts by 
critiquing conventional explanations for participation, such as Rwandan culture being one 
of unquestioned obedience to authority figures, structural violence, deviant individuals 
being predisposed to violence, and the institutional structures facilitating mass 
participation (pp. 653-654).  
Bhavnani (2006) dismisses the common explanations, and argues that the factor 
that motivated participation was punishment, or the threat of punishment (p. 656). Hutu 
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who sheltered Tutsi were punished in various ways, including fines, beatings, rapes, and 
being killed by their fellow Hutu (Bhavnani, 2006, p. 656). Bhavnani (2006) argues that 
the use of punishment created a set of norms whereby Hutus knew that certain behaviors 
were expected of them, and those who were reluctant to participate in the killings were 
punished so severely that most Hutu chose to cooperate with the orders given to them (p. 
666). Bhavnani (2006) also asserts that the norms created in Rwanda were ethnic norms, 
which resemble intragroup mechanisms such as in-group policing of members (p. 657).  
Bhavnani (2006) created a model to explain ethnic norms, which includes a finite 
population of agents from the same ethnic group with a level of animosity toward another 
ethnic group and tolerance for fellow group members who do not share the same 
animosity (p. 658). Bhavnani (2006) claims that violence-promoting norms (such as the 
call to exterminate the Tutsi in Rwanda) can be found in these ethnic groups, but it is not 
limited to groups dominated by extremists; in fact, they can emerge in groups dominated 
by moderates (p. 663). Bhavnani (2006) contends that strong punishments are a 
requirement for the emergence of norms promoting interethnic violence (pp. 663-664). In 
sum, Bhavnani (2006) believes that the usual explanations for participation in the 
Rwandan genocide are not accurate; instead, a set of ethnic norms that promoted 
interethnic violence in groups and used punishment to enforce the norms are what led to 
mass participation. Bhavnani’s (2006) article is useful for understanding the punishment 
factor in participation, and presents an alternative view for looking at why many 
individuals took part in the genocide.  
Lee Ann Fujii’s (2004) article examines the transformation of norms in Rwanda 
so that actions that were barred, such as murder, could be viewed as not only appropriate, 
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but also necessary (pp. 99-100). Fujii (2004) outlines the steps needed to transform the 
norms. The first step was to disseminate the genocidal message throughout the country 
and monopolize the public space so no other message could get through; the second step 
was to give concreteness to the message, which was done via practice massacres; and the 
final step was to intensify the immediacy of the message to a level that would persuade 
any doubters to become true believers (pp. 100-101). According to Fujii (2004), this 
message was that Tutsi were fundamentally different from Hutu, Hutu and Tutsi should 
not mix, and all Tutsi were evil (p. 102). This message was spread primarily using radio: 
nearly 60% of residents in urban areas owned radios, and around 30% in rural areas did 
(Fujii, 2006, p. 104). Using a mixture of music, banter, and editorials, stations like RTLM 
reinforced the genocidal message on a constant basis, and many compared RTLM’s style 
to having discussions over beer with friends (Fujii, 2006, p. 104).  
Fujii (2004) claims that RTLM’s influence over Rwandans grew during the 
genocide, as travel and communication became difficult and people relied on their radios 
to get news and information; this reliance allowed RTLM to interpret news for the 
population and reinforce the genocidal message (p. 105). Before the genocide occurred, 
practice massacres were carried out in a few communes, killing a few hundred people to 
help prepare individuals for the main event; people were trained when to start killing, 
when to stop killing, who to target, and who to spare (Fujii, 2004, p. 107). In addition, 
Rwandan authorities disseminated false information regarding the civil war, including 
spreading rumors and fabricating Tutsi attacks on Hutu (Fujii, 2004, p. 108). The use of 
radio to broadcast propaganda helped create a new set of norms that removed the moral 
imperatives against murder and facilitated the participation of individuals in the genocide 
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(Fujii, 2004, p. 113). Fujii’s (2006) article provides valuable information about the use of 
propaganda in Rwanda and the way in which morals and norms in Rwandan society were 
changed to enable participation in the genocide.  
One of the most useful works for my dissertation is a book by Jean Hatzfeld 
(2003). Hatzfeld interviewed ten prisoners who killed in three communities, Kibungo, 
Ntarama, and Kanzenze (p. 9). Hatzfeld (2003) starts off with a discussion of how the 
killing was organized; the killers told him that the organizers included members of the 
Interahamwe, a municipal judge, and area leaders (pp. 10-11). Hatzfeld’s (2003) 
interviews with the killers covered many areas, including overcoming the reluctance to 
kill, working in a group during the killings, punishments for not following orders, 
looting, and remorse and forgiveness. Hatzfeld (2003) got the killers to share detailed 
information about their participation, such as how they viewed the genocide; many of the 
killers described the killings as work, with one killer stating “We had work to do” (p. 15). 
The killers also described participation in the genocide as less tiring than farming, and as 
“…a demanding but more gratifying activity” (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 62-63).   
With regards to remorse, one killer told Hatzfeld (2003) that he was not sorry for 
a single killing he committed (p. 51), while others talked about having nightmares (pp. 
157-158). Some of the killers have apologized to the families of their victims, and claim 
that when they are released from prison, they will bring gifts of food and drink to the 
families, or assist the Tutsis in the fields (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 190-192). The killers are 
torn on the issue of forgiveness: one stated that the killings were out of their hands, and 
therefore, so is forgiveness, while another argues that forgiveness is necessary, otherwise, 
the killings might start again (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 202-204). Overall, Hatzfeld’s (2003) 
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book provides valuable information about the killers in Rwanda, and helps others to 
understand that the killers are not a homogenized group. 
Nicole Hogg (2010) conducted interviews in Rwanda in 2001 with 71 
incarcerated female genocide suspects, in order to gain a better understanding of the 
extent to which they participated, the nature of their participation, the legal consequences 
for women who participated, and how gender influenced women’s participation (p. 70). 
Hogg (2010) starts off her article with a discussion of typical roles for women in 
Rwandan society, which include educating the children, managing the household, 
advising their husbands, and maintaining tradition (p. 72). In addition, women in Rwanda 
are taught to be subordinate to men and not to argue with their husbands (Hogg, 2010, p. 
71). Because of these traditions, women accused of participating in the genocide are 
rarely accused of being leaders of the genocide; they are normally accused of offenses 
such as looting Tutsi property and reporting Tutsi hiding places to the killers (Hogg, 
2010, pp. 76-78). A female genocide suspect told Hogg (2010) that she believed women 
who participated in the genocide can be divided into three action categories: refusing to 
hide Tutsis, assisting the killers by preparing meals, bringing drinks, and encouraging the 
men in their work, and exposing the hiding places of Tutsi (p. 79).  
Hogg (2010) then examines the way female genocide suspects are viewed by the 
law and Rwandan authorities. Hogg (2010) argues that investigators, lawyers, and 
prosecutors so strongly believe the gender stereotypes about Rwandan women that they 
cannot recognize them as criminals (p. 81). This may help explain why far fewer women 
have been prosecuted for genocide than men. Lastly, Hogg (2010) looks at the various 
motivations for female participation in the genocide. The first motivation is fear; many 
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women told Hogg (2010) that they were forced by the militia to participate in the 
genocide, while others claimed they were afraid of what would happen to them if they 
refused to participate (pp. 84-85). One woman whose children were Tutsi because their 
father was Tutsi poisoned her children to give them a “kinder” death than being killed 
with a machete (Hogg, 2010, p. 85). Another motivation was the genocidal propaganda; 
women also listened to RTLM, and some women who were teachers and radio 
announcers helped spread the propaganda (Hogg, 2010, pp. 86-87).  
In addition, the propaganda pitted Tutsi women against Hutu women, and told 
Hutu women that Tutsi women would steal their jobs and their husbands (Hogg, 2010, p. 
87). The final motivation was that women got caught up in the melee and simply 
followed the crowd, or women trusted the wrong neighbor or friend with information 
about people they were trying to protect, which led to the deaths of those people (Hogg, 
2010, p. 88). In sum, Hogg (2010) does a very good job of looking at a neglected group 
in research done on the Rwandan genocide: female participants. Hogg (2010) dissects the 
various roles women played as well as the motivating factors, to help others gain a better 
understanding of why women took part in the genocide. 
Smeulers and Hoex (2010) studied literature on the Rwandan genocide and 
conducted 29 interviews with prisoners in Kigali Central Prison in April and May 2009, 
arriving at the conclusion that although ethnicity played a role in the genocide, social 
interaction among perpetrators and group dynamics provide better explanations of the 
genocide (p. 436). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) asked prison authorities for Interahamwe 
and other prisoners convicted of serious crimes who had confessed at least partially to 
their crimes; the interviews were semi-structured, lasted about an hour, and were assisted 
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by an interpreter who translated from Kinyarwanda to English (pp. 436-437). Smeulers 
and Hoex (2010) address the concerns about whether the stories the perpetrators told 
them were reliable, as the interviewees were discussing events from 15 years prior, and 
memory is subjective (p. 438). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) found that the stories told by 
their interviewees matched the general picture that emerged from studying the Rwandan 
genocide, and the stories showed clear and overlapping patterns not only within their 
group of perpetrators, but also with other studies done with interviews of perpetrators (p. 
438).  
Smeulers and Hoex (2010) examine how the killer groups were formed and why 
people participated; they argue that groups were not formed randomly or spontaneously, 
but at the initiative of groups like the Interahamwe, who then took charge of the groups 
(p. 441). Members of the Interahamwe and other groups recruited participants by offering 
them incentives such as food, alcohol, and cash, whereas members of the military took 
part in the killings because they believed all Tutsi were dangerous and part of the RPF 
(Smeulers & Hoex, 2010, p. 442). Other people were forced to join groups and 
participate; for example, older people had to man the roadblocks during the day, while 
young people had to guard the roadblocks at night, and the Interahamwe often checked to 
make sure people were doing as they were ordered (Smeulers & Hoex, 2010, p. 443).  
 Smeulers and Hoex (2010) found many motivating factors for participation, such 
as greed: individuals who participated could gain their neighbors’ property and material 
goods by looting houses (p. 444). Other factors included a desire to settle scores, the 
ability to find food, safety, and shelter with others, and individuals being forced to 
participate, such as Hutu with Tutsi wives, family members, or friends (pp. 444-445). 
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Smeulers and Hoex (2010) assert that in Rwanda, killer groups were organized from the 
top-down rather than bottom-up, and the violence was “…instigated, ordered, and 
condoned by the authorities rather than…committed in deviance” (p. 446). Smeulers and 
Hoex (2010) claim that ordinary checks and balances in Rwandan society disappeared 
during the genocide, making it easier for individuals to participate in the genocide, and 
many group members felt the need to prove they were the best group members by being 
particularly tough and killing lots of Tutsi (p. 449). Smeulers and Hoex (2010) provide 
good insight into the group dynamics of the perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide.  
   Timothy Longman (2001) looked at the links between the church and the state in 
Rwanda, as well as the nature of the churches as institutions, in order to provide an 
explanation for why many churches took part in the genocide (p. 164).  While some 
church officials were directly involved in the genocide, most have been criticized for 
their failure to halt the violence (Longman, 2001, p. 166). Longman (2001) asserts that 
churches helped make the genocide possible by making genocidal violence 
understandable and acceptable to the population, as well as teaching obedience to 
authority (p. 166). According to Longman (2001), the churches in Rwanda have a long 
political history. Christian churches set up during the colonial period helped support Tutsi 
domination over the majority Hutu, although this changed following World War II and 
during the transition to independence; the churches began supporting Hutu leaders and 
Hutu began to fill the leadership posts (pp. 168-170). In the early 1990s, calls for reform 
of the churches came from both Hutu and Tutsi, which led to many church leaders being 
sympathetic during the genocide, because it could help reinforce their power and preserve 
their hold on their offices (Longman, 2001, p. 175). In addition, many church leaders 
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supported President Habyarimana, and thus saw the RPF invasion as a threat to their 
power in terms of ethnicity, because they gained benefits from the elected leaders, 
benefits that would disappear if the elected officials had to share power with Tutsis 
(Longman, 2001, p. 179).  
 Longman (2001) points out that none of the churches specifically denounced the 
practice massacres that occurred between 1990 and 1993, and many church leaders 
showed their own anti-Tutsi prejudices, which was interpreted by the public as an 
endorsement of the regime’s anti-Tutsi message (p. 180). During the genocide, church 
officials did not invoke the principle of sanctuary, nor did they speak out against the 
desecration of the churches, and many church workers justified the killing as a defensive 
measure against the RPF invasion, one that necessitated the unfortunate killing of Tutsi 
civilians (Longman, 2001, p. 181). Longman (2001) concludes by stating that while the 
churches did not specifically preach ethnic hatred and murder, they did not promote 
messages of charity and love for human beings, and supporting the genocide was in the 
long run consistent with the theology taught in the churches (p. 182). Longman’s (2001) 
article provides good insight into the role of the churches in the genocide, and a detailed 
explanation for why so many church leaders did nothing to prevent the massacres of 
Tutsis hiding in the churches.  
Paul Magnarella (2000) looks at the Rwandan genocide through a human 
materialism paradigm, which was designed to bridge the gap between scientific and 
humanistic approaches to understanding human behavior and characterizes humans as 
rational, emotional, social creatures who are indoctrinated in ideological, ritual and 
symbolic systems (p. 23). Magnarella (2000) starts his explanation of the Rwandan 
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genocide by looking at the pre-colonial period; he claims that the Tutsi conquered central 
Rwanda and established their rule, thereby making the Hutu subordinate and creating a 
caste system with limited social mobility (pp. 25-28). During colonialism, the Belgians 
put the Tutsi in positions of power over the Hutu, and instituted agricultural and 
infrastructure projects that required a huge amount of labor; this led to a system of forced 
labor by the Hutus and brutal punishments such as whippings and beatings for anyone 
who did not meet the government’s work quotas (Magnarella, 2000, pp. 30-31).  
According to Magnarella (2000), the work demands consumed 50-60% of the 
Hutus’ time, which took away from agricultural production and led to food shortages and 
famines (p. 31). The distribution of identity cards also happened during colonialism and 
rigidly divided Rwandans into ethnic categories (Magnarella, 2000, p. 31). Magnarella 
(2000) claims that the causes of genocide include political and economic factors (p. 38). 
Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s faced a major population and land imbalance: there were 
too many people on too small plots of land, which drove food production down and 
resulted in famines (Magnarella, 2000, p. 38). Tutsi were primarily pastoralists, and 
wanted open ranges to graze their cattle, which put them into conflict with Hutus who 
needed the land for farming (Magnarella, 2000, p. 39). 
Moreover, by the late 1980s, the youth population faced a situation where they 
had no land, jobs, or education (Magnarella, 2000, p. 39). According to Magnarella 
(2000), there were very few economic alternatives to farming other than working for the 
government, and eliminating the Tutsi would open up more jobs for Hutus (p. 39). 
Magnarella (2000) argues that the Arusha Accords, which would have forced 
Habyarimana’s government to share power with the Tutsis, helped contribute to the 
29 
 
 
genocide because Hutus in the government would have lost economic resources; these 
leaders then began manipulating the Hutu population into believing the elimination of the 
Tutsi was necessary (pp. 39-40). Overall, Magnarella’s (2000) approach to understanding 
the genocide focuses mostly on the economic factors, including overpopulation, 
unemployment, starvation, and lack of economic opportunities for young people. 
Magnarella’s (2000) article provides an alternative explanation for the genocide that 
helps expand our understanding of why it happened. 
 In his article, Charles Mironko (2004) interviewed confessed genocide 
perpetrators and concluded that while state actions in Rwanda may have sped up the 
process of genocide, the people of Rwanda, acting in mobs, assumed a degree of 
initiative in the violence and went beyond the state’s mandates (p. 47). Mironko (2004) 
asserts that until insight is gained into how and why the perpetrators participated in the 
genocide, it will be difficult to detect and prevent future genocides (p. 48). Mironko 
(2004) conducted interviews in six major prisons in Rwanda, and interviewed 100 men, 
45 women, and 24 children over three weeks in the year 2000 (pp. 48-50). Mironko 
(2004) went to the prisons without making an appointment and had the Prison Directors 
randomly call at least 20 genocide suspects who had pleaded guilty; he made it clear to 
his participants that he would only tape the interviews with their permission and that he 
would not share any information provided with the government (p. 49). Mironko (2004) 
found that his participants had believed the Tutsi were spies and accomplices of the RPF, 
and many used terms that dehumanized or stereotyped Tutsis, such as cockroaches, 
enemy, and forest dwellers (p. 51). During the interviews, Mironko (2004) realized that 
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many of his participants used the term igitero, (group attack) to describe how they killed; 
many participants said they had taken part in group attacks (p. 51).  
Mironko (2004) explains that igitero has two meanings in the context of the 
genocide: the first is a group of words associated with hunting, and the second is the 
social and political organization that facilitated the attacks on the Tutsi (pp. 52-53). 
Regarding the first context, during the interviews, many participants used terms like yell, 
to hide, to flush out of hiding, to herd, or to hunt/chase (Mironko, 2004, p. 52). Mironko 
(2004) states that psychologically, the individuals called to participate in the genocide 
transformed themselves into hunters of dangerous animals, which was part of the 
dehumanization process and made it easier for people to take part in the killings (pp. 52-
53). Regarding the second context, the interview participants discussed the mobilization 
of the mobs by the local leaders; the first leader they interacted with was the Nyumba 
kumi, a person appointed by the government to control everything taking place within 10 
households (Mironko, 2004, p. 54). In addition, people had to respond to shouts or 
whistles calling them to join in the killings, to show their support for the government; 
some individuals were forced to participate in the killings directly or indirectly (for 
example, burying bodies), thus making everyone equally complicit in the genocide 
(Mironko, 2004, p. 54). Mironko (2004) concludes his article by calling for a forum for 
frank dialogue between survivors and perpetrators to facilitate a truthful settlement, 
otherwise there can be no peaceful co-existence between the groups (p. 58). Mironko’s 
(2004) article provides useful information about why individuals participated in the 
genocide, and helps explain the mob mentality that helped facilitate the killings. 
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Scott Straus (2004) spent seven months in Rwanda researching the genocide’s 
local-level dynamics, and wanted to come up with a fairly accurate assessment of the 
number of individuals who participated in the genocide (pp. 85-86). Straus (2004) 
defined a perpetrator as any person who participated in an attack against a civilian in 
order to kill or seriously injure that person, and he limited the time period for 
participation in the genocide from April 6, 1994 to July 19, 1994 (p. 87). In order to 
collect data to come up with a number, Straus interviewed perpetrators using four criteria: 
1. Detainees had to be sentenced, as they had less incentive to lie than those awaiting 
sentencing; 2. The sample had to be randomly chosen, where possible; 3. Those 
interviewed had to have already pled guilty; and 4. The sample had to be national (p. 90). 
Straus (2004) interviewed 210 prisoners in 15 central prisons, and found his participants 
by asking for a list of prisoners who had pled guilty and been sentenced, and then by 
using random, computer-generated numbers to select prisoners from the list; in some 
cases, the lists were too small to use random numbers, so he interviewed every person on 
the list (p. 90).  
After conducting interviews and collecting data, Straus (2004) estimated that 
there were between 175,000 and 210,000 active participants in the genocide (p. 93). 
Straus (2004) asserts that while this figure supports the claim that there was mass 
participation in the Rwandan genocide, it does not support the Rwandan government’s 
assertion that it is governing a “criminal population” (p. 94). Straus’s (2004) article is 
important because it shows that while there was popular participation in the Rwandan 
genocide, it was not to the extent that other scholars claim. It also indicates that 
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categorizing all Hutu as killers is inaccurate and damages the prospects for reconciliation 
within Rwanda.  
One common argument used to explain participation in the genocide is that 
individuals were persuaded by the media to take part. The Media and the Rwanda 
Genocide is an edited volume of essays on the role of the media in the Rwandan 
genocide. The book is divided into four parts: hate media in Rwanda, international media 
coverage of the genocide, the media trial, and after the genocide and moving forward 
(Thompson, 2007). The essays are written by a variety of scholars, journalists, and 
activists, including Alison Des Forges, Roméo Dallaire, Mark Doyle, and Linda Melvern 
(Thompson, 2007). There are essays by Rwandan journalists, such as Thomas Kamilindi 
(2007), an independent journalist who was targeted for execution during the genocide for 
refusing to support RTLM’s message; he and his family hid in the Mille Collines hotel 
and survived the genocide (as cited in Thompson, 2007). The edited volume covers both 
sides of the media story in Rwanda: the media inside Rwanda, and the international 
media’s response-or lack thereof-to the genocide (Thompson, 2007). The book provides 
strong, detailed information on the role of the media in Rwanda, and how it was 
responsible in perpetrating the genocide. 
In his book, James Waller (2002) examines why people participate in genocide 
and argues that it is ordinary individuals who commit extraordinary evil (p. 18). Waller 
(2002) admits that this is a difficult argument to understand, as humans prefer to see 
extraordinary evil as something monstrous or observable from a great distance (p. 18). 
However, Waller asserts that people must focus on the ways in which ordinary 
individuals become perpetrators of genocide, in order to understand why it occurs (pp. 
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18-19). Waller looks at the arguments made for seeing perpetrators such as the Nazis as 
psychologically different from ordinary people, by seeing them as “mad” or having 
abnormal brains (pp. 58-59). However, while some Nazis did have psychological issues, 
most were normal, rational individuals (p. 66).  
In addition to looking at psychological arguments, Waller (2002) explores 
biological arguments for understanding human nature, such as whether or not people are 
born inherently good, and if humans are prone to committing evil acts (p. 136). Waller 
argues that there are some biological traits, but people participate in genocide for a 
variety of reasons, including: intergroup competition, being oriented toward obeying 
authorities, moral justifications for violence, dehumanization, conformity to peer 
pressure, and blaming the victims. Waller’s (2002) book provides an in-depth exploration 
of why individuals participate in evil acts such as genocide, and is very useful for my 
research. Waller will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
Like Waller, Steven Baum (2008) explores the psychological reasons for why 
genocide occurs, as well as the psychology of perpetrators and bystanders. Baum (2008) 
lists eight stages of genocide: 1. classification of people into “us and them”; 2. 
Symbolization, for example, forcing Jews to wear yellow stars; 3. Dehumanization of the 
target group; 4. Organization of genocide by the state or groups; 5. Polarization to drive 
groups apart; 6. Identification of victims; 7. Extermination of victims; and 8. Denial of 
genocide by the perpetrators (pp. 33-35). When looking at perpetrators, Baum (2008) lists 
traits shown in perpetrators, including conformity to social conventions, submission to 
authority, and an aggressive law and order culture (pp. 124-130).  
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Baum argues that leaders of genocide do not subscribe to the same mindset as the 
followers, and they are often brighter and more manipulative than their followers, as well 
as being more charismatic (pp. 135-136). In terms of bystanders, Baum claims that they 
are concerned with safety and having a place in the world, are more insecure and are less 
emotionally developed (pp. 154-155). In addition, bystanders will attempt to justify their 
passivity and reduce their guilt over not intervening by distancing themselves from the 
victims and by devaluing the victims; this behavior may lead some bystanders to join the 
perpetrators (Baum, 2008, p. 156). This was seen in Rwanda, when individuals who did 
not participate were coerced or persuaded to take part in the killings. Baum’s (2008) 
work provides good information on the psychological traits of perpetrators and how these 
traits lead to individuals taking part in genocide.  
Philip Zimbardo (2007) is the social psychologist who carried out the famous 
Stanford Prison Experiment, which showed how certain situations can lead to the abuse 
of power and the abuse of individuals. Zimbardo (2007) describes the Stanford Prison 
Experiment in detail, providing a clear picture of how the experiment devolved to the 
point where the participants were no longer playing a part, but had become fully 
immersed in their roles. Zimbardo (2011) admits that he became so caught up in the 
experiment that it took his girlfriend pointing out to him that the treatment of the 
participants was wrong to get him to end the experiment early (p. 170). Zimbardo (2007) 
discusses how he morphed into his role as the Prison Authority Figure, and became an 
authority figure he disliked, one who is authoritarian (p. 180). Zimbardo (2007) uses his 
description and analysis of the Stanford Prison Experiment to explain how people can 
become caught up in evil acts, for example, the prison guards at Abu Ghraib who carried 
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out acts of torture and humiliation such as kicking, beating, dragging prisoners around on 
leashes, and keeping the prisoners naked (p. 416). Zimbardo (2007) concludes the book 
by providing accounts of individuals who have resisted social, situational, and 
psychological influences to participate in terrible acts, and claims that heroic individuals 
should be celebrated, because they help counter evil influences and remind us of our 
humanity (p. 488). Zimbardo’s (2007) book is beneficial for anyone who wants to 
understand how certain situations can lead individuals to carry out acts they might never 
do otherwise. 
Explanations for why genocide occurs 
Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley (2006) attempt to explain why genocide 
occurs, incorporating history, politics, and psychology into their work. Chirot and 
McCauley (2006) assert that mass killing is not irrational, but is the result human beings 
thinking of competing groups in stereotypical ways, which can lead to demonization and 
dehumanization; in addition, our emotions, such as anger, fear, and resentment, 
predispose us to violence when we feel threatened, which can then lead to mass murder 
(p. 7). 
 Chirot and McCauley (2006) claim there are four main motives for mass murder: 
1. Convenience: when two parties are in conflict, the stronger party may believe that 
mass murder and expulsion is the cheapest solution for ending the conflict, such as the 
forced removal of Native Americans from their lands; 2. Revenge: impressing upon the 
enemy that attacking “us” will lead to an avenging of hurt pride, for example the mass 
murder of the Herero by the Germans in the early 1900s; 3. Simple Fear: failure to 
enforce vengeance will allow the enemy to regain their strength and retaliate, for example 
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Stalin’s killing and forced starvations of various groups such as Kulaks, Chechens, and 
Jews; 4. Fear of Pollution: mass murders that are ethnically, religiously, or ideologically 
based; for example, the massacre of communists in Indonesia (pp. 20-38). Chirot and 
McCauley (2006) then discuss the psychological foundations of mass murder, including 
organization of participants, emotional appeals from leaders, fear of the other group and 
fear of extinction, anger, and hate (pp. 57-71).  
Chirot and McCauley (2006) end their work with a discussion of strategies to 
decrease mass murder; these include international interventions to end violence, using 
international pressure to bring the perpetrators to justice, limiting the demands for justice 
and revenge: using truth and reconciliation commissions that allow for perpetrators to 
confess to guilt, but also limit punishments, building friendships between communities, 
and building civil society from the ground up (pp. 170-190). Chirot and McCauley’s 
(2006) book is helpful for understanding the various motivating factors for mass murder 
and genocide, and it provides practical solutions for attempting to end episodes of mass 
murder.  
Barbara Coloroso (2007) looks at why genocide occurs through a different lens, 
that of bullying. Coloroso (2007) argues that genocide is a form of extreme bullying, in 
which a bully rises to power, espouses a murderous ideology, creates a group wherein 
brutality becomes the norm, and leads to ordinary people performing murderous tasks 
that become normalized and routinized (pp. 52-53). Coloroso argues that children learn 
racial slurs and the rules of bigoted behavior through stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination (p. 67). Coloroso provides an example of this when she discusses a math 
problem in a Rwandan worksheet from the 1960s: “If you have ten cockroaches in your 
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town and you kill four of them, how many do you have left to kill?” (p. 58). 
Reinforcement of racist ideologies and the use of dehumanizing language makes 
participation easier. 
Coloroso (2007) also explores obedience and routinization in genocide. Coloroso 
states that there are two types of obedience: obedience because of the rule, and obedience 
because of the role (p. 107). The poor participants in the genocide took part because they 
had learned to obey any rule handed down by the authority, and those of the higher 
economic status obeyed because of the role they played in the government (p. 107). 
Coloroso argues that once people agree to totally obey orders, those who participate in 
genocidal actions will aggressively try to get others to take part, so no one will have clean 
hands, and the attitude will be one of “we are all in this mess together” (p. 108). In 
addition, those in charge will routinize and normalize cruelty, because this will make it 
easier for communities to participate in the genocide (p. 108). According to Coloroso, 
routinization involves the sanitizing of language. For example, killing becomes the final 
solution, cutting the tall trees, clearing the brush, etc., and those participating in the 
Rwandan genocide used terms like “collecting cabbage” when delivering the severed 
heads of Tutsis to their commander in order to cover up the reality of having killed 
another human being (pp. 108-109). Coloroso’s book provides a different angle of 
looking at why genocide occurs, and her discussion of the routinization of genocide is 
important for understanding why people participate in genocide.   
 David Livingstone Smith (2011) explores why human beings dehumanize one 
another, and how dehumanization has been used throughout history. Smith (2011) starts 
with an analysis of dehumanization in wars, especially World War 2. Smith (2011) 
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reminds us that it was not just the Nazis who dehumanized the enemy; Russian 
propagandists described the Germans as having animal breath, and called on Russian 
soldiers to kill every German they could (pp. 16-17). During the capture of Nanjing by 
the Japanese, soldiers raped, mutilated, and tortured thousands of Chinese civilians, while 
viewing them as bugs or pigs, and American publications portrayed the Japanese as 
cockroaches and rats (Smith, 2011, pp. 17-19). Smith (2011) then discusses how 
dehumanization was viewed historically; medieval Muslims believed that humans could 
be transformed into subhuman creatures such as pigs, apes, and rats as punishment by 
God (p. 43). A seventh-century poet described women as subhuman creatures created 
from sows, vixens, donkeys, and monkeys (Smith, 2011, p. 30).  
Smith (2011) also explores the psychological aspects of dehumanization through 
an outgroup bias: people have a tendency to favor members of their own group while 
discriminating against outsiders, seeing our group as more industrious, intelligent, and so 
forth; people also tend to care more for certain people than others (pp. 49-51). Smith 
(2011) then looks at the use of dehumanization in wars, genocide, and racial beliefs, and 
concludes by calling for more time, money, and talent to be devoted to figuring out how 
exactly dehumanization works, so it can be dealt with effectively, and perhaps prevented 
(pp. 272-273). Smith’s (2011) book is very helpful for understanding the historical roots 
of dehumanization, and why human beings dehumanize each other. Smith will be 
discussed in more detail later on in the chapter. 
 Ervin Staub (2000) provides a brief description of the influences leading to 
genocide and mass killing, such as difficult life conditions and group conflict (pp. 368-
369). Difficult life conditions include economic problems, political conflict, and intense 
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and rapid social change that frustrate basic human needs (Staub, 2000, pp. 369-370). 
Staub (2000) claims that in order to satisfy their needs for identity and connection, people 
turn to a group and then elevate their group by psychologically or physically diminishing 
the other group; they scapegoat another group for their problems, and engage in harmful 
actions against the other group (p. 370). Another factor contributing to genocide is past 
victimization of a group and the unhealed wounds; without healing, the group will feel 
diminished and vulnerable (Staub, 2000, p. 370). Staub (2000) believes a good example 
of past victimization can be found in the Bosnian genocide, when Serbs felt like they 
were being attacked by Croatia (p. 371).  
Staub (2000) argues that in order to heal past victimization, members of 
victimized groups need to re-experience their pain, sorrow, and loss under safe 
conditions, as well as receive empathy, support, and affirmation from people outside the 
group (p. 376). Staub (2000) led a project in Rwanda that promoted reconciliation in the 
community; the project had several positive impacts, including reaffirming the humanity 
of the participants, shifting attitudes about the perpetrators so they are no longer seen as 
simply being evil, and helping individuals understand the factors that led to the genocide 
so they can try and prevent the recurrence of violence (p. 378). Staub’s (2000) article 
provides a good outline of some of the major factors that contribute to genocide, and how 
understanding these factors might help facilitate genocide prevention in the future.  
 Another good source that examines why genocide happens is Daniel Goldhagen’s 
(2009) book Worse than War. Goldhagen argues that instead of studying the most 
familiar genocides together and then drawing conclusions, we should study each case of 
genocide individually because all instances of genocide vary from each other, and these 
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differences must be understood in order to know the phenomenon of genocide and each 
case of genocide (p. 30). Goldhagen makes a very good argument for how war and 
genocide intertwine, as was the case in Rwanda and Darfur: 
…War makes people more likely to consider eliminationist initiatives. It 
encourages people to see violent and lethal measures as appropriate for dealing 
with real or imagined problems that had or would have been previously managed 
differently…. War also creates new practical opportunities to act on eliminationist 
desires, by giving perpetrators better access to the potential victims, and by 
lessening the perceived cost of committing mass murder (p. 40).  
Goldhagen (2009) claims that in order for genocide to happen, at some point, one 
or a few people will consciously decide to slaughter thousands or millions of fellow 
human beings (p. 69). In addition, the worldviews, aspirations, prejudices and hatreds, 
and personalities of this group of people are crucial, because without their influence, 
genocide will not happen (p. 73). This can be seen in Rwanda, where the political leaders, 
in addition to media outlets like the RTLM radio station, influenced the general 
population’s worldviews and beliefs about the Tutsis, and helped the population conclude 
that the Tutsis were a threat that must be eliminated. Goldhagen argues that the 
perpetrators’ initiative to take action is not the result of blindly following orders or 
simply doing a job, but as the action of individuals who are influenced by their values 
and beliefs and choose to act (p. 170). Goldhagen will be discussed in more detail later in 
the chapter.  
Peter Uvin (1998) explains why genocide occurs through a different lens, by 
using Galtung’s (1969) structural violence theory to analyze the Rwandan genocide. Uvin 
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provides a detailed explanation of Rwandan political history from independence to the 
genocide, and how the elites created a system whereby the state controlled all factors of 
life, including jobs, education, and prescription of social behaviors (p. 22). Uvin (1998) 
raises a good point when he remarks that after independence, “…One monoethnic power 
system had been replaced with another…” (p. 20). Uvin discusses the role of the 
international community in supporting structural violence in Rwanda: many donors chose 
to ignore human rights violations and the suppression of the Tutsis in order to justify their 
aid work, and wrote reports that praised Rwanda for its economic growth and cultural and 
social cohesion (p. 44).  
Uvin (1998) describes how Rwanda went from suffering from structural violence 
to experiencing acute violence. Uvin rightly points out that structural violence provokes 
anger and frustration, which significantly increases the potential for acute violence (p. 
107). Uvin describes how lack of economic opportunities, corruption, immobility of the 
population and complete control by state actors created the perfect storm for physical 
violence to occur in the form of genocide. Uvin will be discussed in greater detail later in 
this chapter.  
Justice in post-genocide Rwanda  
 Elizabeth Neuffer (2001) interviewed victims and perpetrators of the Bosnian and 
Rwandan genocides, as well as the judges presiding over some of the trials, to explore 
how people in Bosnia and Rwanda came to terms with what happened in their country 
and attempted to move forward. Neuffer (2001) moves back and forth between Bosnia 
and Rwanda, and tells the stories of individuals who struggled to survive the genocides. 
Neuffer (2001) describes the problems the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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(ICTR) faced, including lack of funding, inability of witnesses to get permission to travel 
from Rwanda to Arusha, Tanzania (where the court is based), and the fact that the 
strongest punishment the ICTR could hand out was life imprisonment, whereas in 
Rwanda, people convicted of genocide could face the death penalty (pp. 256-257). The 
lack of death penalty for the ICTR trials was strongly criticized by Rwandans, who 
argued that the ICTR was sentencing the architects and organizers of the genocide to life 
in prison, while those who had followed orders were being executed (Neuffer, 2001, pp. 
256-257).  
One of the strongest chapters of Neuffer’s (2001) book is “What a Tutsi Woman 
Tastes Like”, the chapter in which she examines the role of rape in the Rwandan 
genocide and the conviction of mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu, the first man found guilty of 
genocide by an international tribunal, and the first case in which rape was held by a court 
to be an act of genocide and a crime against humanity (pp. 271-272).  Neuffer (2001) 
discusses the role of rape in war throughout history, and how war and rape go hand in 
hand (pp. 272-274). Neuffer (2001) describes the testimony of a witness given the 
pseudonym JJ, whose testimony was critical for the conviction of Akayesu. According to 
JJ, Akayesu told Tutsi women to come to the cultural center, where he then turned them 
over to be raped by the militia (Neuffer, 2001, p. 288). During the second day of rapes, 
Akayesu told the killers, “Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like…tomorrow 
they will all be killed” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 289). Neuffer’s (2001) discussion of the role of 
rape in the genocide is important, because rape has often been downplayed or even 
ignored in discussions of the genocide, but it can be an act of genocide. Neuffer (2001) 
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provides a strong account of the search for justice after genocide and how it has often 
failed, as well as how people affected by genocide try to rebuild their lives.  
 Rimé, Kanyangara, Yzerbyt, and Paez (2011) designed a quantitative study to 
examine the effectiveness of the Gacaca tribunals on the reintegration and coexistence in 
communities of perpetrators and victims (p. 698). Rimé et. al. (2011) had 8 hypotheses 
they tested: 1. Participation in Gacaca was expected to increase negative emotions in 
victims as well as perpetrators; 2. The exchange of power in the Gacaca process would 
increase antagonistic emotions (i.e. anger) among victims and reduce them among 
perpetrators as well as reducing shame for victims and increasing it for perpetrators; 3. 
Victims’ and perpetrators’ ingroup identification would be lower after participation in 
Gacaca; 4. Stereotypes about the outgroup would become more positive after Gacaca for 
both victims and perpetrators; 5. A more heterogeneous perception of the other group 
would be manifested for both victims and perpetrators after participation in Gacaca; 6. 
Indicators of positive emotional climate and social cohesion would be evaluated more 
positively by both groups; 7. The social integration effects of hypotheses 3-6 would be 
mediated by emotional changes elicited by participation in Gacaca; and 8. An assessment 
of the degree to which participants exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
before and after their participation in Gacaca (pp. 698-699). To test these hypotheses, 
Rimé et. al. (2011) conducted a study using 755 volunteers who could read and write in 
Kinyarwanda and were at least 18 years old; 395 were victims and 360 were participants 
(p. 699). Participants rated their responses on scales, some of which went from “not at 
all” to “a great deal”, “not at all characteristic” to “very characteristic”, and “very 
different” to “very similar” (Rimé et. al., 2011, pp. 699-700).  
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 Rimé et. al. (2011) also used a control group in communities where Gacaca had 
not yet taken place (p. 699). For hypothesis 1, the results supported the prediction: 
negative emotions increased for victim and perpetrator participants, including fear, 
anxiety, and sadness; for hypothesis 2, victims reported much less shame after Gacaca 
than the control group, whereas perpetrators reported more shame after Gacaca than 
before (Rimé et. al., 2011, p. 701). For hypothesis 3, ingroup identification decreased for 
both victims and perpetrators after a Gacaca trial; for hypothesis 4, positive stereotypes of 
the other group increased for both victims and perpetrators after Gacaca, whereas there 
was a decrease in the control group; for hypothesis 5, there was a significant decrease in 
the perceived homogeneity of the outgroup after participation in Gacaca for both groups, 
while there was no change among the victims in the control group and a slight increase 
among the perpetrators (Rimé et. al., p. 701). For hypothesis 6, the hypothesis was 
supported for perpetrators, but not for victims; for hypothesis 7, participation in Gacaca 
both increased negative resignation emotions and improved social integration; and for 
hypothesis 8, PTSD decreased for the perpetrators after participating in Gacaca, but 
greatly increased for the victims (Rimé et. al., 2011, pp. 702-703). Overall, the Gacaca 
system has its strengths and weaknesses, but it seems to have a positive effect on 
reconciliation in Rwanda.  
Dina Temple-Raston (2005) looked at the power and influence of the Rwandan 
press on the population, and how the press manipulated facts and events to convince 
people to take part in the genocide. The trial of Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze was the first trial of journalists for genocide since the 
Nuremberg trials (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 102). Temple-Raston (2005) starts with a 
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discussion of Rwandan history, and how the three men became involved in Rwandan 
media; she then talks about the propaganda the journalists put out, and concludes by 
describing their trial. Temple-Raston (2005) talked to ordinary Rwandans, court 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers, to paint a picture of the trial and how it proceeded. 
Nahimana and Barayagwiza for journalists for the RTLM radio station, while Ngeze ran 
the newspaper Kangura (Temple-Raston, 2005, pp. 32-33).  
Temple-Raston (2005) does a good job of explaining how the three journalists 
used their respective media outlets to promote anti-Tutsi propaganda. Kangura started off 
with cartoons spoofing Tutsis, but quickly went on to accuse the RPF of initiating a war, 
and Ngeze asserted that the war would begin with the assassination of President 
Habyarimana (Temple-Raston, 2005, pp. 40-41). Kangura later went on to publish a 
headline captioned “What weapons shall we use to conquer the Inyenzi once and for all?” 
with a drawing of a machete underneath it (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 29). RTLM was 
popular from the beginning, when it started off by playing Congolese music, and featured 
call-in shows and shock jocks; it also gave people the opportunity to express themselves: 
they could call in with complaints and local news and gossip (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 
2). RTLM later introduced anti-Tutsi language, and warned citizens to be vigilant; it was 
also the first to report on the death of President Habyarimana, and accuse Tutsis of being 
behind the attack (Temple-Raston, 2005, p. 4). Temple-Raston (2005) provides detailed 
information about the trial, including the flaws, problems with getting documents, and 
slowness of the trial. All three journalists were convicted, but the trial, and Temple-
Raston’s (2005) book, raised important questions about the limits of free speech and the 
ethics of journalism. 
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Gaps in the Literature 
 While the literature mentioned in this chapter is extremely useful, there are still 
some gaps in the literature. One of the biggest gaps is the lack of discussion on sexual 
dehumanization in genocide. Most books written on genocide will describe physical 
dehumanization in great detail, but will only briefly mention sexual dehumanization, or 
will talk about rape as something separate from genocide. However, we know that 
genocidal rape is in a category of its own. Genocidal rape is different from rape that 
occurs in war or in society, because the intentionality is different. I will discuss these 
ideas in greater detail in chapters four and five. The other major gap is the lack of 
discussion of dehumanization in general in books on genocide. Most books will mention 
dehumanization in passing, but do not usually go into great detail about the role that 
dehumanization plays in genocide. If a society is not properly prepared to take part in, or 
at the very least ignore the killings of, the targeted group via constant reinforcement of 
dehumanization, then genocide is not likely to happen. It is my contention that if we do 
not understand the impact dehumanization has on various aspects of genocide, such as 
participation, we cannot stop genocide from happening. 
Theoretical Framework 
Structural Violence 
 Structural violence is a theory introduced by Johan Galtung in the late 1960s, and 
it describes a type of systemic violence that is not necessarily physical, but is usually 
indirect and includes things like starvation and higher life expectancy in upper classes 
versus lower classes (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). Rwanda had a highly organized structure, 
with a few individuals at the top controlling power, access and resources, and a majority 
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of the people living in poverty. According to Uvin (1998), about 15 percent of the 
farmers in Rwanda owned half of the land (p. 113), and in Butare, the richest 10 percent 
earned 66.4 percent of the region’s income in 1992 (p. 115). President Habyarimana’s 
wife Agathe ran a small influential group called the akazu, or little house. The akazu 
controlled the political, economic, and military muscle and the patronage that was 
eventually called “Hutu Power” (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 80-81). If anyone crossed Agathe 
or the akazu, they were assassinated or jailed (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 81). 
  In addition, Galtung (1969) claims that in structural violence, the power over the 
distribution of resources is unevenly spread, and the uneven distribution is exacerbated if 
individuals who are poor are also under educated, in poor health, and lacking power (p. 
171). One of the factors that furthered systemic poverty was the lack of mobility for 
people. Residence permits were required to stay anywhere, and travel permits were 
needed to move, which meant that individuals who could not make a living in rural areas 
were not easily allowed to move to urban areas in search of opportunities (Uvin, 1998, p. 
116). According to Uvin (1998), the justification for the permits was that the government 
wanted to fight urban poverty and prevent slum creation, which worked, although it kept 
most of the population trapped in rural areas (p. 116). Additionally, education, health 
care, and economic opportunities were highest in urban areas, which meant that the youth 
in the countryside were semi-educated and unable to build a future for themselves beyond 
trying to farm a tiny plot of land (p. 116). Uvin (1998) points out that 90 percent of the 
rural population lived below the poverty line, and the lack of mobility kept people 
trapped in poverty (p. 117).  
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This lack of mobility supports Galtung’s (1969) assertion that structural violence 
includes violence that is objectively avoidable- for example, if people are starving- 
regardless of whether or not there is a clear relation between the person committing the 
act and the person being influenced by it (p. 171). By refusing to allow people to have the 
basic rights of being able to move from rural areas to urban ones or to get a job without 
having to be part of the patronage system, the akazu created a climate whereby 
individuals were stuck in poverty, with no hope of escape. Uvin (1998) rightly argues that 
structural violence provokes anger, frustration, ignorance, and despair, all of which 
increases the likelihood of acute violence (p. 107). Young men were hit especially hard 
by the structural violence in Rwanda: they had much less land than their fathers, which 
meant that they could not support their families or get married; hundreds of thousands of 
young men were forced to search for temporary jobs in lieu of permanent ones, and could 
not make a living in agriculture (Uvin, 1998, p. 118).  
The lack of opportunities for the youth population meant that individuals were 
more easily manipulated by those in charge, and the loss of self-respect lead to frustration 
and anger, as well as a desire to regain self-respect (Uvin, 1998, p. 136). Furthermore, the 
decline in the economy exacerbated the frustrations of the population. The Rwandan 
economy relied heavily on coffee exports, which declined from $144 million in 1985 to 
$30 million in 1993, and the GDP per capita fell from $355 in 1983 to $260 in 1990 
(Uvin, 1998, p. 54). Additionally, the civil war that started in 1990 displaced populations 
in the major food-producing regions, which led to a decline in government revenue, and 
also led the government to spend more money on arms and military expenditures and less 
on social programs (Uvin, 1998, p. 56). In response, the elites in Rwanda manipulated 
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this frustration and anger and redirected it from themselves onto the Tutsis. According to 
Uvin (1998), “…The official, state-sponsored racism against Tutsi…provided a 
convenient, institutionalized scapegoat (and diverted attention away from the privileges 
enjoyed by a few in the name of the masses)” (p. 137).  
As mentioned previously, Uvin (1998) argues that the international community 
supported structural violence in Rwanda. One of the ways it did so was by ignoring 
human rights abuses. For example, the government issued cards identifying individuals as 
Hutu or Tutsi, and a quota system was introduced wherein access to higher education and 
state jobs for Tutsi were limited to a number theoretically equal to the proportion of 
Tutsis in the population (Uvin, 1998, p. 35). According to Uvin, the international 
community knew about the quota system, and not one aid agency denounced the identity 
cards or quota system, even when they knew they were being used to prepare for mass 
killings (p. 44). As Gourevitch (1998) points out, “If you were a bureaucrat with a foreign 
aid budget to unload, and your professional success was…measured by your ability not to 
lie or gloss too much when you filed happy statistical reports at the end of each fiscal 
year, Rwanda was the ticket” (p. 76).  
Rwanda was seen as a tranquil country, in contrast to many other African 
countries during the Cold War, so aid agencies poured money into Rwanda (Gourevitch, 
1998, p. 76). Uvin (1998) asserts that the international community knew that preparations 
for a genocide were underway: two major human rights reports from 1993 detailed 
substantial arms distributions to the population, increasing anti-Tutsi rhetoric, the 
existence of militia groups, and massacres of over 2,000 Tutsis (p. 84). Although it can 
be argued that the international community did not know that genocide was going to 
50 
 
 
occur, many human rights organizations, NGOs, and foreign agencies knew about the 
systemic repression, racism, and violence towards the Tutsi, and did nothing about it 
(Uvin, 1998, p. 86). This failure to hold the government and other parties accountable 
helped reinforce structural violence in Rwanda.  
Galtung (1969) contends that when a structure is threatened, those who benefit 
from structural violence will try to protect the status quo (p. 179). This was seen in 
Rwanda, when the structure was threatened by the civil war and the peace agreement that 
would have created power sharing between the Hutus and Tutsis. As mentioned above, 
the state controlled all sectors of the economy and prescribed social behaviors; in 
addition, the Catholic Church was closely affiliated with the state, as many church 
leaders belonged to Habyarimana’s political party (Uvin, 1998, p. 22). The lack of 
separation between the church and the state meant that there was no large opposition 
movement, and the churches helped make the genocide possible by making genocidal 
violence understandable and acceptable to the population, as well as teaching obedience 
to authority (Longman, 2001, p. 166). As stated earlier in this chapter, in the early 1990s, 
calls for reform of the churches came from both Hutu and Tutsi, which led to many 
church leaders being sympathetic to the genocide because it could help reinforce their 
power and preserve their hold on their offices (Longman, 2001, p. 175). In addition, 
many church leaders supported President Habyarimana, and thus saw the RPF invasion as 
a threat to their power in terms of ethnicity, because they gained benefits from the elected 
leaders, benefits that would disappear if the elected officials had to share power with 
Tutsis (Longman, 2001, p. 179). The RPF was a threat to the present structure, and the 
Arusha Accords would have meant the end of the akazu, something the members wanted 
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to avoid at all costs. Therefore, the extremists within the government decided that the 
extermination of all Tutsis in Rwanda was the best method for preserving the existing 
structure. 
In addition to his argument that those who benefit from the status quo will work 
to preserve it, Galtung (1969) states that structural violence is used to threaten people into 
subordination by informing them that if they do not behave, those in power will 
reintroduce previous disagreeable structures (p. 172). This can clearly be seen in the case 
of Rwanda. Before Habyarimana came to power, there were periodic massacres of Tutsis. 
When Habyarimana took power, he declared a moratorium on Tutsi attacks, and called 
for Rwandans to live in peace and work together for development (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 
69). While Tutsis were repressed by being barred from the military, subjected to quota 
rules, and by only being given rubber-stamp positions in Parliament, they were no longer 
being harassed or killed (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 69-70).  
This system was threatened in 1990, when Tutsi rebels invaded from Uganda and 
demanded rights and power. Habyarimana and the akazu did not want to share power, so 
they decided to reintroduce the disagreeable structure of allowing Tutsis to be massacred. 
The government successfully argued that it was the legitimate representation of the Hutu 
majority, and the sole defense against the Tutsi’s attempts to enslave the population 
(Uvin, 1998, p. 26). By spreading propaganda that claimed the Tutsis wanted to rule 
Rwanda and subjugate the Hutu, the government was maintaining that the Tutsis wished 
to reintroduce the colonial system of forced labor for Hutus and the suppression of the 
Hutu majority. The government called on the Hutu majority to protect themselves from 
this fate by eliminating the Tutsis.  
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As discussed earlier, the population was frustrated and angry about their living 
situations and lack of opportunities. The government saw this, and successfully redirected 
this anger from the authorities to the Tutsis, using the Tutsis as a scapegoat for all the 
problems Rwanda was facing. This scapegoating, combined with the civil war, lead many 
Hutus to see themselves as under attack by all Tutsis, which helped convince them that 
they needed to kill the Tutsis in order to protect themselves and their families. Uvin 
(1998) makes a strong argument for structural violence being a cause of the genocide in 
Rwanda when he states: 
…Structural violence lowers the barriers against the use of violence. As the norms 
of society lose legitimacy, as people’s knowledge based is reduced to slogans, as 
progress becomes a meaningless concept, as communities are riveted by conflict 
and jealousy, as people’s sense of self-respect is reduced, and as segments of 
society show their contempt for the rules of decency as well as for farmers, people 
become increasingly unhampered by constraints on the use of violence to deal 
with problems (p. 138). 
Uvin (1998) claims that the systemic racism toward the Tutsis that occurred for 
decades before the genocide helped persuade individuals to participate in the genocide (p. 
216). The Tutsis were seen as having fixed differences in their history, character, and 
moral, intellectual, and social attributes and roles (Uvin, 1998, p. 216). State reinforced 
prejudice and discrimination against the Tutsis was revitalized in the early 1990s via hate 
speech and periodic violence against the Tutsis, and the ideology became radicalized 
(Uvin, 1998, p. 217). According to Uvin (1998), racist prejudice was a way for ordinary 
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people subjected to structural violence to make sense of their predicament and explain 
their misery by scapegoating the Tutsi (p. 217).  
Uvin (1998) contends that without the RPF invasion, the Habyarimana regime 
would have slowly fallen due to external and internal pressures and there would not have 
been a genocide; however, the invasion was the ideal situation for the government to 
restore its legitimacy, unite the population around it, and increase the levels of violence, 
fear, and control in society (p. 220). The invasion by the RPF sparked fears in the 
population, supported by the government, that the Tutsis wanted to dismantle the existing 
structure and take Rwanda back to the previous disagreeable structure where the minority 
Tutsis dominated the majority Hutus and subjugated them. To prevent this from 
happening, the Hutu population had to kill all Tutsis in Rwanda; it was the duty of the 
Hutus to defend their country and eliminate the Tutsi threat.  
Structural violence can also be used to explain why genocide is occurring in 
Darfur. When Sudan was a British colony, the British saw greater development potential 
in the northern areas, and did not see Darfur as being able to contribute to the Sudanese 
economy, with the exception of exporting cattle and gum (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 13). 
This led to the British government severely under developing and neglecting the Darfur 
region: in 1935, Darfur had one elementary school, one “tribal” elementary school and 
two “sub-grade” schools for a population of six million. Education was restricted to the 
sons of chiefs, so that British authority could not be undermined by better-educated 
Sudanese administrators or merchants. The British also neglected health care: there was 
no maternity clinic before the 1940s, and Darfur had the lowest number of hospital beds 
of any province-0.57 per thousand people (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 13). After 
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independence, the Sudanese government did not treat the population much better- the 
main complaint among Darfuris in the 1980s was that the government in Khartoum was 
not treating them as full citizens of the state, and that villages had scarcely better services 
than during colonialism (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 16).  
As mentioned above, the situation did not improve after independence. The 
successive governments in Khartoum neglected Darfur: there are a lack of schools, 
hospitals, and paved roads in Darfur. According to Prunier (2008), in the 1980s, the water 
system in El-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, was so tainted that the people living there were 
becoming sick from the sewage in the water (p. 50). In addition to water supply 
problems, a major famine hit Darfur in the 1980s, and was at first ignored by the 
government. The Minister of Finance publicly dismissed the reports of famine, calling 
them an exaggeration, and when Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps started 
appearing near Khartoum, the government responded by claiming they were all refugees 
from Chad and forcibly deported them by truck back to Darfur (Prunier, 2008, p. 51).  
Omar al-Bashir also angered the various ethnic groups in Darfur when he made an 
agreement with Muammar Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, to allow Libya to use Darfur as a 
back-door entrance during Libya’s war with Chad in exchange for weapons (Flint & de 
Waal, 2005, p. 25).  
When Omar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in 
1989, they made it clear that they favored the Arab groups over the African ones. When 
the amount of arable land began to decrease due to overgrazing and desertification, the 
African groups, largely farmers, began to restrict access to their land, which angered the 
Arabs, who needed the land to water their camels and other animals (Marlowe, Bain, & 
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Shapiro, 2006, p. 108). In response to the conflict, the government armed the Arab 
groups and encouraged them to take the land from the farmers by force (Marlowe et al., 
2006, p.108).  
This favoritism led to resentment among the African groups, which in turn led to 
the formation of rebel groups and a civil war beginning in 2003. The rebel groups 
demanded equal sharing of resources and development in Darfur (Marlowe et al., 2006, 
p. 113). Marlowe et al. (2006) sum up the government’s position perfectly: 
Omar Bashir’s government is drawn from a small number of elite tribes from the 
Khartoum area in northern Sudan. The regime is largely unpopular with the vast 
majority of Sudanese citizens, no matter the ethnicity. As with many small 
governments resting on a small power base and trying to retain control, it relies on 
chaos in order to survive, certainly in order to justify its oppressive measures (pp. 
68-69). 
In order to fight the rebels, the government armed Arab tribes, giving them a 
monthly payment of 150,000 Sudanese pounds a day, plus 20,000 pounds a day for a 
horse or camel, and promised them they could keep any loot they could carry (Flint & de 
Waal, 2005, p. 40). These armed militias became known as the Janjaweed or Janjawid, 
roughly translated as “devils on horseback” (Prunier, 2008, p. 65). The government in 
Khartoum has no desire to change the social, political, and economic structures of Sudan, 
which heavily favor the Arabs and an elite group in Khartoum, so it has resorted to 
violence, slavery, and genocide in order to stay in power. 
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Dehumanization 
 It has been argued that perpetrators of genocide are evil, “monsters”, sadistic, 
mentally ill, etc. However, as mentioned previously, Waller (2002) argues that it was 
ordinary individuals who commit extraordinary evil (p. 18). After the Holocaust, some 
psychiatrists studied the brains of top Nazis awaiting trial, to see if it could be proved that 
the Nazis were insane (Waller, 2002, p. 58). Psychiatrists administered IQ tests and the 
Rorschachs test to test sanity and for mental illnesses; the results showed that with the 
exception of one individual, the Rorschachs tests showed all Nazi defendants were sane, 
and most fell into the superior to very superior range on the IQ tests (Waller, 2002, pp. 
58-61). Thus, the argument that perpetrators are insane, evil, or mentally deficient has 
been disproved.  
 Although the argument that perpetrators are mentally unstable is not a valid one, 
there are some psychological adaptations human beings make that can lead to 
participation in genocide (Waller, 2002, p. 152). For example, humans can be taught 
xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and desire for social dominance for the group they belong to 
(Waller, 2002, pp. 152-153). In addition, Waller argues that perpetrators have to 
rationalize the extreme acts they are carrying out, and can do so by placing individuals 
and groups outside the border in which moral rules and values apply (p. 186). By 
justifying their actions, perpetrators can remove their own moral imperative against 
killing, and can even defend their actions as moral (Waller, 2002, p. 186). Waller claims 
that there are three binding factors on groups that apply to perpetrator groups: 1. 
Diffusion of responsibility so each person is only responsible for a small part of the act; 
2. Deindividuation, or the state in which a person cannot be identified as a specific 
57 
 
 
individual, but only as a member of the group (for example, seeing a Tutsi not as 
individual X, but only as a Tutsi); and 3. Conformity to pressure, which is when an 
individual will conform so he/she is liked and accepted by other people and will not be 
subjected to punishment or ridicule (pp. 212-219).  
 Waller (2002) also examines dehumanization and its impact on the killers. He 
claims that victims are first deprived of their identity via defining them by a category 
such as ethnic group, and then they are excluded from the community of the human 
family (pp. 244-245). Perpetrators regard victims as beings outside the moral universe of 
humans, and use linguistic dehumanization on the victims, such as calling Jews “vermin”, 
and “parasites” and calling Tutsis “cockroaches” (Waller, 2002, pp. 246-247). Waller 
argues that dehumanization is also carried out by reducing victims to statistics, such as 
stating how many people were killed, tortured, etc.; individuals go from having separate 
identities and stories to being lumped into the category of victims and having their lives 
reduced to facts and figures (p. 247). An interesting assertion made by Waller is that 
people-not just perpetrators, but also individuals inside and outside the community-will 
blame the victim for what happens to them (p. 250). Waller argues that we do this 
because although we know bad things happen to good people, we do not wish to 
relinquish our belief that the world is a fair and just place; therefore, we blame the 
victims by asking why they did not leave or fight back, or by casting aspersions on their 
character (p. 250).  This can be seen in Darfur, where rape victims have been blamed for 
their attack or cast out by their families and communities. Blaming the victim is a form of 
dehumanization, albeit one that we do not recognize we are doing.  
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Like Waller, Moshman (2005) claims that it is “…crucial to our self-conceptions 
to see ourselves as fundamentally different from the perpetrators. Thus we are reassured 
by simplistic theories that present the perpetrators as evil beings in the grip of genocidal 
hatred” (p. 192). Moshman (2005) defined genocidal hatred as a murderous hate directed 
at a racial, ethnic, national, cultural, political, or other abstract group based on a person’s 
affiliation with the hated group rather than their individual characteristics (pp. 186-187). 
In his short article, Moshman (2005) explored the genocide in Rwanda and the Nazi 
death camp Treblinka to see how hatred played a role in each genocidal act. Hatred has 
been emphasized in Rwanda; western accounts of the genocide called up an image of 
ancient tribal hatreds, and Simon Bikindi’s song “I Hate Hutus”, a song attacking 
moderate Hutus in Rwanda, has been used as an example to support the argument that 
hatred played a role in the killings (Moshman, 2005, pp. 188-190).  
Moshman (2005) claims that the emphasis on hatred in Rwanda deflects attention 
away from other bases for genocide and impedes the creation of more complex theories 
on why genocide occurs (p. 190). Instead of hatred, Moshman (2005) asserts that in 
Rwanda, the genocide was partially political due to Rwanda’s history, as well as 
psychological elements (pp. 188-189). When Moshman (2005) examined Treblinka, he 
looked at what the camp commander Franz Stangl said in a series of interviews done in 
prison after the war (p. 192). Contrary to popular belief, Stangl claimed that he did not 
hate the Jews. Instead, he saw them as cargo or like a herd of cows: when he was on a 
train in Brazil, he saw cattle at a slaughterhouse looking trustingly at the people on the 
train; this reminded him of how the Jews looked in Poland just before they entered the 
transport trains (Moshman, 2005, p. 193). Moshman (2005) argues that dehumanization 
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is different from hate, because hatred makes it possible to kill those we see as people, 
whereas genocide makes it possible to kill without hating, as a farmer might kill a cow (p. 
194).  
Moshman (2005) concludes his article by contending that genocidal hatred is not 
a driving force for genocide; it does exist, but dehumanization may be a more important 
basis for genocide (p. 206). Hatred is an attitude towards a person or group, whereas 
dehumanization is a process of placing a person or group outside the realm of personhood 
and outside the universe of moral obligation (Moshman, 2005, p. 206). Moshman (2005) 
is correct when he points out that we (humans) tend to overemphasize the role of hatred 
in genocide because we want to see perpetrators as very different from ourselves, instead 
of as individuals who are the same as us but were convinced to take part in genocide (p. 
207). According to Moshman (2005), what we need is a theory that explains how 
ordinary individuals can come to commit genocide (p. 207).  
As mentioned previously in the chapter, David Livingstone Smith (2011) explores 
why human beings dehumanize one another, and how dehumanization has been used 
throughout history. Smith (2011) defines dehumanization as “…the act of conceiving of 
people as subhuman creatures rather than as human beings” (p. 26). Smith (2011) points 
out that committing violence against a person does not make the person subhuman, but 
perceiving people as subhuman often makes them the objects of violence and victims of 
degradation (p. 28). Smith (2011) makes a connection between outgroup bias and 
dehumanization when he states that outgroup bias is when individuals favor members of 
their own community and discriminate against outsiders, as well as seeing members of 
their own group as more industrious, diligent, etc. (p.49). Smith (2011) brings up the 
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point that dehumanization is used in war, because war cannot occur unless members of 
one group are willing to go out and kill members of another group, and, in order to be 
able to do so, the group needs to see the outsiders as subhuman (pp. 60-61). Smith (2011) 
argues that people are innately biased against outsiders, and this bias is used in 
propaganda to motivate individuals to kill each other; thus, while dehumanization is a 
cultural process and not a biological one, it rides on our innate biases in order to be 
effective (p. 71).  
Smith (2011) describes the dehumanization process as a two-step process. The 
first step is for the target group to be seen as a distinct kind of persons, ones who are 
radically different from the other group; the second step is to attribute a subhuman 
essence to the group (Smith, 2011, p. 186). Smith claims that dehumanizers always 
identify their victims with animals associated with violence, for example, rats or 
cockroaches, animals that need to be exterminated (p. 223). This is seen in Darfur with 
the government’s attitude that the African groups as savage and backwards, and by the 
constant referral to black Sudanese as “dogs, monkeys, and slaves” (Prunier, 2008). 
Seeing dehumanized individuals as animals that can contaminate other humans arouses 
feelings of disgust and repels an individual from the targeted group (Smith, 2011, p. 252). 
This is necessary for genocide to succeed, as individuals need to be convinced that the 
targeted group should be exterminated, and individuals who will not actively take part in 
the killings will at least passively stand by and not intervene.  
Like Smith, Goldhagen (2009) examines the role of dehumanization in genocide, 
and the effect is has on the perpetrators. Goldhagen (2009) claims that if people want to 
understand and explain why the perpetrators killed, then they must first recognize that 
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perpetrators approve of what they are doing (p. 189). According to Goldhagen (2009), by 
their very actions, perpetrators imprint on their victims’ bodies and psyches that they are 
worthless or vile beings who brought this fate upon themselves (p. 183). Goldhagen 
believes that one of the least understood aspects of participation in genocide is how 
people make the transition from the initial stage of dehumanizing language to one of 
actually eliminating the targeted group (p. 342). Tutsi survivors recounted that people 
would shout “look at that cockroach” or “look at that snake” when they passed by; calling 
the Tutsis a snake implied that they were dangerous, poisonous animals that needed to be 
killed (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 353). In Darfur, the Janjaweed refer to their victims as dogs, 
monkeys, slaves, etc. This casual use of dehumanizing language helped smooth the path 
to genocide. 
Goldhagen (2009) states that the perpetrators’ ease in convincing themselves that 
they are justified in doing to the victims what they believe the victims would have done 
to them demonstrates human beings’ vulnerability to prejudices and hate ideologies (pp. 
442-443). In the case of Rwanda, the anti-Tutsi propaganda spread by the government 
and news outlets such as RTLM repeatedly warned the Hutus that the Tutsis were 
planning to take over Rwanda and murder all Hutus; therefore, they must kill the Tutsis 
before they could kill them. This kill or be killed belief, combined with systemic 
dehumanization of the Tutsis, facilitated participation in the genocide. In Darfur, the 
government has convinced the Janjaweed that the African tribes need to be removed 
from the land because the Arabs are the rightful owners of Darfur.  
The arguments made by Waller (2002), Moshman (2005), Smith (2011), and 
Goldhagen (2009) are supported by Hatzfeld’s (2003) book on the perpetrators. Many of 
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the perpetrators described the killings as work or a job (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 15). Pio, one of 
the killers, described killing a neighbor and recalled that “In truth, it only came to me 
afterward: I had killed a neighbor. I mean, at the fatal instant I did not see in him what he 
had been before; I struck someone who was no longer close or strange to me, who wasn’t 
exactly ordinary anymore…” (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 24). Some of the other participants 
stated that they struck people with their machetes without seeing their faces, that they 
were surprised by the speed of the death, and that they felt the strain of the effort of 
killing somebody with a machete, but no personal pain (Hatzfeld, 2003).  
In addition, the killers described the Tutsis as animals, as something to throw 
away with no more meaning to them, and that the Tutsi were prey that they were hunting 
(Hatzfeld, 2003). Pancrace used hunting language when describing killing Tutsis in a 
marsh to Hatzfeld (2003): at first, it was easy because people were scared and not moving 
around a lot, but then the Tutsi were “…picking up all the tricks of the marsh game 
creatures…. Even the hunters grew discouraged” (p. 61). Aldabert told Hatzfeld (2003) 
that when the group spotted some Tutsis running away from the marshes, they would call 
them snakes because of the way they wriggled in the mud, or dogs, because many 
Rwandans did not like dogs (p. 152). Some of the perpetrators informed Hatzfeld (2003) 
that it was not possible to spare a friend or neighbor, as someone who came along after 
them would kill the person, and might do so in a slower or crueler manner (pp. 119-120).  
Conclusion 
This first part of this chapter focused on the literature on Rwandan and Darfur 
history, why genocide occurs, explanations for participation in genocide, rape in 
genocide, and the search for justice in post-genocide Rwanda. I then explored two 
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theories that help facilitate our understanding of why genocide has occurred in both 
countries: structural violence and dehumanization. The literature, as well as the theories, 
will be woven throughout chapters four and five. In the next chapter, I will describe how 
the qualitative method of case study research will be used to explain the effects of 
physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan and Darfur genocides.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will explain the qualitative research methodology I used for this 
study, which is case study. I used Yin’s (2009) book on case study to outline what case 
study is, and how a case study is conducted, including the steps done before starting the 
research and the collection of the evidence. I will end the chapter with a discussion of 
how I collected and analyzed the data and the steps taken to ensure rigor. 
What is case study? 
 According to Yin (2009), case study is a research method that allows researchers 
to look at the complete and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (p. 4). In this 
dissertation, the real-life events are the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. A more formal 
definition of case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). In both 
Rwanda and Darfur, dehumanization facilitated the genocide, and it is difficult to 
separate dehumanization from the events of each genocide.  
Case Study Research Design 
 Yin (2009) explains that there are five components of a research design for case 
study; these are a study’s questions, its propositions, the unit of analysis, logic linking the 
data to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the findings (p. 27). The study’s 
questions are the “how”, “why”, “where”, etc., that are important to narrowing down the 
topic (Yin, 2009, p. 27). As mentioned in chapter one, the research questions for this 
study are: What are the various types of dehumanization found in both genocides, and 
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what was/is their impact on the genocide? How was/is dehumanization spread in these 
countries? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-humanize both the victims 
and killers? Thus, the scope of this dissertation is limited to the role dehumanization has 
played in both genocides, as well as the types, their dissemination, and what can be done 
after a genocide to rehumanize both sides.  
According to Yin (2009), the units of analysis means that those included in the 
study must be distinguished from those outside the study (p. 32). In this study, the units 
of analysis are Rwanda and Darfur, which excludes other cases of genocide such as the 
Holocaust, and it focuses on dehumanization, therefore excluding other areas of study 
such as participation in genocide. The units of analysis focus on the dehumanized groups 
in both genocides, which necessarily excludes other populations within each country that 
were not subjected to this. The final step Yin (2009) discusses is reliability, which is 
conducting the case study so that a later researcher can follow the same procedures done 
by the researcher and arrive at the same conclusions (p. 45). Yin (2009) rightly points out 
that in order for the later researcher to do this, I must document each step of the process; 
this is also necessary for me to replicate my own study in the future (p. 45). Before I 
discuss my steps, I will briefly discuss the procedures that must be done before starting a 
case study.  
What to do before starting a case study 
 The first phase of the pre-case study protocol is to make sure the researcher is 
asking the right questions while evaluating the evidence, to make sure they understand 
why facts or events appear the way they do (Yin, 2009, p. 69). The second phase is 
“listening”, which means not only reading and interpreting what is in the text, but also 
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reading between the lines to see what significant information is not visible but is 
nonetheless important to the study (Yin, 2009, p. 70). The third phase is adapting 
procedures or plans if the research shifts or something unexpected happens; when a shift 
occurs, I must repeat and re-document any of the steps already done (Yin, 2009, p. 71). 
The fourth phase is making sure I have a firm grasp of the issues being studied, or I could 
miss some deviations, such as contradictory information (Yin, 2009, pp. 71-72). I have 
been studying both Rwanda and Darfur for over ten years now, and I studied both cases 
in my Master’s Thesis, so I met this criterion. Finally, Yin (2009) points out that the 
researcher must avoid bias: because I selected two cases I am familiar with, I could have 
made the mistake of collecting research that supports my pre-conceived notions of what 
has happened in both cases (p. 72). This issue will be discussed in more detail later on in 
this chapter.   
Type of case study used 
 There are many different types of case study that can be used. For my dissertation, 
I used multiple case design. The reason for this is that I wanted to compare and contrast 
two cases of genocide where both physical and sexual dehumanization were strongly 
used, to understand how dehumanization is used to facilitate genocide. Yin (2009) states 
that multiple case study is seen as more robust, but each case needs to be selected so they 
either predict similar results or predict contrasting results that are anticipated (pp. 53-54). 
Both Rwanda and Darfur should predict similar results. Multiple case study must contain 
literal replication, which is the conditions where the phenomenon is likely to be found, 
and theoretical replication, which is the conditions where the phenomenon is not likely to 
be found (Yin, 2009, p. 54). 
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 In addition, each case study is considered a whole case study, with each case’s 
conclusions being the information needing replication in the other cases (Yin, 2009, p. 
56). In this study, the results from Rwanda regarding physical and sexual dehumanization 
needed to be replicated in the Darfur case study. I only utilized two case studies, as the 
theories I used are straightforward and do not need an excessive degree of certainty (Yin, 
2009, p. 58). In other words, there is enough evidence that using Rwanda and Darfur will 
lead to replication between the two cases, thus another case is not necessary.  
 Yin (2009) created a very useful chart explaining the steps of a multiple case 
study project. The first step is to develop a theory you want the cases to explore; next, 
you have to choose the cases (p. 57). I tested the theory of dehumanization and its impact 
on genocide, and I chose Rwanda and Darfur because they are similar cases, yet there are 
enough differences to warrant exploring how physical and sexual dehumanization played 
a role in both genocides. After you have selected the cases, you must conduct the first 
case study, write the individual case report, and then repeat these steps with the second 
case study and any subsequent cases (Yin, 2009, p. 57).  
After the case reports have been written, the researcher has to draw cross-case 
conclusions, modify the theory as necessary, develop the policy implications, and write 
the cross-case report (Yin, 2009, p. 57). Yin (2009) explains that the simplest form of 
multiple-case study is one with literal replication; that is, cases where you know the 
outcomes and you are focusing on how and why these outcomes occurred (p. 59). I know 
the outcome of the Rwandan genocide, but the Darfur genocide is still ongoing. However, 
since most of the violence occurred between 2004-2006, I believed that I could use this 
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case despite its uncertain future, by focusing on this three-year time span and including 
policy recommendations for ending the genocide.  
Collecting Case Study Evidence 
 After selecting the cases and doing the pre-case study steps outlined by Yin 
(2009), I started collecting the evidence I needed for this dissertation. According to Yin 
(2009), the sources of evidence for case study include: documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts (p. 102). 
Due to the fact that I did a content analysis study, I did not conduct interviews or observe 
the populations. I did collect documentation, archival records, and interviews done with 
survivors and perpetrators by other scholars and journalists. However, as Yin (2009) 
points out, documents may not always be accurate or unbiased (p. 103). Therefore, he 
recommends corroborating any documents with other sources that verify spellings, titles, 
and names of organizations mentioned in a document, provide specific details that 
validate the evidence in another document, and provide information you can make an 
inference from (p. 103). In addition, Yin (2009) recommends the use of multiple sources 
in order to address a broader range of issues, as well as assisting with triangulation (pp. 
115-116). Triangulation occurs when the events or facts of the case study have been 
supported by more than one source of data (Yin, 2009, p. 116). I collected evidence from 
various sources, including books, journal articles, NGOs, and news articles. I used 
reputable news sources, such as the BBC, and internationally recognized NGOs such as 
Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Borders, and Amnesty International, to ensure 
reliability and validity. 
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Analyzing the evidence 
 Yin (2009) outlines four general strategies for analyzing the case study evidence; 
the first is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to the case study, the second is to 
develop a descriptive framework for organizing the case study, the third is to use both 
qualitative and quantitative data, and the fourth is to look at rival explanations (pp. 130-
134). I spent several months collecting data for this dissertation. I looked for sources on 
genocide in general; information specifically on Rwanda and Darfur; general 
explanations of dehumanization; broad information on dehumanization in genocide; and 
specific information on dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur. While I collected the 
evidence, I followed Yin’s advice in step 1, to follow my theoretical proposition. I 
theorized that physical and sexual dehumanization were/are widely spread throughout the 
populations in both genocides, and that the various types used facilitated support for, or 
participation in, each genocide. I have also theorized that rape in both cases was/is an act 
of genocide. Keeping this in mind, I read and re-read each source with my theoretical 
framework in mind, looking for phrases or words that supported my theory. 
 In terms of the second step, I had an initial set of research questions that I kept in 
the back of my head as I collected and read my sources. I looked for certain keywords, 
such as dehumanization, rape, and genocide. When I did a search for “physical 
dehumanization”, I was able to find sources, but when I sought information on “sexual 
dehumanization”, the results were surprisingly limited. Almost no sources mention sexual 
dehumanization specifically, although many sources did include elements of sexual 
dehumanization in their writings. This may be the case because sexual dehumanization is 
a relatively new term, or there may not be much literature on it. The term rape was found 
70 
 
 
in many sources, but I made sure to read each one thoroughly to ensure that rape was 
mentioned multiple times, not just once or twice. I also included the words “racism” and 
“race” in my search for literature on Sudan, as systemic racism against the so-called 
African groups in Darfur and other parts of Sudan has existed for many decades and 
contributes to the physical dehumanization of the targeted groups. This yielded some 
useful sources. As I read and marked up each source, I began to formulate a descriptive 
framework for how to structure my case studies. I made the decision to start each case 
with physical dehumanization, and then transition into discussing sexual dehumanization. 
The reason for this is because there is a fair amount of research done on physical 
dehumanization, but very little on sexual dehumanization, so I wanted to focus more 
attention on this aspect of genocide. 
 For step 3, using both qualitative and quantitative data, I did include some 
quantitative sources, but the majority of my research was qualitative. The reason for this 
is that while the quantitative studies I used provided helpful information, they lacked the 
ability to fully explain the “how” and “why” of physical and sexual dehumanization. 
Quantitative studies have been done on dehumanization using experiments that prove that 
humans in general dehumanize each other, depending on the circumstances. However, in 
terms of genocide, while quantitative research can provide a breakdown of numbers on 
topics such as how many people participated in a genocide, the number of people killed 
in an area, etc., they do not provide an explanation for why people participated or why 
people were killed in one area, but not another. Qualitative research that included 
interviews with perpetrators and survivors provided the best insight for me into how 
dehumanization was/is used in both cases. Qualitative research done on rape in general 
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and rape in genocide specifically helped bolster my analysis of sexual dehumanization 
and how rape is an act of genocide. While a quantitative study on physical and sexual 
dehumanization can be done, I chose to do a qualitative study because I believe it 
provided me with a more robust, well rounded dissertation. 
 As mentioned above, Yin’s (2009) final step for analyzing case study evidence is 
to look at rival explanations for the phenomenon in question (p. 133). Some of the 
literature I used in this dissertation argued that what is happening in Darfur is not 
genocide, because it does not meet the criterion of intentionality. While I disagree, I did 
not let that affect my analysis of the literature, as the authors made several good points 
about an aspect of the events in Darfur that I found useful for this study. I also kept in 
mind that the labeling of Darfur as “genocide” has been contentious; while the U.S. and 
several other countries have used this term, many others, including most Middle East 
countries, do not. Thus, I could not ignore or refuse to include literature on Darfur that 
did not call the events genocide. Another rival explanation is that rape in genocide is not 
different from rape in war or rape in general, and therefore, does not merit special 
attention. While I understand this argument to some extent, I respectfully disagree. I 
believe that rape in genocide is different, because the intentionality is different; I will 
expand on this point in chapters four and five.  
 As I was analyzing the evidence, I had to determine what type of analytic 
technique I wanted to use. After reading about the different types in Yin’s (2009) book, I 
decided to use explanation building (p. 141). In explanation building, “… the case study 
evidence is examined, the theoretical positions are revised and the evidence is once again 
examined from a new perspective…” (Yin, 2009, p. 143). Explanation building wants to 
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explain how or why something has happened, using a significant theoretical proposition; 
in other words, the explanation might provide insights into social science theory, which 
in turn can lead to recommendations for future policy actions (Yin, 2009, p. 141).  
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain how physical and sexual 
dehumanization are used in genocide, and my hope was to offer some recommendations 
for how to stop the spread of physical and sexual dehumanization in a country that is on 
the brink of genocide or where a genocide has just begun, as well as ideas on how to 
rehumanize not just the victims, but also the perpetrators. Therefore, explanation building 
was the best analytic technique to use for this study. However, as Yin (2009) points out, 
the danger of using explanation building is that the researcher may begin to drift away 
from the original topic; to counter this, I followed his advice to constantly refer to the 
purpose of this study (p. 144).  
 To ensure that my analysis is rigorous and of a high quality, I followed the four 
steps Yin (2009) outlined. Step 1 is that you show that you exhaustively covered your 
main research questions; the analysis should show how the study used as much evidence 
as possible, while leaving no loose ends (p. 160). I did this by conducting an extensive 
literature review on my topic, using variations of keywords and phrases in order to find as 
much literature as possible to support my study. The evidence was analyzed and then 
reanalyzed in order to ensure that important information was not missed. I also made sure 
to look for any inferred information in each document. Step 2 is to address, if possible, all 
the major rival explanations (pp. 160-161). As mentioned above, I did include sources 
that argued Darfur is not genocide, and that rape in genocide should not be treated 
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differently from rape in war or in general. These rival explanations will be explored in 
more detail in the following chapters.  
Step 3 is to make sure that your analysis addresses the most significant aspect of 
your case study (p. 161). The most important aspects of my case study are physical and 
sexual dehumanization, and my analysis covered these aspects in great detail. I made sure 
to keep in mind what the purpose of this study was, so that my analysis would not 
meander or leave the reader confused as to what the study was about. Step 4 is to use 
your own prior knowledge in your case study (p. 161). As mentioned earlier, I have been 
studying the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur for over ten years now, and I used both 
genocides as cases in my Master’s Thesis. I have written papers on different aspects of 
the genocides, such as the role of the media in the Rwandan genocide. This prior 
knowledge has been very beneficial, as it allowed me to focus my literature searches on 
specific aspects of each genocide, due to the fact that I already had literature on the 
history of each genocide. Being familiar with both cases also meant that I would not get 
bogged down in attempting to understand the intricacies of both cases, which can be time 
consuming. When I was first learning about both genocides, I had to spend a large 
amount of time ensuring that I knew both cases in detail, including how the genocides 
started, who participated in the genocide, what the international response was/is, and how 
the genocide ended in the case of Rwanda. Having this knowledge already made finding 
the most useful sources much easier, as it meant that I could discard sources with 
inaccurate information, which would have been detrimental to my study. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
 This chapter explored the methodology used in the dissertation. I explained what 
case study is, how it is conducted, and the type of case study I used. I outlined how my 
case study was carried out, including the collection and analyzing of literature. Having 
explained the methodology, I will now describe both cases in great detail in chapter four 
and five. Chapter four will look at physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan 
genocide, while chapter five will explore physical and sexual dehumanization in Darfur.  
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Chapter 4: Case Study Rwanda 
Chapter Introduction  
 In this chapter, I will examine the physical and sexual dehumanization that 
occurred in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. I will start the chapter off with a brief overview 
of the genocide, in order to provide the reader with a context. Next, I will look at the 
various types of physical dehumanization used in Rwanda and how structural violence 
facilitated the dehumanization. After that, I will explore sexual dehumanization, 
including the mass rape and torture of women during the genocide. Lastly, I will 
conclude the chapter with a summation of the previous sections and final thoughts on 
dehumanization in general in Rwanda.  
Overview of Rwandan Genocide 
 During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus 
were murdered in 100 days. This equated to around 8,000 a day, which meant around 333 
lives lost per hour, or around 5 lives per minute (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 133). Those who 
took part in the killings included doctors, teachers, farmers, and members of the clergy. 
According to Gourevitch (1998), neighbors killed neighbors in their homes, doctors 
killed patients, and teachers killed students in hospitals and schools all across Rwanda (p. 
115). As mentioned in chapter 1, the killings were highly organized: members of the 
Interahamwe prepared small groups in neighborhoods, as well as drawing up lists of 
Tutsis to be executed and organizing retreats where members practiced burning houses 
and hacking up dummies with machetes (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 94-95). The media, 
including Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), disseminated anti-Tutsi 
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propaganda, such as calling Tutsis “cockroach” and reminding listeners not to take pity 
on women and children and kill every Tutsi in Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).   
The reasons for why the genocide occurred are complex, and the genocide cannot 
be described as the result of ancient tribal hatred. However, there are historical aspects to 
the genocide, including the legacy of colonialism. The Belgians were the colonial rulers 
in Rwanda after World War 1, and the Belgians saw the Tutsi as “racially superior”, 
based on the idea of race science and the supposedly superior features of the Tutsis, 
including being taller and having longer, thinner noses (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 52). The 
colonizers put the Tutsis into positions of power over the majority ethnic Hutus. The 
Belgians issued identity cards based on ethnicity and used them for job and school 
placements (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 56-57). The Hutus were denied education and job 
opportunities, forced to do communal work, and taught that they were racially “inferior” 
to the Tutsis.  
When Rwanda gained its independence in 1959, the Tutsis were removed from 
power, and Hutu leaders were elected. Massacres against the Tutsis began in 1959, as 
Rwanda was taking steps towards becoming an independent country. The killings often 
happened without any government intervention to stop the killings or punish those 
responsible, which helped lay the foundations for the 1994 genocide. In 1973, Juvenal 
Habyarimana overthrew the government and formed a dictatorship, with a small group of 
Hutus close to his family running the country. During his dictatorship, attacks against the 
Tutsi decreased, although the Tutsis had little rights under the regime, and were banned 
from the military. Most Tutsi were willing to live with the restrictions, though, in 
exchange for some security and peace (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 69).  
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The fragile security in Rwanda was shattered when the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990. The RPF called for the right of the 
Tutsis living outside Rwanda, including refugees from previous killings, to be allowed to 
return to the country. In addition, the RPF wanted a power-sharing government between 
the Hutus and Tutsis. President Habyarimana agreed to negotiate with the RPF in 1993, 
and the Arusha Accords were signed in Tanzania to end the war and set up a multi-party 
system in Rwanda; the Arusha Accords also led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
force to monitor and enforce the peace agreement. President Habyarimana’s acquiescence 
to the Arusha Accords was seen as a traitorous act by Hutu extremists, who began calling 
for his death. On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana and the president of Burundi 
were assassinated when the plane they were in was shot down over Kigali (Gourevitch, 
1998, p. 110). Almost immediately, the killings began. 
Despite the presence of UN soldiers, the international community did little to 
respond to the killings. The UN left a force of only 300 soldiers to mandate the peace 
agreement, which meant that the peacekeepers were not allowed to intervene in killings. 
The UN withdrew most of the troops after 10 Belgian peacekeepers were tortured and 
killed by Hutu militias. This led to Belgium withdrawing all of its troops, and the US, 
still haunted by the death of its soldiers in Mogadishu, calling for a complete withdrawal 
of the UN peacekeeping force, despite the fact that Romeo Dallaire’s call for an 
expanded peacekeeping force would not have required American troops (Gourevitch, 
1994, p. 150).  The US government also refused to categorize the killings as genocide, 
because it believed that doing so would force the US to take military action (Gourevitch, 
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1998, p. 153). The violence ended only after the RPF was successfully able to overthrow 
the government in July 1994 (Gourevitch, 1994, p. 162). 
Facilitation of Physical Dehumanization 
While some have argued that the genocide in Rwanda was the result of chaos and 
anarchy, Gourevitch (1998) rightly points out that the genocide was the outcome of an 
authoritarian, organized, and meticulously ruled state (p. 95). Gourevitch (1998) further 
argues that genocide requires great ambition and needs to be conceived as the means to 
achieving a new order (p. 17). In addition, Gourevitch (1998) claims that the organizers 
and perpetrators of genocide do not need to enjoy killing, but above everything else, want 
their victims dead so badly that they consider it a necessity (p. 18). Mob rule may work 
temporarily in genocide, but there needs to be some factor that motivates people to 
participate day after day, to keep killing after the first victim (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 17).  
Another common argument made is that genocide is a result of hatred, that the 
perpetrators kill because they hate the victims. While this may be true in some cases, 
Moshman (2005) points out that hatred can be manipulated for political reasons, and that 
dehumanization is more likely to affect participation (p. 194). Moshman (2005) argues 
that dehumanization makes it possible to kill a person without hating them; using the 
analogy of killing a cow, he argues that it is possible to do so because you no longer see 
the individual as human (p. 194).  
Dehumanization played a large role in facilitating participation in the Rwandan 
genocide. Dehumanizing rhetoric and language was spread by the media and the 
government to persuade people to kill the Tutsis. The 1990 invasion by the RPF and 
subsequent peace talks led the government to fear that their domination of the Rwandan 
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economy and society would end when they would be forced to share power with the 
Tutsis. As mentioned in chapter 2, about 15 percent of the farmers in Rwanda owned half 
of the land (Uvin, 1998, p. 113), and in Butare, the richest 10 percent earned 66.4 percent 
of the region’s income in 1992 (Uvin, 1998, p. 115). President Habyarimana’s wife 
Agathe ran a small influential group called the akazu, or little house. The akazu 
controlled the political, economic, and military muscle and the patronage that was 
eventually called “Hutu Power” (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 80-81). If anyone crossed Agathe 
or the akazu, they were assassinated or jailed (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 81). Thus, this group 
was determined to prevent the power and resource sharing, and began planning to 
eliminate the Tutsi. 
One of the first steps taken toward dehumanization by the government was to 
place the Tutsis in a different group from the Hutus, to make the Tutsis the “outgroup” 
(Smith, 2011, p. 49). The Tutsis were seen as the “other,” creating an “us and them” 
mentality (Smith, 2011, p. 49). When one group sees the other as separate, they begin to 
discriminate against the outgroup, seeing them as deserving of their suffering, as less 
hardworking, honest, etc. (Smith, 2011, p. 49). Moshman (2007) explains that identity in 
Rwanda changed to the point where people were identified first and foremost as Hutu or 
Tutsi, with all other identifiers being a distant second (p. 119).  Moreover, Moshman 
(2007) points out that if the outgroup is seen as something other than human, “…then 
they cannot share interests, values, or commitments with ‘us’” (p. 123). The RPF 
invasion in 1990 allowed the government to claim that all the Tutsis living in Rwanda 
were RPF sympathizers and spies, and that, unlike the Hutus, they were traitors to their 
country (Gourevitch, 1998). By labeling the Tutsis as traitors, the government was 
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making it clear that any actions taken against them would not be punished, and might 
even be rewarded. 
Another common tactic used in dehumanization in fear; that is, creating a fear that 
the other group is out to eliminate the ingroup. The Rwandan government used the 
mirroring method, whereby the outgroup is accused of wanting to take actions that the 
ingroup are actually preparing to do (Chrétien, 2007, p. 55). In other words, the Tutsis 
were accused of wanting to kill all of the Hutus, when in fact the government was 
preparing to slaughter all of the Tutsis. The 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the RPF led to 
fears that the Tutsis planned to take back over the country and return the system to what 
it was during the colonial era, when the Hutus were a repressed majority (Gourevitch, 
1998). RTLM and newspapers like Kangura called on Hutus to take up arms to defend 
themselves against the RPF and Tutsis living inside Rwanda (Gourevitch, 1998). 
Gourevitch (1998) recounts that the government declared all Tutsis to be RPF 
accomplices and stated that any Hutus who did not support this view would be viewed as 
“Tutsi-loving traitors” (p. 83). In addition, Hassan Ngeze, the editor of Kangura, argued 
that all Tutsi women were RPF agents and that all Tutsis were dishonest, and the Minister 
of Justice during that time period argued that 99% of the Tutsis were pro-RPF 
(Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 88; 98). The use of fear led many to see the situation as “kill or be 
killed”, and many perpetrators justified their actions on the grounds of self-defense. 
After establishing that the Tutsis were spies and traitors determined to take over 
the country, the government began using dehumanizing language and rhetoric to instill in 
the population a belief that the Tutsis were not like them, that they were not even human. 
As Smith (2011) rightly points out,  
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We are innately biased against outsiders. This bias is seized upon and 
manipulated by propaganda to motivate men and women to slaughter one another. 
This is done by inducing men to regard their enemies as subhuman creature, 
which overrides their natural, biological inhibitions against killing (p. 71). 
The popular radio station RTLM started the dehumanization process in a slow and subtle 
manner. RTLM was popular because its announcers were quick witted, humorous, and at 
times irreverent toward the government (Des Forges, 2007, p. 44). The station would 
make funny jokes about the Tutsis, such as a suggestion to air mail Tutsis to Uganda 
(Gourevitch, 1998). RTLM used the word inyenzi (cockroach) casually, which at first 
shocked people but then led to them becoming accustomed to hearing, and even using, 
the term to describe Tutsis (Gourevitch, 1998). RTLM increased their hateful rhetoric as 
the government and RPF began negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. According to Des 
Forges (2007), RTLM announcers used the terms inyenzi and Tutsi interchangeably, also 
using the term RPF, which lead the listeners to conclude that all the Tutsis were RPF 
supporters; in addition, RTLM warned listeners that RPF soldiers would be dressed in 
civilian clothes and encouraged listeners to look for any refugees who looked like they 
might be disguised RPF members-essentially, anyone who was Tutsi (p. 48).  
 Unlike RTLM, Kangura immediately used anti-Tutsi rhetoric and language. 
Hassan Ngeze, the newspaper’s editor, was hired by the government to write a newspaper 
that supported the government and attacked the RPF and Tutsis (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 
85). Ngeze published documents that he claimed showed that the RPF was part of a Tutsi 
supremacist campaign to subjugate the Hutus and ran lists of names of Tutsis and Hutu 
accomplices that were traitors to the government (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 86). Ngeze 
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published the infamous “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which commanded Hutu men to 
avoid marrying, befriending, or employing Tutsi women, prohibited Hutus from having 
business dealings with Tutsis, and the most famous and oft-quoted commandment, 
commandment 8, which declared that “Hutus must stop having mercy on the Tutsis” 
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 88). Ngeze promoted Hutu supremacy and used his critics’ attacks 
to his advantage: Gourevitch (1998) describes an instance where a rival newspaper ran a 
cartoon with Ngeze on a psychiatrist’s couch complaining that his sickness was the 
Tutsis; Ngeze then ran the cartoon in Kangura (p. 87). Ngeze’s inflammatory rhetoric 
made Kangura one of the most widely read newspapers, and certainly the one Rwandans 
remember the most from that time period (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 87).  
 Both RTLM and Kangura used stereotypes of Tutsi features and mannerisms to 
mark them as the outgroup. According to Gourevitch (1998), Tutsis were seen as 
“…lanky and long-faced, not so dark-skinned, narrow-nosed, thin-lipped, and narrow-
chinned” (p. 50). Tutsis were also described as not eating often, preferring to drink milk 
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 209). While some Tutsis fit these stereotypical descriptions, such as 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame who is very tall and thin, most Tutsis did not. After 
generations of intermarriage between Hutus and Tutsis, neither group could accurately be 
called distinct ethnic groups (Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 45-46). Most distinction of Hutu vs. 
Tutsi came from their roles in society: Tutsis were herders of cattle, and Hutus farmed the 
land (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48). However, the Belgians issued identity cards labeling 
people as Hutu or Tutsi based on the attributed features of both groups, and after 
independence, the government continued this practice, with the ethnicity of the father 
determining the ethnicity of the children (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 57). While some 
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individuals could change their identity via bribery or absence/death of the father, most 
Rwandans were forced to keep the ethnicity assigned to them at birth (Gourevitch, 1998).  
 The Rwandan government facilitated the dehumanization of Tutsis for a variety of 
reasons. First, the global prices of coffee and tea, Rwanda’s main exports, dropped 
drastically in the late 1980s, causing major economic problems in the country (Uvin, 
1998, p. 54). This meant that Rwanda had to increasingly rely on foreign aid, which came 
with strings attached: the United States and many European countries demanded an 
opening of the political system to include multiple political parties and open democracy 
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 82). President Habyarimana had no choice but to play along; he 
allowed for the creation of opposition parties and newspapers, but often cracked down on 
the opposition by arresting or killing politicians and editors (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 86). 
Habyarimana knew that if he allowed for free and open elections, he would lose power, 
along with the Akazu. According to Uvin (1998), before the genocide, in the province of 
Butare, the richest 10 percent earned 66.4 percent of that region’s income; about 90 
percent of the rural population lived below the poverty line, and the country was unable 
to feed itself due to overpopulation and unequal land distribution (pp. 115-117).  
 The lack of economic opportunities for young people led to vast frustration, and it 
did not help that the government limited the population’s mobility: residency and travel 
permits were required to stay or move anywhere, to prevent slums in and around Kigali, 
the capital (Uvin, 1998, pp. 115-116). Young men were trapped on plots of land that were 
incapable of providing for a family, which meant that they could not get married, nor 
could they seek an education or a better job (Uvin, 1998, p. 118). A young, frustrated and 
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angry population could have spelled major trouble for the Habyarimana regime, but he 
was saved when the RPF invaded in 1990.  
 The RPF invasion gave Habyarimana a convenient scapegoat for Rwanda’s 
problems: the Tutsis that he claimed wanted to take back over the country and subjugate 
the Hutus. Although many Tutsis in Rwanda were no better off than their Hutu 
counterparts, the government was successfully able to convince Rwandans that the Tutsis 
were dominating the economic sectors and preventing Hutus from improving their 
situation. As Uvin (1998) points out, 
When people are denied the realization of their full human and intellectual 
potential, when they are deprived of choices and information, they are more easily 
manipulated. When people are treated in a humiliating and prejudicial manner, 
when they are made to lose their self-respect, the result in frustration and anger, as 
well as a strong need to regain self-respect and dignity (p. 136).  
Habyarimana and the Akazu knew that they would need to channel that anger and 
frustration in another direction, away from them. Thus, they convinced the population 
that the Tutsis were to blame for their problems, and that the RPF invasion meant that the 
Tutsis planned to return Rwanda to the policies of the colonial times. The government did 
not want to lose the structure they had built and sustained post-independence, so they 
decided to remove the biggest threat to the structure, the Tutsis. As Uvin (1998) explains, 
racism was a means for ordinary Rwandans to make sense of their predicament, of their 
misery via projection and scapegoating (p. 217). Uvin (1998) also claims that 
…Structural violence lowers the barriers against the use of violence. As the norms 
of society lose legitimacy, as people’s knowledge base is reduced to slogans, as 
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progress becomes a meaningless concept, as communities are riveted by conflict 
and jealousy, as people’s sense of self-respect is reduced, and as segments of 
society show their contempt for the rules of decency as well as for farmers, people 
become increasingly unhampered by constraints on the use of violence to deal 
with problems (p. 138). 
The government of Rwanda prepared people for the use of violence by importing and 
distributing machetes, creating the Interahamwe, drawing up lists of Tutsis to target, and 
organizing retreats where militia members would practice burning houses, tossing 
grenades, and hacking up dummies with machetes (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 93). Over the 
course of at least two years, the government prepared its citizens to slaughter Tutsis 
without mercy.  
Physical Dehumanization 
Tutsis as Animals 
 Arguably, the most famous dehumanizing term used against the Tutsi was inyenzi, 
or “cockroach.” As Gourevitch (1998) explains, the Tutsi rebels were the first to be called 
cockroaches, and they used the term themselves to “…describe their stealth and their 
belief that they were uncrushable” (p. 64). However, as Higiro (2007) points out, 
“cockroaches are annoying insects that disappear when somebody turns on the light. The 
only way to get rid of them is to kill all of them” (p. 85). Having dealt with cockroaches 
in my apartment, I agree with Higiro (2007). Most people see cockroaches as annoying, 
ugly insects who must be wiped out. 
The use of a repulsive creature to describe Tutsis made it easier to convince 
people that all Tutsis, and not just the RPF, needed to be eliminated. Most people would 
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not think twice about stomping on a cockroach to kill it; thus, reducing the Tutsis to 
cockroaches helped remove the moral imperative against killing a fellow human being by 
turning them into a creature that must be stamped out. Moreover, in order to get rid of a 
cockroach infestation, you have to kill the eggs and larvae as well as the adult 
cockroaches; RTLM reminded listeners of this fact when they informed them that “A 
cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly, a cockroach gives birth to a cockroach…” 
(Melvern, 2004, p. 50).  
By using this analogy, RTLM was reminding the Interahamwe and perpetrators 
not to leave any Tutsi children alive; in fact, RTLM went so far as to remind its listeners 
to disembowel pregnant victims (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 98). The fact that use of the term 
cockroach was widespread is demonstrated in Gourevitch (1998): Paul Rusesabagina, the 
manager of the Hotel des Mille Collines told Gourevitch in an interview that a priest he 
knew, Father Wenceslas, brought his elderly Tutsi mother to the hotel for safekeeping 
and told him, “Paul, I bring you my cockroach” (p. 140-141).  
In addition to calling Tutsis cockroaches, RTLM and newspapers like Kangura 
referred to Tutsis as snakes and hyenas (Higiro, 2007, p. 87). According to Higiro (2007), 
in Rwandan culture, a hyena is the worst animal, and calling someone a hyena labels 
them a very bad person, one worthy of death (p. 85). Although dehumanization was used 
by oppositional newspapers to depict Habyarimana’s supporters, its use was more 
common in the pro-regime media (Higiro, 2007, p. 84). Kangura likened the RPF and its 
supporters to “…a snake ready to devour Rwanda and oblivious Rwandans” (Kabanda, 
2007, p. 68). Thomas Kamilindi (2007), a journalist who quit Radio Rwanda a few 
months before the genocide because of its promotion of hatred, describes an encounter 
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with the Interahamwe during the genocide: “I have a daughter. She’s twelve now but she 
was very small at the time. One day, somebody said, ‘That one is a snake. They have to 
kill her.’ She wasn’t even two years old. My daughter asked me, ‘Am I a snake? Am I a 
snake?’” (p. 138). Depicting Tutsis as snakes reduced them to dangerous creatures that 
had to be eliminated before they could harm anyone.  
Samuel Totten and Rafiki Ubaldo (2011) conducted in-depth interviews with ten 
Tutsi survivors about their experiences. One participant, Umulisa, remembered being 
frightened by what she was reading in Kangura about Tutsis. She rightly points out that 
by calling Tutsis animals that they had no connection to- instead of being called a lion, 
which implies bravery-calling Tutsis snakes labeled them an animal that is very 
dangerous and one people refuse to live with (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). Being 
called a cockroach bothered her because “ 
…everyone hates them in Rwanda because they get in our cupboards, and you try to do 
everything you can to get rid of them” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). Another 
participant, Emmanuel, shared a disturbing story about the killing of Tutsis in a school. 
The killers tortured women and girls by slashing them with machetes and beating them 
with weapons (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 46). The prefect of the community brought in 
Caterpillar tractors to push piles of corpses into mass graves; some people were still 
alive, and they had their limbs ripped off by the tractors (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 87). 
Most disturbingly, while the tractors were operating, babies could be heard crying, and 
older children were begging and crying out “Please forgive me! I will never again be a 
Tutsi!” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 87). A third participant, also named Emmanuel, was 
hiding in a church when the Interahamwe arrived (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 118). 
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Emmanuel managed to hide outside the church, but he watched as the killers threw 
grenades into the church and shot bullets into it; the killers then checked to see who was 
still alive and began killing them (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119). A pregnant woman 
was discovered and when she did not have enough money to satisfy the Interahamwe, 
one of the militias said “...they wanted to see how Tutsi children looked when they are 
still in the mother” (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119). The woman was sliced open and the 
fetus fell out; the mother screamed until she died (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 119).  
Routinization of Killing 
 In addition to the constant reinforcement of the idea that Tutsis were not human, 
RTLM used language to assure the Interahamwe and others participating in the genocide 
that what they were doing was akin to working. Li (2007) explains that RTLM would 
direct listeners to specific targets and hiding places, interviewed individuals working the 
roadblocks, and included informational updates and operational details to help frame 
work schedules and turn the killing into a routine (pp. 99-101). In addition, the killings 
were carried out by individuals working in rotating shifts, with crew leaders at times 
being elected (Li, 2007, p. 91).  To incentivize this “work”, individuals were allowed to 
loot Tutsi belongings and livestock, and a councilwoman in Kigali offered fifty Rwandan 
francs for what was called “selling cabbages”, or bringing in severed Tutsi heads 
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 115).  
 French journalist Jean Hatzfeld (2003) interviewed perpetrators in Rwanda, and 
they confirmed the routinization of killing. Several of his participants said “we had work 
to do” (p. 15) when talking about the slaughter. Léopord, one of the participants, oversaw 
his killing unit. He told Hatzfeld (2003) that he would whistle the men for assembly, 
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hurry people up, count the missing, check on any reasons for absence, and pass along 
instructions (p. 14). In many ways, Léopord’s job was similar to a manager or foreperson 
at any regular job. Two other participants, Élie and Jean-Baptiste, told Hatzfeld (2003) 
that they got no time off, not even on Sundays, and the local leaders lectured them on 
their duties, threatened in advance anyone who ruined the job, and were told they had to 
work all the way until the end, keep up a satisfactory pace, spare no one, and loot what 
they found (p. 15).  
 As the genocide became routine, the participants began to kill without seeing who 
they were striking, and if they killed someone they knew, for example a neighbor, they 
“…did not see in him what he had been before; I struck someone who was no longer 
either close or strange to me, who wasn’t exactly ordinary anymore…” (Hatzfeld, 2003, 
pp. 21-24). The perpetrators also became desensitized to the killing over time, with Élie 
telling Hatzfeld (2003) “In the end, a man is like an animal: you give him a whack on the 
head or neck, and down he goes” (p. 37). The participants in Hatzfeld’s (2003) book also 
used the term hunting when describing the tracking down of Tutsis to kill. They told 
Hatzfeld (2003) that the perpetrators changed colors from hunting and that the hunt, 
hunters and hunted were savage (p. 47). As Pancrace explains, 
In the beginning the Tutsis were many and frightened and not very active-that 
made our work easier. When we could not catch the most agile of them, we fell 
back on the puny ones. But at the end only the strong and sly ones were left, and it 
got too hard. They gathered in little groups, very well hidden. They were picking 
up all the tricks of the marsh game creatures (Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 61).  
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The routinization of the killing, combined with seeing the Tutsis as creatures to be 
hunted down and killed, made it easier for the perpetrators to kill them. Léopord 
informed Hatzfeld (2003) that the killers no longer looked at the Tutsis on a one-on-one 
basis, but as a collective group that represented a large threat to Rwanda, a threat that 
must be eliminated (p.121). Although a killer might be able to avoid killing a neighbor or 
friend, they could not save them from being killed by another member of their group; if 
they avoided them, the next killer might kill them more slowly, and/or the perpetrator 
who avoided killing them could be fined, thus the perpetrators did not even try to spare a 
neighbor’s life (Hatzfeld, 2003, pp. 120-121). Adalbert told Hatzfeld (2003) that a group 
member who wanted to save their Tutsi wife had to show great enthusiasm for the killing, 
or she would be killed (p. 122). Adalbert also explained to Hatzfeld (2003) that if they 
spotted a group of Tutsis trying to escape by crawling through the mud, they would call 
them snakes; before the killings, they called the Tutsis cockroaches, but during, they 
called them snakes or dogs (p. 132). Insulting their victims made it easier for some 
perpetrators to kill, and when Tutsis were killed in marshes, their dirty appearance made 
them seem completely different from the Hutus, which also made killing them easier 
(Hatzfeld, 2003, p. 132).  
In this section, I have explored physical dehumanization in Rwanda, including its 
facilitation, the type of language used, and the routinization of killing. However, in 
addition to the physical dehumanization, Tutsi women were subjected to sexual 
dehumanization, which will be explained in great detail in the next section.  
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Sexual Dehumanization 
Overview of Rape as Genocide 
 During the Rwandan genocide, between 250,000-500,000 women and girls were 
raped; the exact number is unknown, as many victims did not report their rape (Human 
Rights Watch, 1996, p. 24). Before I discuss rape and sexual violence against women in 
Rwanda, however, I feel it is important to provide a background on the idea of rape as an 
act of genocide. Although rape is mentioned in the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, it 
was not legally codified as such until the international tribunals for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia (Fox, 2011, p. 287). Under the Geneva Conventions, rape was 
considered a crime against a woman’s honor and was thus distinct from other crimes 
against humanity, like torture and murder (Green, 2004, p. 99). It was not until the 
international tribunals that rape was seen as an act of genocide. Allison Ruby Reid-
Cunningham (2008) sums up rape as an act of genocide perfectly when she argues that 
mass rape prevents births within the targeted group via damage to the reproductive 
capabilities or the social fitness of women (p. 281). Reid-Cunningham (2008) also rightly 
points out that rapes committed against women in the target group in a widespread and 
systematic fashion represents an assault on the community as a whole (p. 281).  
 As well as symbolizing as assault on an entire community, mass rape also tells the 
men of that community that they are unable to protect their women, thus adding to the 
shame of the community (Reid-Cunningham, 2008, p. 282). Christopher Mullins (2009) 
points out that Rwanda was a very patriarchal society, one in which women were often 
seen as the property of men (p. 720). Women were often raped in front of their husbands, 
fathers, and sons, and in some cases, their fathers or sons were forced to rape them, which 
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destroyed the men’s ability to enforce the society’s gender norms of protecting their 
women (Mullins, 2009, p. 722).  
Moreover, the Rwanda tribunal’s decision regarding rape as genocide 
acknowledged that the rapes were not sexual in nature, but a tool of war used to destroy 
the Tutsis (Russell-Brown, 2003, p. 352). It is important to note this because although 
many of the perpetrators in Rwanda used sexual terms when raping women, their overall 
goal was to destroy the Tutsis via sexual violence against the women. Many societal 
norms were destroyed during the genocide, and left women with a heavy burden to carry 
in the post-genocide society.  
Hypersexualization of Tutsi Women 
 In addition to the physical stereotypes about Tutsis, Tutsi women were subjected 
to hypersexualization by the Hutu extremists. Kangura played up the myth that Tutsi 
women were far more beautiful than Hutu women, commanding Hutu men not to 
befriend or marry a Tutsi woman, nor hire her or keep her as a concubine (Gourevitch, 
1998, p. 88). According to Human Rights Watch (1996), Hutu propaganda depicted Tutsi 
women as very sexual, willing to sleep with their Tutsi brothers; it also condemned Tutsi 
women as arrogant and looking down on Hutu men as ugly and inferior (p. 16). Thus, 
rape was used as a way to get revenge on these women for refusing to sleep with Hutu 
men. Another way Tutsi women were hypersexualized was when Kangura portrayed 
them as seductresses and spies for the RPF. Figure 1 below shows a cartoon from 
Kangura demonstrating this. 
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Figure 1. A 1994 cartoon in Kangura that says in Kinyarwanda: "General Dallaire and 
his army have fallen into the trap of Tutsi femme fatales." Note. Taken from Sai (2012).   
The propaganda successfully rendered Tutsi women as hypersexual, willing to 
seduce the Hutu to help the RPF take over the country. RPF and Kangura encouraged the 
rape of Tutsi women, describing them as sexually special; many perpetrators told their 
victims they wanted to know if Tutsi women were like Hutu women, or how they tasted 
(Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 18-19). This hypersexualization fueled the mass rape of 
women all across Rwanda during the genocide. 
Rape as an act of mental harm 
Article II of the United Nations Genocide Convention (1948) declares measures 
that cause serious bodily and mental harm to members of a group an act of genocide. As 
described in the previous paragraph, Tutsi women were hypersexualized, which 
facilitated the mass rape of women. The perpetrators subjected the Tutsis women to 
severe mental harm during the attacks. Many victims were told they were too proud and 
thus deserved to be attacked (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 19). Although the exact 
number of rape victims during the genocide is unknown, a survey conducted by 
UNAMIR of 304 survivors found that 28% of victims were under age 18; 43.75% 
between the ages of 19-26; 17.1% between 27-35; 8.55% between 36-45; and 1.6% over 
age 45 (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 24). The fact that most of the victims 
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were of an age to marry and reproduce is not coincidental, as women were generally 
targeted due to their reproductive capabilities.  
In addition to being sexually assaulted, around 70 percent of rape survivors are 
HIV positive, with a number of the cases being the result of the Hutu extremists 
encouraging perpetrators with HIV/AIDS to rape women to deliberately infect them with 
the disease (Fox, 2011, pp. 289-290). The knowledge that they would die slowly from a 
debilitating disease added to the humiliation the survivors felt. Some victims told Human 
Rights Watch (1996) that their attackers said that rather than killing them on the spot, 
they would leave them to die from their grief (p. 35). Many women begged to be killed so 
their suffering would end; instead, they were spared from death so they could be 
humiliated by being repeatedly raped (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 39). Many women 
have to live with the knowledge that their families were killed and they were only saved 
from death due to being repeatedly raped and even gang-raped.  
It is important to note that the mental harm caused by mass rape was not only 
inflicted upon the survivors, but also on their communities. As Fox (2011) points out, 
many of the women were raped in front of their husbands and sons in order to emasculate 
the men (p. 289). The inability of the men to prevent their wives and mothers from being 
raped caused mental anguish and humiliation. When Fox (2011) interviewed survivors of 
the genocide, she discovered that the men found it very difficult to talk with their 
surviving family members about their rape, as they did not know how to approach the 
subject (p. 297). More than one male genocide survivor recounted that their attempts to 
get a family member to talk about being raped were shut down by the survivor, who was 
too ashamed of their experience to discuss it (Fox, 2011, pp. 296-297). The inability of 
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rape survivors to talk about what happened to them increased their sense of isolation and 
led to a distancing of the survivor from her family. Being incapable of recounting their 
trauma to their community has caused the women to still feel humiliated and have 
nightmares, with a few telling Human Rights Watch (1996) that they have thought about 
committing suicide (p. 45).  
Another source of mental anguish for the Tutsi communities is the presence of 
rape babies. A social worker told Human Rights Watch (1996) that the children born to 
rape survivors are called the children of an Interahamwe (p. 72). According to Human 
Rights Watch (1996), although abortion is illegal in Rwanda, many women tried self-
inducing abortions or went to private clinics in Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of 
Congo if they had the money; the women who self-induced an abortion had to be treated 
for uterine infections, uterus rupturing, and hemorrhaging (pp. 77-78). In many cases, 
women who did give birth were unable to accept the child because they reminded them of 
the trauma inflicted upon them, and some women call their children “unwanted children”, 
“children of bad memories”, or “children of hate”, with some women abandoning their 
babies if they resembled their attacker too much or allowing their babies to die once they 
got home (Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 79-81).  
The mental harm done to the rape survivors as well as their communities was 
vast. Having discussed this aspect in detail, I will now discuss the other part of Article II 
of the UN Genocide Convention (1948), rape as an act that caused severe physical harm.  
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Rape as an act of physical harm 
Many of the women suffered major damage to their bodies, especially their 
reproductive organs, when they were subjected to gang rape and/or raped with a foreign 
object. Most of the women who were treated for rape after the genocide had vaginal 
infections, and some had HIV (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 25). Several of the victims 
were told by their attackers that they wanted to know what Tutsi women “tasted like” or 
“looked like” (Human Rights Watch, 1996). During the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda’s (ICTR’s) trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the mayor of Taba, a witness 
identified only as JJ told the court that when she had fled to the Bureau Communale of 
Taba for safety but was raped, Akayesu told the Interahamwe as they finished raping the 
women, “Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman tastes like…Tomorrow they will all be 
killed” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 271).  As mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, the 
hypersexualization of Tutsi women contributed to their mass rape, and this is clearly 
demonstrated via the use of the phrases “taste like” and “look like” by the attackers.  
JJ was not subjected to rape for the first time in the Bureau Communale; in fact, 
she had been raped in a sorghum field and a forest prior to fleeing to Taba for safety 
(Neuffer, 2001, p. 271). While at the Bureau Communale, she was raped by three men, 
with the third attacker being so vicious during the assault that she could not put her legs 
together; she believed she would die from the assaults (Neuffer, 2001, pp. 288-289). As a 
leader, Akayesu had a responsibility to protect the people in his area; instead, he allowed 
Tutsis to be killed and encouraged mass rape, likening Tutsi women to “…a piece of 
melon, waiting to be carved, eaten, and thrown away” (Neuffer, 2001, p. 284). The 
testimony of JJ and other survivors helped link rape to genocide, and led to Akayesu and 
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others being convicted of rape as genocide for the first time under international law 
(Neuffer, 2001, p. 272). 
Like JJ, many women were raped by more than one assailant. The rapes met two 
acts of genocide listed in the UN Genocide Convention (1948): “Causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group” and “Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group” (as cited in Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 34). Human Rights 
Watch (1996) points out that rape and sexual violence can leave a woman physically 
unable to reproduce, or she may be denied the opportunity to do so by the community 
because of the assaults (p. 35). In the following paragraphs, I will discuss individual 
stories of sexual violence against the Tutsi collected by Human Rights Watch (1996) for 
their report to provide detailed information on the physical harm carried out against the 
women. 
Bernadette was raped at a riverside by a group of six Interahamwe and thrown 
into the river to drown. When she did not die, the Interahamwe let her go, but she was 
raped by another group of Interahamwe, became pregnant, and miscarried the baby (pp. 
42-43). Perpetue was taken to a river by a group of Interahamwe, with one member 
saying they knew the best method “to check that Tutsi women were like Hutu women” 
(p. 43). For two days, Perpetue was raped by as many as 20 Interahamwe, and on the 
third day one let her go when he saw she could not walk anymore. After seeking refuge in 
a church, another Interahamwe raped her; later on, two other members sharpened the end 
of a hoe and pushed the stick inside her three times until she bled everywhere. They let 
her go, but she was raped again by another Interahamwe and black, heavy blood kept 
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oozing out of her vagina. Perpetue received medical care in Kibuye, but she has not had 
her period since the genocide ended, and her stomach swells up sometimes (pp. 43-45).  
Anne was raped by the Interahamwe, and while she was being raped, one of the 
men told her that “…they wanted to kill all Tutsi so that in the future all that would be 
left would be drawings to show that there were once a people called the Tutsi” (p. 52). 
Marie was kidnapped by the Interahamwe and marched to a neighboring commune, being 
threatened with rape along the journey. The Interahamwe came at night with torches to 
pick which women to rape; Marie was raped by three men and began urinating blood, but 
did receive medical treatment after the genocide (pp. 53-54). Constance was raped by 
four young men, some of whom were as young as 12; after they finished raping her, the 
Interahamwe told her to go because she probably had AIDS (pp. 55-56).  
Mullins (2009) recounts that in addition to being raped, many victims were 
paraded around in public naked, something that is seen as very shameful in Rwanda, 
especially if the woman is a mother (p. 729). A female student at a secondary school was 
forced to stand naked and do gymnastics in front of a crowd of Interahamwe before 
Akayesu told the Interahamwe to be sure to have sex with the girl (p. 729). Mullins 
(2009) also describes the attackers as telling their victims that they hated the Tutsi and 
were going to take free advantage of them, since the women could no longer reject them 
(p. 729). This translated into mass rape of the women, with one victim having a tree 
branch thrust into her vagina, another one being raped with a policeman’s truncheon, a 
third having a cigarette put out in her vagina, and a fourth being pierced with a spear in 
her sexual organs and having a breast cut off (Mullins, 2009, pp. 729-730).  
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In one of the interviews conducted by Totten and Ubaldo (2011) with Tutsi 
survivors about their experiences, one participant, Rose, recounted how the Interahamwe 
came into a compound where Tutsis were hiding and would grab the breasts of the 
women “…if they were still firm, not like older women, and if they [their breasts] were 
firm they would take them to rape them” (p. 29). Rose reunited with her children and was 
running toward the nearest roadblock when four of the Interahamwe raped her in front of 
her children (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 31).  
One of the most extreme examples of sexual dehumanization in Rwanda is found 
in Denise’s story: six militia men, including a neighbor she knew, came into her house 
looking for her husband. When she refused to tell them where he was, she was beaten and 
raped by one of the militias. After he had finished, he took her inside the house and held 
one of her legs open while another militia held the other one open. The first militia called 
the others inside to see what the inside of a Tutsi woman looked like; he then proceeded 
to cut out the inside of her vagina, put it on a small stick, and put the stick in the ground 
outside her house so “Everyone who comes past here will see how the Tutsikazi 
[Kinyarwanda word for Tutsi] look” (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 63). Denise was 
treated with traditional medicine by a Hutu neighbor but did not see a doctor, and has 
extreme pain during her menstrual period (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 64).  
Survivors like Denise were severely harmed by the mass rape and rape with 
foreign objects, which caused damage, sometimes permanently, to their reproductive 
organs. This left the survivors incapable of giving birth, thus eliminating the possibility 
of future births among the Tutsi population. Many survivors also do not publicly disclose 
that they were raped, as they can be ostracized by their families and their communities. 
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Human Rights Watch (1996) states that many Rwandans assume that rape victims have 
an STD, most often AIDS, which leads rape victims to fear that they will never get 
married if they admit they were raped (p. 72). In Rwandan society, women are valued for 
their roles as wives and mothers, which makes the issue of marriageability very 
important.  
In addition to women being valued for their suitability for marriage, marriage is 
the best option for many of the women to have economic stability and security, as well as 
protection (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 72). Many of the rape victims who lost family 
and do not, or cannot, marry, are unable to even farm their family’s lands, as they need 
help to work the fields (p. 72). This has left many survivors trapped in poverty, with little 
hope for improvement. Moreover, several survivors did not seek medical care as they 
were afraid of being judged by their communities and society as a whole, and even 
though some women did seek medical treatment, they did not disclose to their doctors 
that they were raped, forcing the doctors to circumvent the issue and ask other questions 
in order to find out what happened and properly treat the women (Human Rights Watch, 
1996, pp. 72-73).  
Chapter Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I explored both physical and sexual dehumanization in Rwanda in 
great detail. It was necessary to start off with a brief history of the genocide in order to 
provide the reader with a context. Next, I described how physical dehumanization was 
used in Rwanda, including the dehumanizing language used as well as its persuasiveness 
for the perpetrators of the genocide. I then briefly discussed rape as an act of genocide, 
and then delved into sexual dehumanization in Rwanda, including the hypersexualization 
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of Tutsi women as well as rape as an act of mental harm and rape as an act of physical 
harm.  
Both physical and sexual dehumanization were used quite successfully in Rwanda 
in order to facilitate the killings of the Tutsis as well as the mass rape and sexual torture 
inflicted upon the Tutsi women. The sexual abuse in the genocide has had a lasting 
impact on the survivors, both in terms of physical issues and psychological ones. We may 
never know all the costs incurred from the genocide, but it is safe to assume that they 
were very high. Having explained physical and sexual dehumanization in great detail in 
this chapter, it is now time to turn my attention to the second case study: the ongoing 
genocide in Darfur, Sudan.  
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Chapter 5: Case Study Darfur 
Chapter Introduction  
 Since 2004, a civil war and genocide has occurred in Darfur, the western region of 
Sudan. This chapter will follow the outline of chapter 4, in that I will examine both 
physical and sexual dehumanization that is occurring in Darfur. First, I will start the 
chapter off with a brief overview of the history of genocide, in order to provide the reader 
with a background. Next, I will look at the various types of physical dehumanization used 
in Darfur and how structural violence facilitated the dehumanization. After that, I will 
explore sexual dehumanization, including the mass rape and impregnation of women. 
Lastly, I will conclude the chapter with a summary of the previous sections and final 
thoughts on dehumanization in general in Darfur.  
Brief History of Genocide in Darfur 
 As mentioned above, a civil war and genocide are ongoing in Darfur. Over 
400,000 people have been killed, with millions of Darfuris being internally displaced and 
several hundred thousand living as refugees in Chad and other neighboring countries 
(Marlowe et. al., 2006, pp. 3-4). Prior to the genocide, the so-called African tribes 
(consisting mainly of the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit) and “Arab” (lighter skinned groups 
within Darfur) generally got along; the Africans were farmers, while the Arabs were 
herders, and the Africans would allow the Arabs to water and graze their livestock on 
their lands (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 7). This arrangement fell apart with the increasing 
desertification of the arable land in Darfur: farmers began enclosing their lands and 
denying the herders any use of their water and crops (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 7). A war 
between the Arabs and the Fur took place between 1987-1989, and just after the peace 
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agreement between the two sides was reached, the National Islamic Front (NIF) took 
power in a coup and installed General Omar al Bashir as Sudan’s leader (Flint & de 
Waal, 2005, p. 25). 
 The new government favored the Arab groups over the African ones, which 
angered the African tribes. This favoritism, combined with systemic racism and neglect, 
led to the formation of two rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In February 2003, the SLA and JEM rebels 
destroyed government planes in the regional capital of El Fasher, catching the 
government off guard; they subsequently carried out other attacks on police stations, 
army barracks, and convoys throughout Darfur (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p.76).  
 Rather than negotiate with the rebel groups, the government responded by arming 
local militias that became known as the Janjaweed, or “devils on horseback” who then 
attacked villages (Steidle, 2007, p. 36). The Janjaweed travel on horses and camels and 
attack villages at dawn; they shoot anyone they come across, steal livestock and 
possessions, cut down fruit trees and destroy crops, rape women and girls, and burn down 
the village (Steidle, 2007, p. 36). The complete destruction of the village and all its 
supplies is deliberately done to drive the African groups off the land and to prevent them 
from coming back to rebuild, so the Arab groups can use the land for their own purposes 
(Steidle, 2007, pp. 36-37).  
Although an African Union (AU) force is operating in Darfur, the soldiers’ roles 
are largely limited to collecting information on attacks on villages and submitting reports 
to the AU and United Nations; the AU is also forced to work with the Sudanese army in 
many cases to even access attack sites (Steidle, 2007, pp. 73-75). Over 400,000 people 
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have died; roughly half of those deaths came from the original attacks on the villages, but 
now most Darfuris are dying from disease and starvation (Steidle, 2007). Although a 
peace agreement was signed between the government and some of the rebel groups in 
2005, millions of people are still displaced and both the war and genocide are ongoing 
with no end in sight. In fact, in a recent Bloomberg article, El Wardany (2016) wrote that 
73,000 Darfuris have fled their homes in the past month due to fighting between the 
government and the rebel groups.  
Physical Dehumanization in Darfur 
Systemic Racism and Structural Violence in Sudan 
The word Darfur means “Land of the Fur”, one of the major ethnic groups in the 
region (de Waal, 2005, p. 181). Although North Sudan is seen as Arab and South Sudan 
as African, the people of Darfur use multiple identities and saw their land as 
encompassing both Arabs and Africans (de Waal, 2005, pp. 185-187). Both Arab and 
African groups have intermarried in Darfur, which can make it difficult to distinguish 
between the two groups. I was at a conference in Washington, D.C. in 2005 on the war in 
Darfur, and two men were speaking on a panel about race in Darfur. They announced to 
the audience that in Sudan, one man is defined as Arab, while the other is labeled an 
African; they then asked if anyone in the audience knew which man was which. We 
could not tell just by looking at them, which is fairly common in Darfur. However, the 
government of Sudan has decided that those with lighter skin are Arab, while those with 
black skin are African (Sharkey, 2008, p. 27). Some Arabs even refer to Darfuris as zurq, 
or “blue [dark-skinned] people” (Sharkey, 2008, p. 27).  
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After determining ethnicity based on skin color, the succeeding Arab 
governments in Khartoum created and sustained a system of racial and religious 
discrimination against the rest of the Sudanese. The government made Arabic the official 
language, which was met with resistance in South Sudan by the rebel leaders, who 
wanted Arabic-English bilingualism officially recognized by the government in education 
and governmental matters (Sharkey, 2008, p. 25). However, if a Sudanese wanted to 
attend school beyond the small village schools, they were forced to learn Arabic. Halima 
Bashir (2008), a doctor from Darfur, recounts in her autobiography that when she was 
speaking Zaghawa with a classmate during lunch when she first started school, the 
headmistress cracked both girls on the head with a stick and told them they could only 
speak Arabic at her school (p. 70). Bashir (2008) would also be hit for stepping out of 
line, and was beaten severely by a teacher when she only cleaned one side of a 
blackboard because the other girl, who was Arab, had not shown up to clean the other 
side (p. 76). Most Darfuris, however, cannot afford to attend school beyond the primary 
level.  
In addition to unequal access to education, the government of Sudan has spent the 
revenue from the oil refineries on projects in and around Khartoum, the capital. The 
government has built skyscrapers and hotels there, and the people in Khartoum are 
largely middle class or rich, which has led to the building of shopping malls, coffee 
houses, apartment blocks, and a large increase in the number of cars in the capital 
(Cockett, 2010, pp. 8-9). This confluence of wealth in the north means that Bashir and the 
NIF have the support of the people there, which keeps them in power. In addition, many 
of the people in Khartoum are unaware of the genocide in Darfur, and most do not want 
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to know what is happening: Cockett (2010) interviewed a Sudanese economist who, 
when told about the violence in Darfur, replied that the reports must be exaggerated and 
that the people in the refugee camps were “…enjoying the free food, watching television, 
chatting on their cell phones…relaxing and enjoying themselves, with nice clothes” (p. 
36). Sadly, this is not an uncommon view in the capital. 
The lack of government spending in Darfur is a clear example of structural 
violence. As mentioned in chapter 2, during British colonial rule, Darfur had ninety 
elementary schools, eleven intermediate schools, and one secondary school (Daly, 2007, 
p. 134). Railroads only reached Darfur after independence, the roads were simply tracks 
made by trucks that became impassable during the rainy season, and both drought and 
famine plagued the region (Daly, 2007, pp. 138-139). Things did not improve after 
independence: clean water was almost completely inaccessible, with the people in El-
Fasher, the region’s capital, getting sick from drinking water contaminated by sewage 
(Prunier, 2008, p. 50). When famine occurred in the early 1980s, the government 
dismissed reports as “exaggerated;” when they finally began distributing food aid, most 
of the food did not reach rural areas due to transportation problems, and the government 
provided significantly less aid than was needed (Prunier, 2008, p. 51; Daly, 2007, p. 232).  
In general, the government saw Darfur as a region that provided no useful natural 
resources but one that would ally with the government due to most of the population of 
Darfur being Muslims. According to de Waal (2005), the NIF saw Darfur as a major 
constituency of devout Muslims who could be mobilized for their purposes (p. 191). 
Bashir (2008) recalls that government agents went to Zaghawa villages to recruit young 
men to fight for the government in the civil war in the south; they would tell the men that 
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they would be fighting in a jihad, and that it was their duty to kill the non-believers in the 
south (pp. 126-127). The political parties would also campaign in Darfur but when they 
would win the votes of the people, they failed to deliver on any promises and instead 
gave positions of power and privilege to the Arab groups (Jok, 2007, p.64). This clear 
favoritism of the Arab groups over the African groups angered the Africans, and 
contributed to the civil war and subsequent genocide.  
To reiterate, the government of Sudan encouraged the young men in Darfur to 
fight for them in the civil war in the south, but it also discriminated against Darfuris. 
Bashir (2008) describes an incident in a marketplace where a black man and an Arab man 
got into a heated argument, with the Arab calling the black man a dog and a slave; when 
the black man began to beat up the Arab man, six Arab policemen intervened, savagely 
beat the black man, and dragged him away in their car without even asking who had 
started the fight or attempting to punish the Arab man as well (pp. 124-125). Bashir 
(2008) also recounted her anger at discovering that one of her teachers, an Arab, lived in 
a nice home with running water and electricity, a home that was reserved for Arabs only 
(p.99). As Bashir (2008) mentally compared this modern house with her uncle’s mud and 
brick house, and the poverty of her village, she became enraged and threw a stone at one 
of the houses and broke a window (p. 100).  
The government’s neglect of Darfur’s needs, combined with its systemic racism 
against the Africans and clear favoritism of the Arabs, contributed to the civil war that 
began in 2003. Both the SLM and JEM claim that they are representing the people in 
Darfur in their demands for equal treatment from the government. Flint and de Waal 
(2005) describe members of the SLM as devout Muslims who pray five times a day and 
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helped the villagers by fetching water, offering whatever meat they had, and walking for 
hours to the villages to get information about government attacks (pp. 66-67). Both rebel 
groups view the situation as one of self-defense: the government wants to ethnically 
cleanse them from the land so they can give it to the Arabs; therefore, they must fight 
back (Flint and de Waal, 2005, p. 71). 
 Marlowe et al. (2006) interviewed a man named Suleiman, who told them that 
the people of Darfur do not want to secede from Sudan, as there are not enough natural 
resources to make Darfur a sustainable independent country (p. 113). Suleiman also told 
Marlowe et al. (2006) that the true enemy of the people is not the Arabs, but the 
government; this is the case because if the fight was just between the Arabs and Africans, 
either the Africans would defeat them, or there would be a negotiated settlement. The 
government is using the Arabs to force the Africans off their lands and take it over (p. 
109). The Darfuris want equal treatment by the government, as well as funds to improve 
the infrastructure such as roads, schools, and hospitals. Darfur was neglected for so long 
that its people reached the point where they believed that a rebellion was the only way to 
get the government to pay attention to their needs. 
Unfortunately, instead of responding to the rebels in a positive way such as 
negotiating with them, the government began a campaign of genocide against not just the 
rebels, but anyone from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups. As mentioned 
previously, the government armed Arabs who became known as the Janjaweed, or 
“Devils on Horseback.” As Marlowe, et al. (2006) pointed out, Omar al Bashir and the 
NIF are largely unpopular with most the Sudanese population, because only a small 
group of elite Sudanese in and around Khartoum benefit from the oil revenues and 
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government spending (pp. 68-69). The NIF knows that if it negotiates with the Darfuri 
rebels and diverts money away from the capital, it will lose the support of the elite and 
might be toppled in an uprising. Therefore, Bashir’s response to any threat to his regime 
is to eliminate it.  
As mentioned previously, the NIF government has actively discriminated against 
the African groups in Darfur. Common dehumanizing terms used in Darfur include black 
dog, monkey, and Abeed, or “slave” (Bashir, 2008, p. 124). Abeed has also been used in 
South Sudan, when the government forces would kidnap women and children and sell 
them into slavery in the north. According to de Waal (2005), Abeed is used by some Arab 
supremacists in Darfur about the African groups, as a reminder of their so-called “Arab 
superiority” (p. 199). Jok (2007) points out that members of the Janjaweed use the word 
Abeed during their attacks to distance themselves from their victims, to keep from feeling 
any remorse for their actions (p. 127). Seeing Darfuris as inferior and animal like has 
made it easier for the government to carry out attacks not only against the rebel groups, 
but also the civilians. 
Attacks on Civilians in Darfur 
 It is important to reiterate that Omar al-Bashir’s government responds to any 
threats by attempting to eliminate the individual or group responsible for this threat. To 
that end, since 2003, the government has armed and supported the Janjaweed attacks in 
Darfur. A typical attack on a village in Darfur goes like this: first, the government 
helicopters will circle the village, firing on civilians and dropping bombs. Next, the 
Janjaweed enter the village before dawn, killing men, raping women, and abducting or 
killing children; then the militias burn down the homes and all the village’s infrastructure, 
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destroy crops, steal livestock, cut down fruit trees, and destroy all sources of food and 
water (Flint & de Waal, 2005, p. 64). The Janjaweed recruits are paid 150,000 Sudanese 
pounds [roughly $24,000] per month, plus 20,000 Sudanese pounds a day for a horse or 
camel; they can keep all the loot they can carry, except for cash and heavy weapons (Flint 
& de Waal, 2005, p. 40). This monetary incentive, combined with racism and systemic 
dehumanization, makes recruitment easy for the government. 
Attacks on the civilians can be especially cruel, as Steidle (2007) saw firsthand:  
Several bloody corpses filled a shallow grave. They were lined up in a row and 
covered with grass mats. Images from the Holocaust and Rwanda filled my 
mind…Every single man in this countless row of African civilians had had his 
eyes plucked out and his ears cut off…Another photo revealed a man lying in the 
dirt, blood streaming away from his groin. He had been castrated and left to bleed 
to death (p. 88). 
In another attack Steidle (2007) investigated, a witness told him that the Janjaweed had 
locked thirty-four people in their huts and burned them alive (p. 140). In the village of 
Hamada, 107 of the 450 villagers had been tortured and murdered; infants had been 
crushed, toddlers had their faces smashed in with rifle butts, and a message was left on a 
blackboard in the school, calling the civilians “Faggots” and “Donkeys” (Steidle, 2007, p. 
214).  
 Although there has been some debate over whether or not what is happening in 
Darfur constitutes genocide, it is my belief that the government’s actions meet the UN 
(1948) definition of genocide. Steidle (2007) was given a document that outlined the 
government’s plan of action in Darfur; the document contains phrases like “Change the 
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demography in Darfur”, and orders of “Killings, burning of villages, farms and terrorize 
and rob properties from African tribes and force them to migrate outside of Darfur…” (p. 
187). The International Criminal Court (ICC) (2008), based on a number of evidence, has 
indicted Omar al-Bashir on several counts, including genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes (p. 3). The International Criminal Court’s (2008) indictment continually 
refers to “Forces and agents controlled by Al Bashir” (p. 5) when detailing the alleged 
crimes being committed in Darfur.  
At the very least, if this is not indicative of genocide, it does show a government 
plan to ethnically cleanse Darfur of the African groups. Flint and de Waal (2005) 
describe a communique between a Sudanese army commander and a pilot wherein the 
commander tells the pilot there are people in an attacked village who say they will work 
with the government; the pilot’s response is to say not to trust any of the villagers and to 
kill them all (p. 107). Moreover, Flint and de Waal (2005) discuss an attack on a village 
where 66 villagers were hanged by their feet or decapitated, and schoolgirls were chained 
together and burnt alive; in a particularly vicious attack, the Janjaweed stopped a woman 
with a 21-day old baby boy named Ahmed at a roadblock and cut off Ahmed’s penis; 
Ahmed died shortly after the attack (pp. 108-109).  
 The deliberate destruction of the villages and forced migration of the people 
clearly demonstrate how systemic racism and physical dehumanization made genocide 
possible in Darfur. Civilians are supposed to be protected during a war, but the Sudanese 
government is instead deliberately targeting them for extermination. Those who are not 
killed in the initial attack on a village are left to die from disease and famine. Those who 
are lucky enough to cross into neighboring Chad have received aid from the international 
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community, but the aid has dried up as the war and genocide continue. The government’s 
plan to rid all of Darfur of the African groups has been largely successful. Having 
described physical dehumanization in detail, I will now turn my attention to the sexual 
dehumanization of women in Darfur. 
Sexual Dehumanization 
 Like the first case study of Rwanda, the women in Darfur have been subjected to 
mass rape and sexual violence. Additionally, the rape in Darfur meets two of the criteria 
for genocide under the UN Genocide Convention (1948): “Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group” and “Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group.” I will explain both criteria in detail in the following sections. 
 Rape as Physical Harm 
 The mass rape in Darfur has caused severe physical harm to the women and girls. 
One issue that increases the physical damage is the fact that most of the women in Darfur 
have undergone female circumcision. The type of female circumcision that is practiced in 
Darfur is known as infibulation. According to the World Health Organization (2016), 
infibulation is when the external genital organs are removed and the flesh is sewn 
together, leaving a small opening for urine and menstrual blood. Infibulation is the worst 
type of circumcision, and the results can include: girls dying during the procedure from 
blood loss and shock, death from a resulting infection due to unsterilized tools being 
used, and complications while giving birth (World Health Organization, 2016). As the 
World Health Organization (2016) points out, there are no medical or health benefits to 
the procedure, and it is often done in order to ensure that a girl remains “pure” before 
marriage, by taking away her ability to feel sexual desire.  
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 The near universal practice of female circumcision in Darfur has made treating 
rape victims harder. With infibulation, the vaginal opening is widened on the girl’s 
wedding night via penile penetration, or it can be widened with a knife (World Health 
Organization, 2016). The opening is very painful, and rape makes the pain more severe. 
Bashir (2008) recounts an incident in her autobiography when the Janjaweed attacked a 
primary school and raped the girls and women, with many of the girls being under the 
age of 10 (pp. 209-212). While treating a girl named Aisha, Bashir (2008) noticed that the 
girl had been ripped apart by the first attacker, leaving a red, bloodied rawness of flesh 
(p. 213). Bashir (2008) had to try to help many other girls who had the same injuries by 
sewing their wounds, binding their legs with rope, and giving them half a sleeping tablet 
so they would rest (pp. 213-216).  
 Evelyn Aswad (1996) argues that rape can be considered an act of torture if 
perpetrated by government officials or government backed groups and if done for 
political purposes (p. 1915). I believe that the rapes in Darfur constitute torture, as the 
Janjaweed’s deliberate attack of young girls is designed to inflict maximum physical pain 
on the African groups in Darfur.  Aswad (1996) also rightly points out that viewing rape 
as different from torture “…perpetuates the myth that rape is a private, sexual act rather 
than a political weapon and reinforces notions that a woman’s dignity…is less worthy of 
protection than a man’s” (p. 1916). Women in the IDP or refugee camps are usually sent 
to get firewood and water for their families, because they will “only” be raped. Women 
who try to work in their fields may be attacked by militias or government forces, and it is 
especially dangerous during the dry season for women to collect water: the river beds are 
dry, so women have to dig holes into the river bed and collect the water as it slowly 
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comes out, which means they may be by the river bed for hours, trying to collect enough 
water (Haroun, 2007). This leaves the woman more vulnerable to rape, but if the men or 
boys are sent to collect water or firewood, they are killed by the Janjaweed, so rape is 
seen as the lesser of two evils in this case. Too often, rape is not recognized as an act of 
genocide. The murder of men and young boys is clearly labeled genocide, but rape has 
been dismissed as a secondary issue. It is important to acknowledge that rape is an act of 
genocide, and that women and girls who experience rape should receive the same support 
and care as other genocide survivors.  
Rape as Mental Harm 
 The rape of women and young girls is not only an act of physical harm, but it is 
also an act of mental harm. Bashir (2008) describes a Zaghawa man who did not know 
how to help his daughter after she had been raped; in Darfur, men are supposed to protect 
their wives and children, but this man had been unable to do so (p. 212). Bashir (2008) 
helped the man pull himself together enough to comfort his daughter as she treated the 
child, but treating all the girls had a heavy emotional toll on her (pp. 212-213). Bashir 
(2008) also talked to one of the teachers who had been raped; the woman would not 
admit what happened because she did not want her husband to know, and she was feeling 
guilty because she did not fight off her attackers or die trying to do so, as the Masalit and 
Zaghawa believe it is better for a woman to die resisting rather than suffer rape (pp. 215-
216).  
 Bashir (2008) herself was raped by the government forces. After the attack on the 
school, Bashir spoke to UN soldiers about what happened, on the condition that they did 
not use her name (p. 220). However, three soldiers came to the village clinic, grabbed 
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her, and took her to a military camp, where she was severely beaten and then left tied up 
in a hut (pp. 223-225). The next day, three different soldiers came into the hut and gang 
raped her while also burning her with cigarettes and cutting her with a knife (pp. 226-
227). During the rapes, Bashir (2008) was repeatedly called a black dog and told prior to 
the initial assault to “Lie back and take it like the black slave you are” (p. 226). Bashir 
was also raped by two of the soldiers who brought her in originally, and the third one told 
her they were going to release her, because he knew she would prefer to die (pp. 227-
228). The soldier also told Bashir that she would have to live with what happened for the 
rest of her life (p. 228).  
 In the case of Bashir (2008), she was gang raped as punishment for speaking out 
about the rape, and she was attacked to cause her severe physical and mental harm. 
Bashir states in her autobiography that she felt guilty for what happened, that she should 
have fought the men off or died trying (p. 230). This guilt is not uncommon among the 
rape survivors, and adds an emotional burden to the physical one they are already 
carrying. The Janjaweed also humiliate women by raping girls in town squares, in front 
of the villagers; in one case, a 17-year-old girl who resisted being raped was killed and 
left naked on the street for the whole village to see (Wagner, 2005-2006, p. 205). In 
addition, Wagner (2005-2006) reports that the Janjaweed will break the limbs of victims 
to keep them from escaping, as well as marking or branding them: refugee women have 
gunshot wounds to the ankle, gashes on their faces, and brands on their backs and arms 
(p. 207). This torture serves as a permanent reminder of their attack, which causes severe 
mental anguish for the victims.  
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 In addition to branding or marking the women, the Janjaweed and government 
forces will often force a victim’s husband, father, brother, or son witness the rapes before 
killing the men (Miller, 2009, p. 506). Miller (2009) makes an excellent point when she 
states that, “Morally injurious actions deny the equal moral worth of 
victims…Diminishment occurs when the victim is the recipient of behavior that 
represents her as not having equal moral standing to the perpetrator (p. 510). The mass 
rape of women, combined with the branding and racial slurs used during the attacks, 
serve to reinforce the belief that the Arabs are superior to the Africans. Moreover, Miller 
argues that rapes “…compromise victims’ equal moral standing, and, by extension, the 
equal moral standing of their families and communities. In short, genocidal rape can 
obliterate the dignity of the group as a whole” (p. 512). By forcing men to watch the 
rapes, the Janjaweed and government forces are mocking them for being unable to carry 
out their cultural duty of protecting the women in their families and communities. This 
causes mental harm to the members of the group, and can make it harder for a rape victim 
to receive support from their community, as the feelings of shame and helplessness may 
block any discussions of the attacks. Miller (2009) states that Darfuri women and girls 
suffer additional hardships, both physical and mental, when they face alienation and 
banishment from their families and communities (p. 514). The deliberate attacks on 
women and girls are done to destroy their communities and the unity felt between 
members of the group.  
Rape as a measure intended to prevent births 
 As mentioned previously, the UN Genocide Convention (1948) lists “Imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group” as an act of genocide. This has 
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manifested in several ways in Darfur. First, the deliberate killing of men and boys within 
the targeted groups. This is straightforward; the story in an above section about 21-day-
old Ahmed being castrated by the Janjaweed (Flint & de Waal, 2005, pp. 108-109). 
shows their determination to keep the population from reproducing. Even if Ahmed had 
lived, he would have been unable to father children, and thus would be unlikely to get 
married. Second, the Janjaweed and government forces have disemboweled pregnant 
women and killed babies. Marlowe et al. (2006) were told by an interviewee that he saw a 
pregnant woman murdered by the Janjaweed, who then cut open her womb (p. 122). 
Askin (2006) describes attacks on children by the Janjaweed: the attackers cut out the 
stomachs of pregnant women, with male fetuses being hit against a tree and female ones 
dropped into the dirt; another attack involved a baby being removed from a woman’s 
back and sliced through the stomach; one woman’s baby girl was smashed against a tree 
and killed; and finally, government soldiers captured 16 women with babies, broke the 
baby boys’ necks, and beat the mothers with their own babies like a whip until the babies 
died (p. 146). Askin (2006) recounts instances of sexual torture of women, including 
three girls having nails put in their vaginas, two having their vaginas sewn up, and others 
being gang raped, both vaginally and anally, or raped with foreign objects, as well as 
having their breasts and vaginas mutilated (pp. 146-148). 
 While the deliberate killing of men and babies are acts done to prevent births, the 
biggest act being undertaken by the Janjaweed and government soldiers is the mass rape 
and intentional impregnation of Darfuri women. Askin (2006) included testimony from 
survivors in her chapter, such as women being told they would be the wives of the militia 
members, and statements like “We rape you to make a free baby, not a slave like you” 
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and “We will take your women and make them ours. We will change the race” (p. 147). 
Amnesty International (2004) investigated on the atrocities in Darfur and interviewed 250 
women who had been raped (Section 1.1). One victim told Amnesty International (2004) 
that the Janjaweed would sing while raping women and tell them that they are slaves, and 
that the militia can do whatever they want with them (Section 3.1). Women who attempt 
to flee their villages have been raped at roadblocks or checkpoints by the Janjaweed, as 
well as being raped while collecting water and firewood at IDP or refugee camps 
(Amnesty International, 2004, Section 3.3.). Amnesty International (2004) was told by 
Darfuris that while the community might accept a raped woman back into the 
community, the child they would bear from being raped would not be welcomed, as they 
are seen as a child of the enemy (Section 4.1).  
 Like Amnesty International (2004), Médecins Sans Frontiéres [Doctors Without 
Borders; hereafter abbreviated as MSF] (2005) has also conducted investigations into the 
violence in Darfur, and doctors from MSF has treated hundreds of rape victims (p. 2). 
Between October 2004-February 2005, MSF (2005) treated 297 rape victims between the 
ages of 12 and 45; most of the victims were raped while doing every day, ordinary 
activities (p. 3). 28% of women were raped by two or more men, and many women were 
held captive and repeatedly raped (Médecins Sans Frontiéres, 2005, p. 4). Women were 
also treated for injuries resulting from rape and sexually transmitted diseases, such as 
AIDS (Médecins Sans Frontiéres, 2005, p. 5). At the time they sought treatment from 
MSF (2005), 7% of women knew they were already pregnant from the rape, although 
with many others, it was too soon to tell (p. 5).  
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 Women who do become pregnant from the rapes face ostracism from their 
families and communities, and can even be arrested by the government. MSF (2005) 
states that some women who report their rape to the police are arrested for an illegal 
pregnancy if they are not married; the police will lock the women up and beat them, as 
well as fining them (p. 6). Askin (2006) confirms this, explaining that survivors are 
charged with zena, which is adultery or having sex outside of marriage, if they cannot 
prove that they were raped (p. 149). The government does not even attempt to investigate 
claims of rape, which results in most victims refusing to report their attack (Wagner, 
2005-2006, p. 209).  
 MSF (2005) interviewed a 16-year-old woman who had been raped and became 
pregnant; when she told her family what had happened, they threw her out of the house, 
and her fiancé broke off their engagement, stating that he did not want to marry her 
because she was “…disgraced and spoilt” (p. 6). Amnesty International (2004) reported 
that a prevailing cultural belief in Darfur is that a nobody can get pregnant when raped, 
because it is unwanted sex, therefore, the woman is seen as having consented (Section 
4.1). In addition, married women are abandoned by their husbands, which makes them 
socially and economically vulnerable (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 4.1). 
Amnesty International (2004) argues that women are targeted for violence because of 
their ethnicity, and that the militias are deliberately impregnating women from these 
ethnic groups (Section 7). Wagner (2005-2006) recounts the testimony of a survivor who 
said that after being attacked in a school by the Janjaweed, she was told that “…they 
would take care of all of us black people and clean Darfur for good” (p. 201).  
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 As mentioned above, many rape victims are ostracized by their communities, and 
several are thrown out of their homes by their families. This makes women more 
vulnerable to repeated assaults, as they have no protection. Amnesty International (2004) 
reported that the Janjaweed often show up in the IDP camps, where they rape and kill the 
inhabitants (Section 1.2). A Human Rights Watch (2005) report documents the instances 
of women being raped in refugee camps in Chad, not only by soldiers, but by Chadian 
male civilians as well, when women go out in search of firewood and water (p. 7). One 
woman who was raped by a civilian was then abandoned by her husband when they were 
reunited in Chad and he discovered she’d become pregnant from the rape (pp. 7-8). 
Human Rights Watch (2005) interviewed Sudanese women who had crossed into Chad, 
and they described being abused by the Chadian authorities: they are imprisoned by the 
authorities for trying to collect firewood outside the camps, and are then raped by 
Chadian inmates while in detention (p. 8).  
 Human Rights Watch (2005) documented the abuses women face in IDP camps 
and refugee camps in Chad when they are abandoned by their families. One sixteen-year-
old Fur woman was raped by three men while gathering firewood near an IDP camp; 
when her family found out, she was thrown out of her home, her fiancé broke off their 
engagement because she was “disgraced”, and she was raped by the local police who 
came to her dwelling at night (p. 9). Women and girls who are on their own are also 
coerced by male residents of the camps and soldiers to provide sexual services in return 
for protection (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 9). Another problem is early marriages: 
Amnesty International (2004) was told by some refugees that the bride price in the camps 
has greatly decreased, and parents are marrying their daughters off at very young ages, 
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because they fear that they cannot “control” them in the refugee camps and want to 
protect their “honor” (Section 4.5.1). Moreover, women who are the heads of households 
are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, and many are forced into prostitution, or are 
forced to prostitute their daughters, in order to get essentials such as food, soap, water, 
etc. (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 4.5.2).  
 The rape of women can be seen as a measure intended to prevent births through a 
different lens, that of women being labeled “unmarriageable.” As one Fur woman told 
Human Rights Watch (2005), “No one would accept to marry a raped woman” (p. 10). 
Even victims who cannot become pregnant from the rapes, such as young girls, are 
sometimes abandoned by their families because they have “…disgraced their family” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 10). However, some women have received support from 
their families. For example, when Bashir’s (2008) father found out she had been raped, 
he did not blame her for what happened; he blamed the militias and refused to allow her 
to isolate herself from the family (p. 230). Moreover, her father actually arranged for her 
to marry a cousin who was living in England; when Bashir (2008) told her husband about 
the rapes, he was angry-but not at her-and he did not abandon her or hold her responsible 
for what happened (pp. 284-285). However, it should be noted that Bashir’s father and 
husband were both University educated men, so they had more knowledge than most men 
in Darfur, as well as a wider perspective.  
 When girls and young women are declared “spoiled” or “disgraced” by their 
families, this can prevent them from getting married, which in turns prevents them from 
reproducing and adding members to their ethnic group. The Janjaweed and government 
soldiers are familiar with Darfuri cultural beliefs, so they know that this will often be the 
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result of their attacks on girls and women (Amnesty International, 2004, Section 7). If 
they cannot, or do not, make one of the girls from a targeted group pregnant, they will 
settle for them being unable to marry. Honor is important to the Fur, Zaghawa, and 
Masalit, and a woman being raped is seen as a loss of honor for the family and the 
community. The cultural belief that pregnancy can only result from consensual sex 
(Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 10) makes it very difficult for a victim to receive any 
support or help for being raped. As Médecins Sans Frontiéres (2004) points out, they can 
provide emergency contraception and HIV antiretroviral drugs to try and prevent 
infection, but these must be taken within 72 hours of the attack (p. 8). Many women are 
unable to seek medical assistance that soon after an attack, or are afraid to report it out of 
shame or fear they will be disowned by their families, so these victims do not get the 
medical attention they desperately need. If a girl or woman is disowned, and forced to 
live apart from her family, she is extremely vulnerable to further sexual violence, and she 
will suffer economic consequences as well. The Janjaweed and government soldiers take 
advantage of the cultural beliefs of the targeted groups to prevent the population from 
reproducing, whether it is done via impregnating a woman with a so-called “Arab” baby, 
or having the women be declared “unmarriageable” and thus preventing their ability to 
reproduce via marriage within the group. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I described the physical and sexual dehumanization that is 
occurring in Darfur. The African groups are seen as inferior to the Arab groups, who 
insult their victims by calling them “donkeys”, “black dogs”, “faggots”, “black 
monkeys”, and “slaves.” The Janjaweed and Sudanese government are attempting to 
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cleanse Darfur of the African groups by killing the men and boys, as well as 
disemboweling pregnant women. They are also trying to change the ethnicity of the land 
by deliberately impregnating women with an Arab baby. As Askin (2006) pointed out, 
during and after the attacks, the victims are taunted with comments such as “We will kill 
all men and rape women. We want to change the color. Every woman will deliver red. 
Arabs are the husbands of these women” and “We will take your women and make them 
ours. We will change the race” (p. 147). Statements like these prove that the 
government’s plan is to rid Darfur of the African groups, one way or another.  
Like Rwanda, women in Darfur have been subjected to mass rape. Unlike 
Rwanda, the attacks are done with the goal of impregnating women with a baby from a 
different ethnic group, and thus preventing births within the targeted ethnic groups. 
Having described physical and sexual dehumanization in Rwanda and Darfur in great 
detail, in the next chapter, the conclusion, I will wrap up this dissertation with a summary 
of these two cases, describe efforts to rehumanize not only the victims, but also the 
perpetrators, and outline possible conflict resolution methods that can be used to create a 
lasting peace in both countries.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Chapter Introduction 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have analyzed dehumanization in genocide, 
specifically looking at physical and sexual dehumanization in the Rwandan and Darfur 
genocides. In both cases, the targeted groups were subjected to severe acts of physical 
and mental harm, acts that were facilitated by the widespread, top-down dehumanizing 
language used to call for their extermination. In Rwanda and Darfur, the ethnic groups 
that were targeted had been neglected by the government; when they fought back against 
this discrimination, their respective governments decided that rather than negotiate with 
the groups, or share resources, they would massacre them instead. This decision led to the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, as well as the 
displacement of millions. Moreover, my discussion of sexual dehumanization is my 
original contribution to the field. There is no formal definition of the term, so I created 
my own. I hope this definition will be used in other research in this important area of 
genocide studies.  In this final chapter, I will sum up both case studies, discuss the 
strengths and limitations of the dissertation, and make recommendations for future 
research and policies on dehumanization. 
Summary of Both Case Studies 
 Before I go into a detailed summary of both cases, I decided to create a table 
comparing the two cases, which is on the next page. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Case Studies 
Case Date of 
Genocide 
Number of 
People Killed 
Physical 
Dehumanization 
Terms Used 
Sexual 
Dehumanization 
as Act of 
Genocide 
Rwanda April-July 
1994 
800,000 Cockroach, 
Weed, Hyena, 
“Cut the tall 
trees,” Snakes 
Causing serious 
bodily or mental 
harm to the group 
Darfur March 2004-
Present 
Estimated at 
450,000 
Donkeys, Black 
Dog, Black 
Monkey, Slave 
Causing serious 
bodily or mental 
harm to the group; 
Imposing 
measures intended 
to prevent births 
within the group 
As can be seen from the table, the two cases are similar, yet different. The Tutsis 
in Rwanda and the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit in Darfur were dehumanized prior to the 
genocide, and the women in both genocides experienced sexual dehumanization. 
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However, in Darfur, sexual dehumanization included deliberately impregnating the 
women whereas in Rwanda, pregnancy was a byproduct of the rapes.  
 In both cases, physical dehumanization included reducing the targeted groups to 
animals, including cockroaches, hyenas, monkeys, snakes, and dogs. In Rwanda, this 
dehumanization occurred over a period of time, and was spread via the popular radio 
station RTLM and the newspaper Kangura. Paul Rusesabagina (2006), the manager of 
the Milles Collines hotel and inspiration for the film Hotel Rwanda, discussed this 
process of dehumanization in his autobiography. Rusesabagina (2006) correctly points 
out that “Stripping the humanity from an entire group takes time. It is an attitude that 
requires cultivation, a series of small steps, daily tending” (p. 64). RTLM did not 
immediately start out with calling Tutsis cockroaches, but built up to it over time; with 
their repeated, casual use of the term, Rwandans became desensitized to the word, and 
began to see Tutsis as cockroaches. Rusesabagina (2006) also states that the use of 
phrases like “cut the tall trees”, “clean your neighborhood of brush”, and “do your work” 
made killing sound like a responsibility and a normal thing to do (p. 82). Rusesabagina 
(2006) discusses the routinization of the killings, which made them boring in time (p. 
193), a claim that is supported by Hatzfeld’s (2003) book wherein he interviewed the 
perpetrators of the genocide.  
 Like Rwanda, in Darfur, dehumanization occurred over time. However, it was 
done by the government and not via the media. The succeeding governments in the post-
independence era saw the Arabs as superior to the Africans, although they also used the 
Darfuris as soldiers in their war against the groups in South Sudan. The people of Darfur 
were treated marginally better than their southern counterparts because they were also 
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Muslims, unlike the Christians and Animists in the south. Yet, when Omar al Bashir and 
the NIF came into power in the late 1980s, they openly supported the Arab groups in 
Darfur over the African groups in any disputes over land or grazing rights. They also 
refused to provide basic services, such as roads, schools, and hospitals. If an African 
Darfuri managed to get accepted to a school with proper classrooms, books, and teachers, 
they would be forced to speak Arabic and be punished for not doing so, and they often 
faced discrimination from the Arab teachers (Bashir, 2008). The NIF called Darfuris 
“black monkey”, “black dog”, and “slave.”  
When the rebel groups in Darfur demanded equal treatment and better services 
from the government, the NIF responded by arming Arab groups and paying them to 
slaughter the African groups in Darfur. The government would support attacks by flying 
helicopters over the village being attacked. Like Rwanda, the attacks in Darfur have 
become routinized: early in the morning, while the village is still asleep, the government 
bombs the village, and then the Janjaweed ride into the village, killing men and boys, 
raping women and girls, stealing livestock, destroying crops, and poisoning wells while 
driving the survivors out of the village and into the desert (Flint & de Waal, 2005).  
 In both Rwanda and Darfur, mass rape occurred/is occurring. Moreover, the rapes 
are an act of sexual dehumanization. In Rwanda, the Tutsi women were hypersexualized 
by the media, who described them as “seductresses” and “spies” for the RPF. Kangura 
warned Hutu men not to become friendly with Tutsi women, or keep a Tutsi woman as a 
mistress or concubine (Gourevitch, 1998, p.88). RTLM and Kangura depicted Tutsi 
women as haughty and looking down on Hutu men, thus encouraging the militias to rape 
Tutsi women to “put them in their place.” The hypersexualization of Tutsi women also 
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contributed to the belief that they were sexually different from Hutu women; this can be 
seen through the comments rape survivors heard about wanting to know what Tutsi 
women “look like” and “taste like.” The brutal case of the woman who had part of her 
vagina removed by a member of the Interahamwe, who then put it on display outside her 
house (Human Rights Watch, 1996, p. 63), shows the extreme nature of sexual 
dehumanization during the genocide.  
Rape was carried out to inflict physical and mental harm on the women: several 
women suffered permanent damage to their reproductive organs due to gang rape or rape 
with a foreign object; this serves as a constant reminder of their attacks. The women who 
became pregnant had to deal with having a baby of the “enemy,” which led some to 
abandon the baby or attempt to abort it.  Women were often raped in front of their 
families, adding to the humiliation of the attacks, and causing mental anguish for the 
family members who were unable to stop the attack. Many women did not receive 
adequate medical care, or any medical care at all, for their injuries, which has prolonged 
their suffering. The women have been reluctant to talk about what happened, so there has 
been no mental health support provided, and no outlet for the women to discuss their 
thoughts and feelings about what happened to them. This perpetuates the trauma, with the 
women suffering in silence.  
As was the case in Rwanda, in Darfur, the women have been subjected to sexual 
dehumanization. Like Rwanda, rapes were carried out to inflict physical and mental harm 
on the women: the women are circumcised, which makes the rape especially painful 
because the narrow opening created during the circumcision is forced open. When young 
girls are raped, the damage done to their bodies is significant. Bashir (2008) described 
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one rape victim’s genitals as “…a raw, bloodied mess” and stated that when the first 
attacker forced himself inside her, “…He had ripped her apart” (p. 213). Treating the rape 
victims is extremely difficult, as they often have to be sewn back together to stop the 
bleeding. The Janjaweed know that the girls are circumcised, and the deliberate targeting 
of young girls is done to inflict maximum physical harm upon the group.  
Unlike Rwanda, however, the Janjaweed purposely rape the women to 
impregnate them with a so-called Arab baby, and taunt the victims afterwards that they 
will give birth to a light-skinned baby. Investigations carried out by Médecins Sans 
Frontiéres (2005), Amnesty International (2004) and Human Rights Watch (2005) 
confirm that women are targeted for rape as an act of changing the ethnic makeup in 
Darfur via the impregnation of women with an Arab baby. In addition to this deliberate 
pregnancy tactic, the Janjaweed are attacking young, unmarried women knowing that 
they will be considered “damaged” after, and thus unmarriageable. If a girl cannot get 
married, she cannot contribute to her group’s biological reproduction and growth. This 
violence does not only inflict physical damage; it also causes severe mental harm to the 
women and the community. Many rape survivors, like Bashir (2008), feel guilty that they 
did not fight off their attackers or die trying, which is the expected behavior in their 
community. Women also consider themselves spoiled or damaged, like Bashir (2008) 
did. This shame and guilt causes mental anguish in the survivors, which is exacerbated if 
their families reject or disown them.   
Both cases help support my research questions, which were: how was/is 
dehumanization spread in these countries? What was/is the impact of physical and sexual 
dehumanization on each genocide? When genocide ends, what steps can we take to re-
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humanize both the victims and killers? Is it possible to facilitate reconciliation between 
the two groups to prevent a new or continuing cycle of violence? We can clearly see that 
dehumanization was spread by the governments and elite groups in both countries via the 
media and the use of structural violence. Physical dehumanization allowed the 
participants to see the victims as less than human, as “cockroaches,” “snakes,” “dogs,” 
“monkeys,” and “hyenas.” By reducing the victims to something that is culturally reviled 
in both countries, this made it easier for the participants to kill without hesitation. Sexual 
dehumanization in Rwanda reduced Tutsi women to objects for sexual gratification, 
hypersexual beings who denied Hutu men the ability to have sex with them and thus 
deserved to be “put in their place” by the militias. Sexual dehumanization in Darfur 
reduced the women to their basic biological function of reproduction, a function that was 
to be controlled by the Janjaweed to propagate the Arab groups and prevent the birth of 
African groups. With regard to the last two questions, my recommendations for those can 
be found later in this chapter.  
Strengths and Limitations of the Dissertation 
 One of the biggest strengths of this dissertation is that it adds to the discussion of 
dehumanization in genocide. One of the questions that is often asked by people learning 
about genocide is “why did it happen?” By analyzing dehumanization in detail, including 
the routinization of genocide, this study can help individuals understand how people are 
convinced to take part in genocide, which in turn helps them understand why genocide 
happens. In Rwanda, most of the killings were done by people who knew their victims: 
they were neighbors, co-workers, even family members. The perpetrators went door-to-
door and killed people in their houses, in schools, hospitals, and churches. This would not 
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have been possible without the systemic, widespread dehumanization of the Tutsis. In 
Darfur, the dehumanization of the African groups allows the Janjaweed to kill with 
impunity. When you no longer recognize someone as human, when you no longer see 
them as your equal, it is much easier to overlook the moral imperative against killing.  
 Another strength is the discussion of sexual dehumanization. This is a relatively 
new idea in the field of genocide studies, as most work on genocide focuses on the 
physical dehumanization, the act of reducing the victims from human beings to an animal 
or lifeform unworthy of protection. Sexual dehumanization is largely carried out against 
women, although men can be the targets as well. Sexual dehumanization degrades 
women, reducing them to their basic biological functions, as was the case in Darfur, or 
labeling them as sexually “different” or “special”, as was the case in Rwanda. Sexual 
dehumanization in Rwanda led to the mass rape of Tutsi women as a reward for the 
perpetrators, or as an act of humiliation against women who were described as looking 
down on the men. Sexual dehumanization also created a set of circumstances in which 
Tutsi women were raped so men could see how different they were from Hutu women, 
because Tutsi women supposedly looked and tasted different. This made Tutsi women a 
novelty to be experienced. Sexual dehumanization in Darfur demoted women from fully 
human to a carrier of human life, a womb. Women were attacked because of their 
reproductive necessity for the group. If a woman is impregnated with an Arab baby or 
made unmarriageable, then they cannot contribute to the group’s biological expansion. 
The goal of the Janjaweed is to ethnically cleanse Darfur by killing off the current 
generations and preventing the creation of future generations.  
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 However, there are some limitations to this study. The first is that the study relied 
on literature to explain this phenomenon. The danger with this is that sometimes the 
literature is not completely accurate. To avoid this, I used sources that are reliable, such 
as reports from reputable organizations like Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights 
Watch, and Amnesty International. Still, I am unable to verify the accuracy of their 
information. In order to verify the information, I would have needed to do fieldwork, 
which was not possible. Nonetheless, I do believe that the information presented in this 
dissertation is as accurate as possible, and the overlap of information in multiple sources 
seems to suggest that this information is reliable. 
 The second limitation is that most of the literature on Darfur is from 2004-2006. 
With Rwanda, using literature from the mid-1990’s to the early 2000’s is acceptable, 
because there is a bounded time period for the genocide, which was 100 days. However, 
the Darfur genocide is still occurring. The reason that most of the literature on Darfur is 
from 2004-2006 is due to the fact that awareness about the events in Darfur reached their 
peak during these three years, and then sharply dropped off as people lost interest and 
news organizations moved on to other topics. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain current 
events in Darfur, to see if the mass rapes and murders are still being carried out. A 
Bloomberg report (2016) from February of this year stated that 73,000 people have had to 
flee Darfur due to recent fighting, but it was one of the few reports I could find on what is 
happening now in Darfur. Nonetheless, most of the literature states that the worst crimes 
in Darfur occurred between 2004-2005, which is why the research is heavily skewed 
toward that time period. The literature from these years provided a wealth of information, 
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and even if the attacks have decreased, there is enough evidence to show that the 
government of Sudan has committed genocide in Darfur.  
Future Research and Policy Implications 
 The goal of this dissertation was to contribute to the understanding of how 
dehumanization plays a role in facilitating genocide, and how physical and sexual 
dehumanization work in genocide. I chose two cases where both physical and sexual 
dehumanization can be clearly recognized, although neither have been studied in great 
detail in the existing literature on the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. The term sexual 
dehumanization is almost nonexistent in studies on rape in genocide. In fact, all too often, 
rape is not seen as an act of genocide, but an act that occurs during genocide. By 
conducting this study, I hope to pave the way for other researchers to study sexual 
dehumanization and rape as an act of genocide in greater detail.  
 As I was collecting research for this dissertation, I could not help but notice that 
in most of the books and articles on genocide, rape was not mentioned very often, and if 
it was, it was almost discussed as a separate issue. When the claim is made that women in 
Darfur are sent to collect the firewood and draw water because they will “only” get raped, 
this downplays the impact rape has on the women, and by extension, the community. 
When I discuss genocide with people, they usually think of murder or killing as acts of 
genocide, but not rape. More research needs to be done on rape as an act of genocide, so 
that it will be recognized as such. The Akayesu trial at the ICTR, when the mayor was 
found guilty of rape as an act of genocide, was especially significant, as he was the first 
person to be convicted by an international tribunal of rape as genocide (Neuffer, 2001, p. 
272). However, the fact that it took until 1997 for rape to be recognized as an act of 
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genocide reflects our lack of acknowledgment that rape can be an act of genocide. Rape 
during genocide has a specific intentionality, whether it be to cause severe physical or 
mental harm to the group, or as a measure intended to prevent births within the group, 
and more work must be done to separate rape as an act of genocide from rape in general. 
 This dissertation can also serve as a reference for future research on rape in other 
genocides. For example, ISIS’s sexual enslavement and rape of the Yazidi women is a 
case that will be studied in depth in the future, and it would be interesting to compare 
how sexual dehumanization has been used against the Yazidi women to how it was used 
against the Tutsis and Darfuri women. There can also be other cross-case comparisons, 
such as looking at sexual dehumanization and rape in the former Yugoslavia or 
Cambodia.  
 As I worked on this dissertation, I thought of some policy recommendations that 
could be made for scholars, activists, and politicians. There are many things that can be 
done to stop dehumanization before it leads to genocide. As was seen in Rwanda, the 
media played a significant role in the fostering and spreading of dehumanizing language 
and ideology. Many foreign governments knew about the language being used by the 
media, but they did little or nothing to stop it. According to Des Forges (2007), Human 
Rights Watch and other NGOs called for the RTLM signal to be jammed by the US and 
UN, but the US government refused to do so, claiming that it would be a violation of free 
speech (p. 51). Had the RTLM signal been jammed, many people could have been saved 
when the Interahamwe were not being directed to a house or gathering place to kill 
people. Currently, there is concern over the language being used by the media in Burundi; 
some of the language is reminiscent of that used in Rwanda. The monitoring of hate 
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language is critical to stopping genocide, as hate speech, including dehumanizing terms, 
is often indicative of a potential genocide.  
 I realize this is a difficult argument to make, as there could be concerns about 
limiting free speech. However, in most countries, including the United States, language 
that is used to incite killings or hate crimes is not protected speech. Furthermore, the 
longer the international community ignores the use of phrases that call for the 
extermination of a particular group, or the use of terms that reduce members of that group 
to non-humans, the easier it becomes to persuade people to take part in a genocide. 
Hatzfeld (2003) and others have demonstrated that perpetrators in Rwanda were 
convinced to take part in the killings because they no longer saw the Tutsis as humans, 
but as cockroaches, snakes, etc. Methods of countering dehumanization include jamming 
radio signals, punishing editors of newspapers or website that publish content that 
promotes hate or incites killing, and creating alternative media outlets to counter the hate 
speech. During the Burundian Civil War in the 1990s, international groups created a 
radio station where members of the various communities could come together to share 
their concerns, and also repudiate rumors of attacks in a certain community by having 
people living in those areas call in and make it clear that no attack was underway 
(Dahinden, 2007). This could be helpful in a country where a group is being accused of 
carrying out massacres in order to promote fear among the other groups and facilitate the 
killing of the targeted group. 
 Another policy recommendation is medical and psychological help for the victims 
of rape. Too many women in Rwanda and Darfur did not receive the medical care they 
desperately needed, which caused permanent damage in some cases. The government of 
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Sudan has blocked aid workers from entering the country, thus preventing much needed 
medical care in the aftermath of a rape such as an exam, emergency contraceptives, and 
HIV prophylaxis, as well as pregnancy support. Women and girls have been traumatized 
by rape, but they have been unable to talk about it due to cultural restrictions as well as 
personal shame and guilt. These women and girls need to be able to speak to someone 
about what happened, and to understand that what happened to them was not their fault.  
The cultural norms in Darfur of seeing rape victims as spoiled goods makes 
victims extremely reluctant to come forward and report what happened, and the 
erroneous belief that a woman cannot get pregnant via rape stigmatizes the victims. 
While it is not the place of international aid workers to change cultural beliefs, it is 
important for them to meet with the communities and help them understand that the 
women need their support and help, instead of being shamed and disowned. If a woman 
is kicked out of her family home, then she needs to be given a safe place to establish a 
shelter, one where she is not vulnerable to rape or sexual coercion by soldiers or men in 
the camps. Mental health counseling should be provided for the victims, so they can heal 
mentally as well as physically. 
Finally, my last recommendation is to ensure that not only do the victims of 
genocide be re-humanized, but also the perpetrators. This is a difficult concept to 
understand, as it is human nature to be disgusted by an individual who commits a heinous 
act, especially murder. All too often, the perpetrators of genocide are labeled “monsters,” 
“devils,” and “evil.” A 1994 edition of Time magazine quoted a missionary on its cover 
stating that “There are no devils left in Hell…They are all in Rwanda.” While this 
sentiment is understandable, it continues the cycle of dehumanization. People take 
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comfort in the idea that perpetrators are evil, and that they themselves would never do 
something like that. However, as uncomfortable as this might make us, the truth is 
anyone can commit an act of genocide, given the right set of circumstances. If we 
acknowledge that, then we can break the cycle of dehumanization. A study done by 
Ĉehajić, Brown, and Gonález (2009) measured empathy for victims, as felt by the 
perpetrators. The authors used students at a university in two experiments, and discovered 
that reminders of ingroup responsibility for their actions are a way for perpetrators to 
come to terms with what happened, and thus create empathy for their victims (p. 726). 
The best way to do this, according to Ĉehajić et al. (2009), is to expose the perpetrators to 
stories of individual harm done, while also being aware of the collective violence done 
against the targeted group (p. 726). 
This can be seen in Rwanda, through the Gacaca process. Due to the number of 
people accused of taking part in the genocide, the court system was unable to try every 
suspect. The Rwandan government then reinstated the local systems of justice in order to 
try suspects more quickly. A number of perpetrators confessed their guilt, and were 
sentenced to community service instead of jail. This has had the benefit of reintegrating 
the perpetrators into the communities, while making up for the loss a community suffered 
when many of its inhabitants were killed. While the Gacaca system is not without its 
flaws, including false confessions by people to get out of jail, the system has been 
effective overall in re-humanizing both the victims and the perpetrators.  
Another recommendation is providing economic support for the victims of 
genocide. The participants in the Totten and Ubaldo (2011) study discussed life in post-
genocide Rwanda and the difficulties they have encountered. Umulisa told the 
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researchers that the government has built houses some survivors, but not nearly enough, 
nor are they built well (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 63). In addition, health insurance is 
provided for the very poorest survivors, but other poor survivors receive no assistance; 
there is no mental health support (Totten & Ubaldo, 2011, p. 63). Education for orphans 
and survivors is lacking; many survivors were so traumatized that getting a formal 
education is extremely difficult, most people cannot afford university tuition, and the 
government has a hard time keeping teachers in the poor, rural areas (Totten & Ubaldo, 
2011, p. 63). Rwanda is still a developing country, which means providing financial 
support for all of the survivors is not possible, but humanitarian aid could help alleviate 
some of the burden.  
The outcome of the genocide in Darfur is uncertain, but I envision three 
possibilities: 1. The government forces can overtake the rebels, forcing a negotiated 
peace agreement on the government’s terms; 2. The rebels can defeat the government 
forces, and negotiate a treaty that would benefit their groups; and 3. The government of 
Sudan is overthrown in a coup or possible uprising, and the new government ends the 
policy of genocide in Darfur. The third option is unlikely, although Bashir is losing 
support in the north, the long-held support base for the NIF. If a peace agreement is 
somehow negotiated in Darfur, a system of community-based justice will be needed to 
address the crimes. Marlowe, Bain, and Shapiro (2006) were told by one of their 
interviewees that if the government left Darfur, and the Janjaweed were defeated, then 
the two sides would negotiate an agreement and live together again (p. 109). As the 
African and Arab groups have co-existed in Darfur for centuries, a negotiated agreement 
may be the best outcome to this conflict. A local, grassroots system of justice could help 
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facilitate peace between the groups, but until the war and genocide end, there will be no 
peace in Darfur. After the war ends, economic support must be provided for the people of 
Darfur and their needs must be met to prevent a reoccurrence of war.  
Concluding Thoughts 
 In Rwanda and Darfur, physical and sexual dehumanization were extensive 
during the genocide. The physical dehumanization made it easier for the targeted groups 
to be massacred, and the sexual dehumanization led to the mass rape of women in both 
countries. Both genocides could have been stopped, but they were not. Rwanda and 
Darfur are important cases to study to understand why and how genocide occur. More 
research needs to be done, in order to create policies that could stop a future genocide 
from happening. As Gourevitch (1998) points out, 
The West’s post-Holocaust pledge that genocide would never again be tolerated 
proved to be hollow, and for all the fine sentiments inspired by the memory of 
Auschwitz, the problem remains that denouncing evil is a far cry from doing good 
(p. 170).  
It is my hope that this dissertation will inspire others to carry on this important research, 
and broaden our understanding of the nuances of genocide. While dehumanization is only 
one part of genocide, it is an important aspect that has been overlooked, one that can, and 
must, be included in future research on genocide.  
  
140 
 
 
References 
Amnesty International. (2004, July 18). Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war: sexual 
violence and its consequences. Retrieved from 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/node/55614  
Askin, K.D. (2006). Prosecuting Gender Crimes Committed in Darfur: Holding Leaders 
Accountable for Sexual Violence. In S. Totten & E. Markusen (Eds.), Genocide in 
Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan (pp. 141-162). New York: 
Routledge. 
Aswad, E.M. (1996). Torture by Means of Rape. Georgetown Law Journal, 84, 1913-
1943.  
Bashir, H. (2008). Tears of the Desert: A Memoir of Survival in Darfur. New York: One 
World Books.  
Baum, S. K. (2008). The Psychology of Genocide: Perpetrators, Bystanders, and 
Rescuers. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Bhavnani, R. (2006). Ethnic Norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass 
Participation in the Rwandan Genocide. Journal of Peace Research, 43(6), 651-
669.  
Ĉehajić, S., Brown, R., & Gonález, R. (2009). What do I Care? Perceived Ingroup 
Responsibility and Dehumanization as Predictors of Empathy Felt for the Victim 
Group. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12(6), 715-729.  
Chirot, D., & McCauley, C. (2006). Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of 
Mass Political Murder. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
141 
 
 
Chrétien, J-P. (2007). RTLM Propaganda: The Democratic Alibi. In Thompson, A. (Ed.), 
The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (55-61). New York: Pluto Press. 
Cockett, R. (2010). Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
Coloroso, B. (2007). Extraordinary Evil: A Short Walk to Genocide. New York: Nation 
Books.  
Creswell, J. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches (2
nd
 ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.  
Daly, M.W. (2007). Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
Dahinden, Philippe. (2007). Information in Crisis Areas as a Tool for Peace: the 
Hirondelle Experience. In Thompson, A. (Ed.), The Media and the Rwanda 
Genocide (381-388). New York: Pluto Press.  
Dehumanization (2016). In Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved from 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/dehumanization  
de Waal, A. (2005). Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and 
External Engagement. African Affairs, 104(415), 181-205.   
Des Forges, A. (2007). Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994. In Thompson, A. 
(Ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (41-54). New York: Pluto Press.  
El Wardany, S. (2016, February 17). Conflict in Sudan’s Darfur Forces 73,00 to Flee 
Homes in Month. Bloomberg. Retrieved from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-17/conflict-in-sudan-s-darfur-
forces-73-000-to-flee-homes-in-month  
142 
 
 
Flint, J., & de Waal, A. (2005). Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. London: Zed 
Books. 
Fox, N. (2011). “Oh, Did the Women Suffer, They Suffered So Much”: Impacts of 
Gender based violence on Kinship Networks in Rwanda. International Journal of 
Sociology of the Family, 37(2), 279-305. 
Fujii, L.A. (2004). Transforming the moral landscape: the diffusion of a genocidal norm 
in Rwanda. Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), 99-114. 
Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 
6(3), 167-191.  
Goldhagen, D.J. (2009). Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing 
Assault on Humanity. New York: PublicAffairs.  
Gourevitch, P. (1998). We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our 
families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Picador.  
Green, J.L. (2004). Uncovering Collective Rape: A Comparative Study of Political 
Sexual Violence. International Journal of Sociology, 34(1), 97-116. 
Haroun, F. (2007). Women’s Issues in Darfur. Workshop presented at the STAND 
Regional Conference. Providence, RI: Brown University.   
Hatzfeld, J. (2003). Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak. New York: Picador. 
Higiro, J-M. V. (2007). Rwandan Private Print Media on the Eve of the Genocide. In 
Thompson, A. (Ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (73-89). New York: 
Pluto Press. 
Hogg, N. (2010). Women’s participation in the Rwandan genocide: mothers or monsters? 
International Review of the Red Cross 92 (877), 69-102.  
143 
 
 
Human Rights Watch. (1996). Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan 
Genocide and its Aftermath. New York: Human Rights Watch.  
Human Rights Watch. (2005, April 12). Sexual Violence and its Consequences among 
Displaced Persons in Darfur and Chad. Retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/darfur0505/darfur0405.pdf   
International Criminal Court (2008, July 14). Situation in Darfur, The Sudan. 
International Criminal Court Pre-Trial Chamber 1. Retrieved from 
https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200
205/Pages/situation%20icc-0205.aspx  
Jok, J.M. (2007). Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.  
Kabanda, M. (2007). Kangura: the Triumph of Propaganda Refined. In Thompson, A. 
(Ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (62-72). New York: Pluto Press. 
Kamilindi, T. (2007). Journalism in a Time of Hate Media. In Thompson, A. (Ed.), The 
Media and the Rwanda Genocide (136-142). New York: Pluto Press. 
Li, D. (2007). Echoes of Violence: Considerations on Radio and Genocide in Rwanda. In 
Thompson, A. (Ed.), The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (90-109). New York: 
Pluto Press. 
Longman, T. (2001). Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda. Journal of Religion in 
Africa, 31(2), 163-186.  
Longman, T. (2004). Placing genocide in context: research priorities for the Rwandan 
genocide. Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), 29-45.  
144 
 
 
Magnarella, P.J. (2000). Comprehending Genocide: The Case of Rwanda. Global 
Bioethics, 13(1-2), 23-43.  
Marlowe, J., Bain, A., & Shapiro, A. (2006). Darfur Diaries: Stories of Survival. New 
York: Nation Books.  
Médecins Sans Frontiéres. (2005, March 8). The Crushing Burden of Rape: Sexual 
Violence in Darfur. Retrieved from 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/sites/usa/files/sudan03.pdf  
Melvern, L. (2004). Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. New York: Verso.  
Miller, S.C. (2009). Moral Injury and Relational Harm: Analyzing Rape in Darfur. 
Journal of Social Philosophy, 40(4), 504-523.  
Mironko, C. (2004). Igitero: means and motive in the Rwandan genocide. Journal of 
Genocide Research, 6(1), 47-60.  
Moshman, D. (2005). Genocidal Hatred: Now You See It, Now You Don’t. In R. 
Sternberg (Ed.) The Psychology of Hate (pp. 185-210). Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychological Association. 
Moshman, D. (2007). Us and Them: Identity and Genocide. Identity: An International 
Journal of Theory and Research, 7(2), 115-135.  
Moszynski, P. (2005). Sudan arrests aid worker for “crimes against the state.” British 
Medicine Journal, 330(7504), 1350. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC558277/  
Mullins, C.W. (2009). “We are Going to Rape You and Taste Tutsi Women”: Rape 
during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. British Journal of Criminology, 49, 719-735.  
145 
 
 
Neuffer, E. (2001). The Key to my Neighbor’s House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and 
Rwanda. New York: Picador.  
Prunier, G. (2008). Darfur: A 21
st
 Century Genocide (3
rd
 ed.). Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press.   
Reid-Cunningham, A.R. (2008). Rape as a Weapon of Genocide. Genocide Studies and 
Prevention: An International Journal, 3(3), 279-296. 
Rimé, B., Kanyangara, P., Yzerbyt, V., & Paez, D. (2011). The impact of Gacaca 
tribunals in Rwanda: Psychosocial effects of participation in a truth and 
reconciliation process after a genocide. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
41, 695-706. 
Rusesabagina, P. (2006). An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography. New York: Viking. 
Russell-Brown, S.L. (2003). Rape as an Act of Genocide. Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, 21(2), 350-374. 
Sai, N. (2012, February 8). Conflict Profiles: Rwanda. Women Under Siege. Retrieved 
from http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/rwanda  
Sharkey, H.J. (2008). Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, 
Ethnicity, and Race. African Affairs, 107(426), 21-43. 
Smeulers, A., & Hoex, L. (2010). Studying the Microdynamics of the Rwandan 
Genocide. British Journal of Criminology, 50, 435-454.  
Smith, D.L. (2011). Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate 
Others. New York: St. Martin’s Press.  
Staub, E. (2000). Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and 
Reconciliation. Political Psychology, 21(2), 367-382.  
146 
 
 
Straus, S. (2004). How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An 
estimate. Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1), 85-98. 
Steidle, B., & Steidle Wallace, G. (2007). The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing 
Witness to the Genocide in Darfur. New York: PublicAffairs.  
Temple-Raston, D. (2005). Justice on the Grass: Three Rwandan Journalists, Their Trial 
for War Crimes, and a Nation’s Quest for Redemption. New York: Simon & 
Schuster.  
Thompson, A. (Ed.). (2007). The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. New York: Pluto 
Press. 
Time Magazine. (1994, May 16). “There are No Devils Left in Hell," the Missionary 
Said, "They are All in Rwanda." Time, cover page. 
Totten, S., & Ubaldo, R. (2011). We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.  
United Nations. (1948). The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/260%28III%29  
Uvin, P. (1998). Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West 
Hartford: Kumarian Press.  
Wagner, J. (2005-2006). The Systematic Use of Rape as a Tool of War in Darfur: A 
Blueprint for International War Crimes Prosecutions. Georgetown Journal of 
International Law, 37, 193-243.  
Waller, J. (2002). Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass 
Killing. New York: Oxford University Press.  
147 
 
 
Waller, J. (2012). Rape as a Tool of “Othering” in Genocide. In C. Rittner & J.K. Roth 
(Eds.), Rape: Weapon of War and Genocide (pp. 83-100). St. Paul: Paragon 
House.  
World Health Organization (2016, February). Female Genital Mutilation: Fact Sheet. 
Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/  
Yin, R. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4
th
 ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, Inc.  
Zimbardo, P. (2007). The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how Good People Turn Evil. 
New York: Random House.  
 
